







Submitted by Chaoyuan She to the University of Exeter 
as a thesis for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting 
In October 2019 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 




I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved 








This thesis consists of three empirical studies examining how social 
media are used by corporations, advocacy non-governmental organisations (A-
NGOs) and hybrid organisations to engage with stakeholders and enhance 
stakeholder accountability.   
The first study examines the use of social media by corporations to 
disclose CSR information and manage stakeholder perceptions. Drawing on 
organised hypocrisy and organisational theory and through the analysis of 
Facebook posts from S&P100 companies, this study finds that CSR actions 
disclosures attract both positive and negative stakeholder reactions. CSR talk 
and decisions disclosures generate positive reactions and reduce negative 
perceptions. It is also evident that the reputational façade in CSR disclosures 
is more likely to attract positive reactions and less likely to attract negative 
reactions than the rational façade. The progressive façade is more likely to 
attract positive reactions than the rational façade, and it is more likely to attract 
negative reactions than the reputational façade. Overall, the findings suggest 
that corporations employ various strategies in social media CSR disclosures to 
manage stakeholder perceptions and maintain legitimacy.   
 The second study examines the use of social media by A-NGOs to 
attract stakeholder engagement, and whether such engagement leads to large-
scale stakeholder support outside social media platforms. This study draws on 
Castells’ (2013) network-making power perspective and employs a unique 
dataset of Greenpeace signups (i.e. the proxy for stakeholder support) to the 
“Save the Artic” (STA) petition from over 236 countries and a sample of 8,336 
Greenpeace Facebook messages related to the STA campaigns in 29 
languages. The findings suggest that Greenpeace communicates advocacy 
information that appeals to logic and emotions to attract stakeholder 
engagement. In examining the social impacts of A-NGO social media 
engagement, the level of national stakeholder support is positively associated 
with the effectiveness of advocacy information in attracting stakeholder 
engagement at the Facebook account level. The level of global stakeholder 
support is positively associated with both the effectiveness and global 
dissemination of advocacy information at the Facebook network level. Overall, 
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this study affirms that social media can assist A-NGOs in engaging with 
stakeholders and obtaining their support on advocated issues on a large scale, 
thereby enhancing downward accountability. 
The last study focuses on the use of social media by a type of hybrid 
organisation - B Corp - and examines the effect of its governance mechanisms 
on social media engagement activities. B Corp firms face a mission drift risk in 
which financial objectives may overshadow CSR considerations. This study 
posits that B Corp’s legal responsibility, ethical standards and mission-
alignment policies positively influence the extent and quality of its social media 
engagement. After analysing CSR-related tweets posted by 1,074 U.S. B Corp 
firms certified between 2014 and 2018 and those posted by stakeholders 
towards the firm, it is found that the quality of social media engagement is 
positively associated with B Corp’s legal responsibility, ethical standards and 
mission-alignment policies. In addition, this study finds that the extent of social 
media engagement is positively associated with mission-alignment policies. 
Overall, the findings highlight the importance of B Corp’s governance 
mechanisms in improving stakeholder accountability.   
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 Background and Motivation 
Social media have become an important domain for social interaction. 
With two billion active social media users globally, people are disseminating, 
interacting, discussing and reacting to information shared by both individuals 
and organisations (Investis, 2015; Kemp, 2017). The term “social media” is 
defined as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological 
and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and 
exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). Social 
media have various forms, such as video and photo sharing (e.g. Instagram 
and Flicker), microblogs (Twitter and Weibo), and social networking (Facebook 
and LinkedIn), targeted at different user groups and supporting different types 
of media format.   
Social media are well-known for three unique features that make them 
distinctive from traditional media outlets: (1) high interactivity, (2) high 
autonomy, and (3) wide dissemination (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2018; 
Castelló, Morsing, & Schultz, 2013; Castells, 2013; Etter, Ravasi, & Colleoni, 
2019; Gómez-Carrasco, Guillamon-Saorin, & Garcia Osma, 2017; Gómez-
Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Saxton & Waters, 2014). 
Interactivity means that social media allow two-way dialogic interactions 
between disseminators and their audiences. When an audience reads an 
update from a disseminator, s/he can express reactions towards that 
information through interactive functions such as clicking emoticons, re-posting, 
and commenting beneath the message (Miller & Skinner, 2015; Saxton, 
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Gomez, Ngoh, Lin, & Dietrich, 2019). Autonomy means that social media allow 
individuals and organisations with different motives to freely produce, 
disseminate, aggregate, debate, enrich and elaborate on information without 
being restricted by limitations of traditional media outlets (Etter et al., 2019). In 
other words, the information being discussed by users on social media 
represents an authentic picture of their opinions thereby creating an open 
dialogue with other parties (Illia, Romenti, Rodríguez-Cánovas, Murtarelli, & 
Carroll, 2015). Like all other websites, social media also have the advantage of 
disseminating and pushing information to a large number of audiences, so 
organisations are able to reach stakeholders at a relatively low cost 
(Blankespoor, Miller, & White, 2014; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
The increasing popularity of social media has attracted attention from 
many accounting scholars (Lei, Li, & Luo, 2019). For example, studies to date 
have examined motives for adopting social media (Jung, Naughton, Tahoun, & 
Wang, 2018; Lee, Oh, & Kim, 2013; Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015; Zhou, Lei, Wang, 
Fan, & Wang, 2015), characteristics of corporate disclosure in social media 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Huang, Lu, & Su, 2016; Jung et al., 2018; Prokofieva, 
2014), and the impacts of firm-generated and user-generated information on 
the capital market (Bartov, Faurel, & Mohanram, 2017; Blankespoor et al., 
2014; Cade, 2018; Elliott, Grant, & Hodge, 2018; Hales, Moon, & Swenson, 
2018; Lee et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2015).  
Due to their unique dialogic nature and the ability to communicate with a 
wide range of stakeholders, it is argued that social media provide an important 
platform for undertaking large-scale stakeholder engagement (Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004). While prior studies mainly focus on the use of social media in 
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a financial context (Bartov et al., 2017; Blankespoor et al., 2014; Cade, 2018; 
Elliott et al., 2018), studies examining their use in the context of corporate social 
responsibility are scarce (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 
2017; Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Unerman 
& Bennett, 2004).  
There is also a notable absence of studies examining the use of social 
media by alternative types of organisation such as advocacy non-governmental 
organisations (A-NGOs) and hybrid organisations. A-NGOs differ from 
commercial corporations in that their purpose is to advocate for social and 
environmental issues and to lobby for policy making that will protect and 
enhance the rights of marginalised groups in society (Agyemang, O’Dwyer, & 
Unerman, 2019; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a). Since they have power to 
influence corporate and governmental policies that may affect the lives of 
numerous people, it is argued that A-NGOs have downward accountability to a 
wide range of stakeholders (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). As NGOs are 
following the trend to build a social media presence for public relation building 
and strategic communication (Lovejoy, Waters, & Saxton, 2012; Saxton & Guo, 
2014; Xu & Saxton, 2018), it is important to gain a greater insight into how social 
media may promote A-NGO downward accountability.  
Recent legislative and social innovations have also witnessed a new 
form of social enterprise called “Certified B Corporation” (B Corp) emerging in 
the market (Cao, Gehman, & Grimes, 2017; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015). 
B Corp is a certification status awarded to for-profit firms whose owners 
voluntarily pursue both financial and CSR objectives and have met rigorous 
standards regarding CSR policies and practices set out by B Lab, the certifying 
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body (Hiller, 2013; Romi, Cook, & Dixon-Fowler, 2018; Serafeim, Ward, & 
Lawrence, 2017). Due to the co-existence of financial and CSR objectives, B 
Corp firms face a mission drift risk whereby the pressure to maintain financial 
sustainability may overshadow their mission to generate CSR impacts. To 
mitigate such risk, B Lab requires B Corp firms to adopt a stakeholder-centric 
governance model in which stakeholder interests are considered during 
decision-making. Given the uniqueness of the B Corp governance model in 
promoting stakeholder accountability (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008; Cornforth, 2014; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014), it is 
important to understand the influence of its governance mechanisms in social 
media engagement activities.   
 Since stakeholder engagement is an important element in 
understanding stakeholder interests and enhancing transparency regarding 
organisational practices (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007; 
Thomson & Bebbington, 2005; Unerman & Bennett, 2004), shedding more light 
on the organisational use of social media for stakeholder engagement can help 
us better understand the role social media play in enhancing stakeholder 
accountability. The need to understand these questions have become 
particularly important in recent years due to increasing calls for greater 
accountability to stakeholders (Carroll, 2008; Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 
Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010) and the exposure of several 
scandals that have involved the use of social media for non-public interested 
purposes (Flyverbom, Deibert, & Matten, 2019; Neu, Saxton, Everett, & Shiraz, 




 Research Aim and Objectives 
 Based on the preceding discussions, the aim of this thesis is to examine 
how social media are used by organisations to engage with stakeholders and 
enhance stakeholder accountability. More specifically, this thesis focuses on 
three different types of organisation, namely corporations, A-NGOs, and B Corp 
firms, and addresses the following research questions: 
1. How do corporations use social media to engage with stakeholders 
regarding corporate social responsibility practices? 
2. How do A-NGOs use social media to engage with stakeholders and 
enhance downward accountability? 
3. What is the role of B Corp governance mechanisms in influencing social 
media engagement activities? 
 
 Main Findings 
To address the first research question, the study examines stakeholder 
perceptions with regard to legitimation strategies employed in corporate CSR 
disclosures on Facebook. Using Python and R to retrieve and analyse S&P100 
Facebook posts and their engagements activities covering periods between 
24th February 2016 and 2nd March 2017, the results show that corporations 
employ hypocrisy and façade strategies in social media CSR disclosures to 
manage stakeholder perceptions. This study also finds that disengagement 
exists between companies and stakeholders who express concerns or criticism 
about corporate CSR practices.  
To address the second research question, the study examines how A-
NGOs communicate advocacy information to stakeholders in social media in 
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order to attract their engagement, and whether such engagement can obtain 
large-scale stakeholder support beyond social media platforms. This study uses 
Python and R to retrieve and analyse a sample of 8,336 Greenpeace Facebook 
messages which are related to the “Save the Arctic” (STA) campaign, and a 
unique dataset of Greenpeace signups (i.e. the proxy for stakeholder support) 
to the STA petition is also employed. The findings reveal that Greenpeace 
communicates advocacy information that appeals to logic and emotions to 
attract stakeholder engagement on social media. The findings also reveal that 
the effectiveness and global dissemination of advocacy information can help 
Greenpeace obtain large-scale stakeholder support beyond social media 
platforms.  
To address the third research question, the study posits and examines the 
effect of B Corp legal responsibility, ethical standards and mission-alignment 
policies with regard to the extent and quality of social media engagement. Using 
Python and R to scrape and analyse CSR-related tweets posted by 1,074 U.S. 
B Corp firms certified between 2014 and 2018 and those posted by 
stakeholders towards the firm, the study shows that B Corp governance 
mechanisms positively influence social media engagement activities, thus 
enhancing stakeholder accountability. 
 
 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the relevant accounting and social media 
literature in four ways. Firstly, the whole thesis contributes to the accounting 
literature by providing evidence on how different types of organisation use 
social media to engage with stakeholders and enhance stakeholder 
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accountability. While prior studies mainly focus on the corporate use of social 
media in improving financial transparency and facilitating investor decision-
making (Blankespoor, 2018; Lei et al., 2019), very few studies examine the 
potential of social media in promoting social and environmental transparency 
and accountability (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; 
Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Neu et al., 2018). Therefore, this study explores the 
potential of social media in facilitating stakeholder engagement and helps us 
understand more about the different motives that organisations have towards 
stakeholders when using social media.  
Secondly, by exploring the corporate use of social media for stakeholder 
engagement, this study contributes to the CSR literature by revealing how 
stakeholders perceive CSR hypocrisy and façade disclosures in a social media 
context, thus extending the findings in Cho, Laine, Roberts, and Rodrigue 
(2015). Through the utilisation of interactive functions on corporate Facebook 
accounts and the use of various stakeholder reactions on Facebook as a novel 
measure of legitimacy, this study illustrates how companies attempt to maintain 
legitimacy at a social media message level and provides a detailed account of 
stakeholder perceptions towards corporate CSR disclosures, which prior 
studies have only examined at a firm level (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Bansal & 
Clelland, 2004; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan, 2014; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 
2002). By examining corporate disclosures, stakeholder reactions and firm 
subsequent replies, this study provides an overview of, and critical insights 




Thirdly, by exploring A-NGOs’ use of social media, this study contributes 
to the NGO accounting and accountability literature by highlighting the potential 
of social media in enhancing A-NGOs downward accountability (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). Employing Castells' (2011, 
2012, 2013) network-making power theory and the unique data on Greenpeace 
online petition signups, this study examines how A-NGOs communicate specific 
and emotional advocacy information in Facebook messages to invite 
stakeholders’ assessment of and opinions about advocacy activities. This study 
also documents evidence of how the effectiveness and global dissemination of 
advocacy information allows A-NGOs to obtain large-scale stakeholder support 
outside social media platforms; prior studies have only focussed on the effects 
of social media features such as hashtags, URLs or mentions within application 
platforms (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Lovejoy et al., 2012; Saxton & Waters, 2014; 
Xu & Saxton, 2018) 
Lastly, this study adds to the B Corp governance and accountability 
literature by examining the influence of B Corp governance mechanisms on 
social media engagement activities. While prior studies mainly focus on the 
effect of governance characteristics on social media activities in a conventional 
corporation context (Huang et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2013; Saxton et al., 2019; 
Yang, Liu, & Zhou, 2016), their relationship in a hybrid organisation context 
remain under-explored (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Hall 
& O’Dwyer, 2017). Given the uniqueness of the B Corp governance model in 
accommodating both shareholder and stakeholder interests (André, 2012; 
Hiller, 2013; Munch, 2012), and the increasing academic interests regarding 
governance in alternative organisational forms (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brennan 
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& Solomon, 2008; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2016), this study provides timely 
evidence about the role of B Corp governance mechanisms in improving the 
extent and quality of social media engagement and promoting stakeholder 
accountability.  
This thesis also makes several methodological contributions to the 
accounting and social media literature. Firstly, each of the first and second 
empirical studies develops a dictionary for computerized textual analysis that 
identifies social and environmental information. Prior studies often manually 
code social and environmental disclosures into different themes or categories 
(Deegan et al., 2002; Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015). However, scholars 
may face challenges in manually classifying texts from a large volume of 
unstructured data such as social media messages. By using computerized 
dictionary-based textual analysis, researchers may significantly extend the 
sample size and identify relevant information with both increased efficiency and 
effectiveness. Moreover, the use of a pre-determined dictionary increases the 
transparency and reliability of the coding process. This study therefore provides 
an empirical validation of a computerised content analysis on social and 
environmental information.  
Secondly, the third empirical study further improves the computerised 
textual analysis method by employing a machine-learning approach. While 
machine-learning classification has been used in the analysis of financial 
reports (Huang, Zang, & Zheng, 2014; Li, 2010), very few studies apply this 
method in a social and environmental accounting context. Since machine 
learning classification does not require a dictionary to be determined 
beforehand, it offers more flexibility and higher accuracy when classifying 
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information with no consistent pattern or expression. Therefore, this study 
contributes to the social and environmental accounting literature by providing 
an empirical illustration of the use of machine learning algorithm in classifying 
big data. 
Lastly, this study contributes to the stakeholder engagement literature 
by developing a social media engagement quality index. Employing the 
effective communication model proposed in Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2018), 
the third empirical study develops an index for measuring the quality of social 
media engagement on CSR-related issues and provides a detailed picture of 
how organisations engage with stakeholders in different quality dimensions. 
This quality index can be used for future relevant studies.  
 
 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present a major 
research study which focuses on each of the three research questions 
discussed in Section 1.2. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the whole thesis, 
discusses the limitations of the study, and explores future research 




2 Managing Stakeholder Perceptions: Organised 
Hypocrisy and Organisational Façade in CSR 
reporting on Facebook 1 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this empirical study is to examine how corporations use social 
media to engage with stakeholders regarding corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices. In the article titled: Organised hypocrisy, organisational 
façades, and sustainability reporting. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 
40, 78-94, Cho, Laine, Roberts, and Rodrigue (2015) propose the use of 
organisational façade theory (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008) and organised 
hypocrisy strategies (Brunsson, 1989, 2007) to analyse CSR reporting. Their 
approach differs from the two main competing explanations of CSR reporting – 
legitimacy and signalling theory – in that they argue that companies use 
hypocrisy talk, decisions and actions to erect rational, progressive and 
reputational façades in order to meet divergent and sometimes conflicting 
stakeholder interests. In this case, managers aim to “camouflage” corporate 
practices (Michelon, Pilonato, Ricceri, & Roberts, 2016) by supplying talk to one 
party, decisions to another, and actions to the third (Brunsson, 1989, p. 27). 
Cho et al. (2015) use annual reports from two oil companies and stand-alone 
CSR reports as empirical cases, and present evidence on the corporate use of 
façade and hypocrisy strategies in CSR discourses. Specifically, they argue 
                                            
1  The data from this chapter forms the basis of the article titled “Managing stakeholder 
perceptions: Organized hypocrisy in CSR disclosures on Facebook”, co-authored with 
Giovanna Michelon. This paper was submitted to Critical Perspectives on Accounting and was 
accepted and published after two rounds of reviews in 2019.  
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that talk and decisions can be used to build façades which influence 
stakeholder assessments of CSR performance, and in turn, these shape 
positive perceptions towards corporate actions. However, their study focuses 
on the use of hypocrisy strategies to build façades from a corporate perspective, 
and assumes that these strategies can affect stakeholder perceptions. Whether 
and how stakeholder perceptions are influenced by façade and hypocrisy 
strategies remain open to question.  
In recent years, corporations have increasingly adopted social media 
(such as Facebook, Twitter, etc.) as platforms to engage with stakeholders and 
disclose CSR information (Arnaboldi, Busco, & Cuganesan, 2017; Saxton et al., 
2019; Zhou et al., 2015). By the end of 2015, 95% of FTSE100 and all S&P100 
companies had created at least one social media account for corporate 
communications (Investis, 2015). While prior CSR research mainly focuses on 
corporate reporting strategies in annual reports (Deegan et al., 2002; Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998), stand-alone sustainability 
reports (Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva, 2008; Diouf & Boiral, 2017; 
Michelon et al., 2015), and corporate websites (Cho, Phillips, Hageman, & 
Patten, 2009; Coupland, 2006; Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, & de Sousa Filho, 
2008), only a few studies have looked at corporate CSR disclosures through 
social media (Castelló, Etter, & Nielsen, 2016; Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco 
et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Saxton et al., 2019). Clearly, studies that 
examine dynamic corporate-stakeholder interactions remain scarce (Saxton et 
al., 2019).  
Previous literature often implicitly assumes that, by employing various 
legitimation strategies (Cho, 2009; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; 
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O’Donovan, 2002), or increasing the level of biased disclosures (Cho, Guidry, 
Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Deegan et al., 2002; Michelon, 2011; Patten, 2002), 
can the perceptions of stakeholders be successfully managed (Deegan, 2002). 
However, insights into how stakeholders respond to corporate disclosure 
strategies are under-explored and the evidence is unclear (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2017). In studies which have attempted to explore these insights 
using a large-scale quantitative method, stakeholder perceptions are often 
indirectly measured by proxies such as media exposure (Aerts & Cormier, 
2009), reputation scores (Cho et al., 2012) and the use of exogenous shocks 
such as legitimacy-threatening events (Patten, 1992). In studies whose aim is 
to assess direct stakeholder reactions towards corporate legitimation 
strategies, small sample experiments are often used (Milne & Patten, 2002) and 
very few use large sample archival data. In order to examine stakeholder 
reactions towards CSR façade and hypocrisy disclosure strategies directly, this 
chapter explores social media interactions between companies and their 
stakeholders at a Facebook message level. To shed more light on this area, 
this study asks two research questions: (1) how do stakeholders perceive the 
hypocrisy strategies utilised in corporate CSR reporting? And (2) how do 
stakeholders perceive the façades that companies erect? 
 Using programming languages such as Python and R, this study 
retrieves and analyses S&P100 Facebook posts and their engagement 
activities covering periods between 24th February 2016 and 2nd March 2017. 
Using both the Negative Binomial and Logit models and controlling for both 
message and account characteristics, this study finds that stakeholders react 
differently towards hypocrisy and façade strategies. With regard to hypocrisy 
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strategies, talk disclosures are more likely to attract positive reactions, but less 
likely to attract negative reactions and negative comments. It is more likely that 
decisions disclosures attract positive and negative reactions than non-CSR 
posts. Actions disclosures are generally associated with greater stakeholder 
general reactions, and they are more likely to attract positive and negative 
reactions than non-CSR posts and CSR talk and decisions disclosures. The 
findings on talk and decisions disclosures are consistent with organised 
hypocrisy theory in which corporate talk and decisions can partially satisfy 
conflicting stakeholder interests and reduce negative perceptions (Brunsson, 
2007; Cho et al., 2015). However, the diversified stakeholder reactions to 
actions disclosure may reflect the divergent and sometimes conflicting 
stakeholder interests that companies face. Although talk and decisions 
disclosures can help satisfy stakeholder interests by mitigating their negative 
reactions, the intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for actions 
disclosures than for talk and decisions disclosures, suggesting stakeholders 
place more value on corporate CSR actions-related information. In contrast to 
prior literature which asserts that hard information attracts firm legitimacy (Aerts 
& Cormier, 2009), actions disclosures are also more likely to attract negative 
reactions than talk and decisions disclosures, implying that corporate legitimacy 
is not driven by actions information per se, but also by the supply of talk and 
decisions information to meet divergent stakeholder interests.  
 In terms of the organisational façade strategies, reputational façade is 
more likely to attract positive reactions and less likely to attract negative 
reactions than rational façade. This finding indicates that stakeholders prefer to 
read corporate disclosures that promote a positive corporate image. The 
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progressive façade, however, is more likely than the rational façade to attract 
positive reactions, but at the same time, it is more likely to attract negative 
reactions than the reputational façade, suggesting that although some 
stakeholders may welcome the progression of companies towards their 
committed goals, others may still criticise the inadequacy of such efforts.  
 This study also conducts an additional analysis to explore subsequent 
company response to stakeholder comments. The findings reveal that 
companies may be engaging with stakeholders selectively as they are more 
likely to reply to positive stakeholder comments. However, such likelihood 
becomes negative in the presence of a high intensity of positive emotions. The 
results suggest that companies probably reinforce the creation of their 
hypocrisy and façade, and a disengagement exists between companies and 
stakeholders who have concerns or criticisms of corporate CSR practices 
(Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016). 
 This chapter contributes to the CSR literature in four respects. Firstly, it 
explores how stakeholders perceive CSR hypocrisy and façade disclosures in 
a social media context, thus extending the findings of Cho et al., (2015). 
Through the utilisation of interactive functions on corporate Facebook accounts, 
this study reveals the legitimacy-maintaining processes of companies at a 
social media message level, which prior studies have only been conducted at 
a firm level (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Cho & Patten, 
2007; Deegan, 2014; Deegan et al., 2002).  
Secondly, instead of using indirect measures of corporate legitimacy, 
such as reputation rankings or media exposure, this study relies on stakeholder 
reactions to corporate disclosures on Facebook. Legitimacy is a concept 
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grounded in stakeholder perceptions (Suchman, 1995) which is typically difficult 
to measure accurately in an archival-type of study. Since social media allow 
stakeholders to directly express their opinions and emotional reactions towards 
corporate disclosures, stakeholder reactions in social media become a novel 
proxy for legitimacy, revealing rich and direct details of how stakeholders 
perceive firms’ CSR disclosures. 
In addition, this study also makes a methodological contribution as it 
develops a CSR dictionary for computerised textual analysis that identifies 
CSR-related information. Prior studies often manually code CSR disclosures 
into different themes or categories (Deegan et al., 2002; Michelon et al., 2015). 
However, scholars may face challenges in manually classifying CSR-related 
information from a large volume of unstructured data in social media. By using 
computerised dictionary-based textual analysis, researchers may significantly 
extend the sample size and identify relevant information with both increased 
efficiency and effectiveness (Lewis & Young, 2019). Moreover, the use of a pre-
determined dictionary increases the transparency and reliability of the coding 
process. As a result, this study provides an empirical validation of a CSR 
dictionary and illustrates its use in a computerised content analysis. 
Lastly, this study contributes to stakeholder engagement literature by 
revealing the dynamic interactions among firm disclosures, stakeholder 
reactions and firms’ subsequent replies. Previous literature either focused on 
the content of disclosures in social media (Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco et 
al., 2017; Saxton et al., 2019) or the engagement activities in comments per se 
(Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016). This study provides an 
overview of, and critical insights about, this dynamic engagement. The 
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generally positive reactions obtained from corporate posts suggest little 
opposition from stakeholders. In addition, the lack of firms’ replies to negative 
comments points toward a selective engagement strategy. Hence, it appears 
that the use of hypocrisy and façade disclosure strategies in social media allows 
firms to manage stakeholder perceptions and maintain legitimacy. 
 This chapter consists of five sections. Section 2.2 discusses the relevant 
literature on legitimacy measures and provides an overview of corporate use of 
social media in recent years. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework 
and hypotheses. Section 2.4 discusses the research design. Section 2.5 
presents the empirical findings. And lastly, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter 
by firstly exploring managerial implications, then discussing limitations and 
lastly providing recommendations for future research.   
 
 Literature Review  
 Legitimacy and Stakeholder Perceptions 
Legitimacy is defined as the perception of society that an organisation 
will act consistently with societal norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Hence, 
legitimacy is based on how society perceives corporate actions rather than the 
actual activities that are undertaken (Nasi, Nasi, Phillips, & Zyglidopoulos, 
1997). However, since “society” is a broad umbrella term, it is argued that 
corporate legitimacy is based on how stakeholders perceive the company 
(O’Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995). If a company’s actions are perceived as 
being congruent with social expectations, this entity will be conferred the right 
to continue operating within society (O’Donovan, 2002). Otherwise, its 
legitimacy can also be withdrawn, so its survival is at risk. Consequently, 
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legitimacy is an important resource which companies seek in order to survive, 
and maintaining positive perceptions from stakeholders ensures the continued 
supply of this key resource (Deegan, 2002; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).  
Because legitimacy is based on stakeholder perceptions, it is subject to 
manipulation through various legitimation and disclosure strategies (Cho, 
2009). Extensive work in the social and environmental accounting literature has 
attempted to investigate the relationship between the effects of corporate 
legitimacy and CSR disclosure strategies through the use of various measures 
and methods (Deegan, 2002). After reviewing relevant studies in the accounting 
literature, the methods used are grouped into four categories: (1) legitimacy 
threatening events, (2) CSR ratings, (3) media exposures and (4) experiments.2 
 The first group of research uses legitimacy threatening events as an 
indication of a mismatch between social expectations and corporate operations. 
For example, Patten (1992) considers the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 
1989 and finds that environmental disclosures of oil companies increase after 
the event. Similarly, Vourvachis, Woodward, Woodward, and Patten (2016) use 
airline accidents as legitimacy threatening events and document a significant 
increase of airline companies’ CSR disclosures after the accidents. Although 
the use of threatening events provides opportunities to study corporate 
responses when there is a need to repair legitimacy, these studies tend to focus 
on changes in disclosure volumes rather than effects of disclosure strategies 
on restoring legitimacy. 
                                            
2 There is also a group of research which focuses on the legitimacy effect of CSR disclosures 
on the capital market. For example, the commonly used measures as a result of legitimacy 
include unsystematic risks (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), the cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & 
Yang, 2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), and firm value (Plumlee, Brown, 




 The second group of research uses CSR ratings/rankings as a proxy of 
legitimacy. These ratings are constructed by third parties through the 
assessment of CSR reporting practices or interviews of relevant stakeholders, 
industry experts and corporate managers. Some rankings may cover a broad 
range of sustainability issues such as Fortune Most Admired Scores (Brown, 
Guidry, & Patten, 2009; Williams & Barrett, 2000), while others focus on a 
specific area, such as community (Toms, 2002) and environment (Cho et al., 
2012). CSR ratings/rankings provide some insights into how stakeholders 
perceive companies after assessing CSR disclosures, but interviewees (namely 
industry experts or CEOs) may not represent the views of the broader 
stakeholder group. What is more, corporate reputation measures (such as 
Newsweek’s Green Rankings) also suffers from a “financial halo effect”, 
whereby financial performance influences corporate reputations, making this a 
less reliable measure of social legitimacy (Guidry & Patten, 2010).   
 The third group of literature uses media exposure as a measure of 
legitimacy. It is argued that news media play a key role in directing public 
concerns and shaping stakeholder perceptions towards various topics (Deegan 
et al., 2002). Among these studies, the most common method is to count the 
number of press articles reported about an issue or a company (Brown & 
Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002). However, some scholars argue that using 
the total number of articles may not consider the imbalanced effects of positive 
and negative news on legitimacy. To mitigate this problem, Aerts and Cormier 
(2009) and Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari (2008) use the Janis-Fadner 
coefficient (Janis & Fadner, 1943) to adjust the imbalanced effects of favourable 
and unfavourable news. These studies shed valuable light on how the tone of 
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media changes after the disclosure of specific information. Nevertheless, news 
media often set agendas which they deem to be of public concern (Brosius & 
Weimann, 1996). Thus, the use of press articles to measure legitimacy may 
only reflect agendas set by editors and media journalists (or companies 
themselves through press releases) rather than those of the stakeholders (Etter 
et al., 2019).  
 In summary, the studies outlined above employ various indirect proxies 
to measure legitimacy. However, most of these studies do not trace how 
legitimacy changes in response to the legitimation strategies used in CSR 
disclosures. In fact, prior studies often implicitly assume that by employing 
various legitimation strategies (Cho, 2009; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 
1994; O’Donovan, 2002), corporate legitimacy can be successfully gained, 
maintained or repaired. Insights into how stakeholders respond to disclosure 
strategies remain unclear (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2017). Since stakeholder 
perceptions are often reflected in stakeholder reactions towards CSR 
information, and such reactions can be both behavioural (e.g. buying rival 
products) and/or emotional (expressing sentiments), positive stakeholder 
reactions may indicate that corporate legitimacy has been obtained or 
maintained. Otherwise, if stakeholders perceive corporate activities are 
inconsistent with social expectations, they will show negative reactions, causing 
corporate legitimacy to be at risk.  
 In order to directly assess stakeholder reactions towards CSR 
disclosures, prior studies have used a variety of experiments. For example, 
experimental studies have been conducted to reveal stakeholder reactions 
through investment decisions (Milne & Patten, 2002; van der Laan Smith, 
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Adhikari, Tondkar, & Andrews, 2010), the level of trust and trust intentions 
towards companies (Cho et al., 2009), and stakeholders’ responses after 
reading corporate communication (Elsbach, 1994). However, these 
experiments may suffer from problems such as the selection of participants not 
representing the actual stakeholder groups of companies and the use of 
monetary incentives (Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002). Therefore, in order to 
directly analyse stakeholder reactions towards each type of disclosure made by 
companies, we need to consider a platform in which stakeholders can directly 
engage with corporate disclosures, and social media fit this purpose. 
 
 Social Media and Stakeholder Reactions 
Social media are well-known for three unique features that offer a 
potential environment for stakeholder engagement: high interactivity, high 
autonomy and wide dissemination (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2018; Castelló et 
al., 2013; Castells, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Gómez-Carrasco & 
Michelon, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Saxton & Waters, 2014). Interactivity 
means that social media allow two-way dialogic interactions between 
disseminators and audiences. When an audience reads an update from a 
disseminator, s/he can express reactions towards that information through 
interactive functions such as clicking emoticons, re-posting and commenting 
under the message. Autonomy means that audiences can freely express 
reactions or disseminate information without being controlled or influenced by 
other parties. In other words, what is being discussed by stakeholders on social 
media is out of the reach of companies, providing an authentic picture of 
stakeholder opinions, so an open dialogue with corporations can be established 
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(Illia et al., 2015). Social media also allow corporate disclosures to reach a wide 
range of audiences, allowing the engagement of stakeholders with divergent 
interests (Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
Facebook is one the of most popular social media sites that are used by 
companies to engage with stakeholders (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017). It can also 
be seen as a public arena where divergent stakeholder interests are present 
and debated (Whelan, Moon, & Grant, 2013). Due to the presence of divergent 
interests, companies may employ legitimation strategies in the messages they 
disseminate to stakeholders. Unlike microblog sites such as Twitter, Facebook 
posts are not restricted to 140 characters, and its layout gives users a more 
intuitive outlook of people’s reactions and comments than Twitter. Furthermore, 
on 24th February 2016, in addition to the “Like” button, Facebook introduced 
five additional emoticons: “Love”, “Haha” “Wow”, “Sad” and “Angry” (Facebook, 
2016), making it an even more dynamic and interactive system for stakeholder 
engagement (Saxton & Waters, 2014).  
 The growing popularity of social media has also inspired the research 
community to investigate its impact on stakeholder reactions. For example, 
studies have examined market participants’ reactions to corporate financial 
disclosures on social media (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Cade, 2018; Du & Jiang, 
2015; Lee et al., 2015; Yang & Liu, 2017) and people’s reactions to public 
relation strategies (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Guo & Saxton, 2018; Lovejoy et al., 
2012; Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010). Some studies have also explored how social 
media affect stakeholder sentiments, but their analyses are conducted at the 
static firm level (Castelló et al., 2016; Eberle, Berens, & Li, 2013; Guo & Saxton, 
2018; Lee et al., 2013; Vo, Xiao, & Ho, 2019). While the dynamism between 
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corporations and stakeholders occurring at a message level is still under-
explored (Saxton et al., 2019; Saxton & Waters, 2014), it is also likely that this 
area can reveal more insights into how stakeholder perceptions change in 
response to corporate disclosures.  
 
 Theoretical Framework: Organisational Façade and 
Organised Hypocrisy 
 Organisational Façade 
In their recently published article, Cho et al. (2015) suggest using 
organisational façade theory (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008) and organised 
hypocrisy strategies (Brunsson, 1989, 2007) to explain CSR reporting. By 
moving beyond the usual focus of CSR reporting literature on signalling or 
legitimacy theory, they argue that companies use hypocrisy talk, decisions, and 
actions disclosures to erect rational, progressive, and reputational façades due 
to the presence of divergent and sometimes conflicting stakeholder interests. 
In order to gain and maintain corporate legitimacy within the society, managers 
have to “camouflage” corporate practices (Michelon et al., 2016) by supplying 
talk to one party, decisions to another, and actions to the third (Brunsson, 1989, 
p. 27). 
Organisational façades are defined as “symbolic fronts erected by 
organisational participants designed to reassure their organisation’s 
stakeholders of the legitimacy of the organisations and its management” 
(Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008, p. 437). There are three façades which can be 
erected to meet divergent stakeholder expectations: rational, progressive, and 
reputational. A rational façade shows that organisational decision-making is the 
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result of rationality. It is accompanied by both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence to demonstrate that managerial decisions are the results of cost and 
benefit analysis, which is a fundamental behaviour required for modern 
organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Through the erection of a rational 
façade, managers can hide problems within the organisation, thus maintaining 
organisational legitimacy while also giving managers time to find better 
solutions (Abrahamson, 2002). Managers can also use the rational façade as a 
justification for their prior decisions or actions to convince stakeholders that the 
solutions produced are the optimal outcomes under the current state 
(Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008).  
A progressive façade exhibits an organisation’s progression towards its 
committed goals and objectives. It is often evidenced by the employment of 
future-oriented language and the demonstration of continuous improvements in 
practices. In the context of corporate social and environmental responsibility, 
progressive façade can play both symbolic and substantive roles (Abrahamson 
& Baumard, 2008). Managers can erect progressive façade to symbolically 
demonstrate the company’s ongoing progress in solving sustainability 
challenges to stakeholders, for example, by implementing the state-of-the-art 
technologies, programmes and initiatives, while at the same time maintaining 
the status-quo without initiating any change to organisation practices (Cho et 
al., 2015). Nevertheless, for those managers who indeed want to tackle social 
and environmental problems, progressive façade can help managers meet 
stakeholder demands by relieving the urgency on an issue and lend managers 
extra time to experiment with various solutions.   
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A reputational façade often uses languages that reflect corporate visions 
and values and utilises various accounting and disclosure mechanisms to build 
a positive corporate image. For example, inclusion in the sustainability indices 
or receipt of an industry excellence award presents a façade towards 
stakeholders about companies’ commitments to sustainability issues (Cho et 
al., 2015). Reputational façade can also be used as a shield to camouflage 
immoral actions. For example, oil companies may demonstrate their 
environmental commitments in sustainability reports while lobbying for the 
passage of Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Bill at the backstage (Cho, 
Laine, Roberts, & Rodrigue, 2016). 
 
 Organised Hypocrisy 
To build façades, managers utilise talk, decisions, and actions as tools 
of legitimacy (Cho et al., 2015, p. 82). According to the traditional decision and 
administrative theory, people often assume a causal relationship among talk, 
decisions, and actions (Brunsson, 1993). Talk can directly or indirectly lead to 
corresponding actions. For example, managers can directly use talk to 
demonstrate corporate values, ethics, goals and objectives so that employees 
in the organisation can act consistently with such talk. Alternatively, 
management can make decisions in accordance with the previous talk, which 
will, in turn, increase the likelihood of corresponding actions (Brunsson, 2007, 
p. 112). However, Brunsson (2007) argues that the traditional model may not 
work well in a modern organisation as it often faces multiple stakeholder groups 
who have divergent, sometimes conflicting, values and interests. In this case, 
some interests may be common among many stakeholder groups, but some 
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may be incompatible. It is even possible that one stakeholder group’s interest 
is completely opposed to the interests held by other stakeholder groups 
(Godfrey, 2005). Consequently, following the traditional decision and 
administrative model may lead to a situation where the interest of one group of 
stakeholder is completely satisfied but leaves all others dissatisfied (Brunsson, 
2007, p. 116). One example will be the desire for maximising profits at the costs 
of significant environmental damages. 
Brunsson (1993, 2007) argues that the organised hypocrisy model can 
handle divergent stakeholder interests because the unidirectional relation 
between talk, decisions and actions will assign a “related value” to talk and 
decisions. This means that the stronger the belief in talk and decisions 
controlling actions, the greater the relevance and value of talk and decisions. 
Consequently, the “related value” of talk and decisions can give managers an 
opportunity to manage divergent stakeholder perceptions without undergoing 
any costly actions. Through the use of talk and decisions to compensate for the 
inconsistent actions or vice versa, the relationship among the three becomes 
counter-coupling instead of decoupling (Lipson, 2007). Hypocrisy can, 
therefore, help maintain the legitimacy of companies and manage the 
perceptions of some stakeholder groups by only disclosing talk and decisions. 




Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for Organised Hypoc risy and 
Organisational Façade in CSR Disclosures 
 
Research to date have only focused on whether and how companies 
employ organised hypocrisy to erect organisational façade. For instance, Cho 
et al. (2015) use discourse analysis to study oil and gas companies’ annual and 
sustainability reports, and they find that companies use talk, decisions and 
actions disclosures to erect different façades and manage conflicting 
stakeholder demands. In their subsequent study, by employing an innovative 
database of US political contributions, Cho et al. (2016) find that oil and gas 
companies act inconsistently with their talk disclosures, hence proving 
organisational use of hypocrisy strategies. Because both studies examine 
organised hypocrisy strategies from a corporation perspective and assume that 
the strategies can affect stakeholder perceptions, the questions on how 
stakeholders perceive hypocrisy strategies and the façades remain unexplored. 
Therefore, this chapter asks the following two research questions: (1) how do 
stakeholders perceive the hypocrisy strategies utilised in CSR reporting? And 




 Hypotheses Development for RQ1 
 The first research question relates to how stakeholders perceive the 
hypocrisy strategies utilised in CSR reporting. Prior studies suggest that talk 
and decisions disclosures may have positive effects on stakeholder 
perceptions. For example, Bansal and Clelland (2004) find that firms with low 
environmental legitimacy can reduce their unsystematic risks by expressing 
environmental commitments, suggesting financial stakeholders attach value to 
talk and decisions. Similarly, in an experimental setting, Milne and Patten 
(2002) document that, in the presence of mandatory negative environmental 
disclosures, the provision of additional, voluntary positive environmental 
disclosures, such as company commitments and forward-looking disclosures, 
positively affect investment allocation by investors who focus on long-term 
strategies and environmental issues. Using an archival approach, Cho et al. 
(2012) find a positive association between environmental disclosures and both 
environmental reputation scores and the membership in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, even in the presence of poor environmental performance, 
suggesting that reputation appears to be driven more by what companies say 
than what they do. 
While Brunsson (2007) argues that talk and decisions normally reach 
wider stakeholder groups than actions, whether and how stakeholders react to 
these disclosures is not theoretically clear. He notes that stakeholders can be 
“idealists” or “materialists” (Brunsson, 2007, p. 117). If stakeholders are 
“idealists”, they perceive the image that firms construct as a highly admirable 
standing. They believe that talk and decisions are important on their own, and 
their demands can be partially fulfilled by corporate talk and decisions. As a 
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result, talk and decisions may shape stakeholders’ positive attitudes and/or 
mitigate their negative concerns. However, if stakeholders are “materialists”, 
they are aware of possible discrepancies among talk, decisions and actions. In 
this case, if organizations make talk and decisions disclosures rather than 
actions disclosures, “materialist” stakeholders know that the likelihood of 
corresponding actions is significantly low since talk and decisions are seen as 
merely empty words (Brunsson, 2007). As a result, these stakeholders would 
ignore talk and decisions. Following this stream of argument, I develop the 
following hypothesis for CSR talk and decisions disclosures: 
H1a. CSR talk and decisions disclosures are positively associated 
with positive stakeholder reactions. 
 
Traditionally, CSR literature assumes that stakeholders generally 
perceive corporate actions disclosures being more credible than corporate talk 
and decisions disclosures. Prior literature on the quality of CSR reporting 
documents that firms are more likely to report information on general 
expectations for the future than the results and outcomes of plans (Michelon et 
al., 2015), highlighting the scarce use of actions-disclosure by firms. Such a 
lack of focus on actions and outcomes mirrors a lack of comprehensiveness 
(Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor, & Christiaens, 2011), which 
conveys little substantive information for assessment. Because actions reflect 
activities that companies are doing and/or have undertaken, the information is 
verifiable and hence more credible. Given how much boilerplate information is 
disclosed in CSR reports (Michelon et al., 2015), stakeholders may react 
positively when they spot actions-related information. Some empirical studies 
also support such a view. For example, Aerts and Cormier (2009) find that 
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media legitimacy is only driven by quantitative instead of qualitative disclosures. 
Similarly, Brown et al. (2009) find that the relationship between sustainability 
report quality and corporate perceived reputation (measured using Fortune 
Most Admired Scores) is significant only for good performers, who are more 
likely to disclose hard, actions-related information. When actions are insufficient 
to meet or contrary to the expectations of stakeholders, managers simply 
choose not to disclose them (Neu et al., 1998). Consequently, actions 
disclosures are more likely to attract positive stakeholder reactions, which lead 
to the following hypothesis: 
H2a. CSR actions disclosures are positively associated with positive 
stakeholder reactions. 
 
However, in Brunsson's (2007) hypocrisy model, firms can disclose 
actions to different stakeholder groups even though these actions may still be 
in progress or fall short of the expectations of some stakeholders. In this 
situation, because of the divergent and conflicting stakeholder demands that 
corporations face, the provision of actions disclosures to one group of 
stakeholders may attract negative reactions from another group. Along these 
lines, Groening and Kanuri (2013) document that, in the presence of positive 
social action for a group of stakeholders, investors do not reward the firm. Given 
the presence of different stakeholder groups in social media (Gómez-Carrasco 
& Michelon, 2017), the disclosure of actions information may also attract 
negative reactions from other stakeholder groups, hence the formulation of the 
following hypothesis: 
H2b. CSR actions disclosures are positively associated with 




Finally, the intensity of stakeholder reactions may be different for talk and 
decisions versus actions disclosures. Talk and decisions disclosures are 
related to corporate visions and intentions, which are normally qualitative and 
soft, while actions disclosures relate to results and outcomes, which are usually 
quantitative and hard (Michelon et al., 2015). On one hand, all talk, decisions 
and actions disclosures can affect stakeholder perceptions to a certain degree. 
For instance, Cho and Patten (2007) compare the level of monetary and non-
monetary disclosures made by firms from environmentally sensitive and non-
sensitive industries. They find that in non-environmentally sensitive industries, 
poorer environmental performers disclose more non-monetary environmental 
disclosures than their better-performing counterparts. However, in 
environmentally sensitive industries, the level of soft disclosure is similar both 
for poor and good performers. These findings suggest that stakeholders from 
non-sensitive industries are less demanding, therefore talk and decisions 
disclosures are sufficient in meeting their expectations. However, stakeholders 
in environmentally sensitive industries may not be satisfied with only talk and 
decisions disclosures: they need more concrete corporate actions (i.e. 
monetary information). On the other hand, if stakeholders attach importance to 
all talk, decisions actions and actions disclosures are in fact perceived as more 
credible because they use quantitative and verifiable information, then the 
disclosure of talk and decisions may affect stakeholder perceptions to a lesser 
extent than disclosure on actions. Prior empirical studies provide evidence 
supporting this expectation. For example, Toms (2002) documents that general 
rhetoric can significantly increase corporate reputation when firms change from 
non-disclosure to the disclosure of corporate commitments. However, extra talk 
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and decisions disclosure have no effect on reputation until firms start disclosing 
quantifiable statements regarding the implementation and the monitoring of 
policies and targets. Therefore, stakeholders perceive actions more positively 
than talk and decisions, but talk and decisions are also effective in managing 
stakeholder perceptions per se. Thus, the third hypothesis has been developed 
as follows: 
H3. The intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for CSR actions 
disclosures than CSR talk and decisions disclosures. 
 
 Hypotheses Development for RQ2 
The second research question relates to how stakeholders perceive the 
façades that companies try to construct. Because there is no prior empirical 
study that investigates how each façade influences legitimacy, this study relies 
on the following theoretical model to develop the hypotheses. Although 
Abrahamson and Baumard (2008) do not explicitly rank the effect of each 
façade on stakeholder perceptions, their framework appears to imply a pecking 
order of importance which is outlined below.  
Firstly, a rational façade is essential in gaining market legitimacy, and 
this is a basic organisational behaviour expected by stakeholders (Cho et al., 
2015). By incorporating rationalised elements into organisational structures, 
companies are able to gain legitimacy and increase their chance of survival 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Since all modern corporations are expected to behave 
rationally, the extent to which the rational façade influences stakeholder 
perceptions is expected to be minimal among the three façades.   
Secondly, a reputational façade is constructed by displaying symbols, 
mission statements and values to shape positive images about a company 
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(Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008; Cho et al., 2015). Compared to the rational 
façade which is constructed to show justification for a short-term managerial 
decision or action, the reputational façade demonstrates a company’s long-term 
commitments to stakeholder demands, especially for those who are “idealists” 
and “spectators” since they attach importance to corporate values and 
commitments (Brunsson, 2007). Because the reputational façade helps 
companies to shape a positive image, it is expected that this attracts more 
positive reactions than the rational façade.  
Lastly, a progressive façade is constructed to demonstrate progression 
towards corporate long-term goals and objectives. Abrahamson and Baumard 
(2008) argue that the progressive façade not only contains the element of 
rationality but also reflects the status of progress. They suggest that the 
progressive façade can play three roles: (1) to camouflage the status quo; (2) 
to show progress symbolically; and (3) to facilitate substantive progression 
towards long-term commitments. Due to its potential for organisational change, 
stakeholders may perceive the progressive façade as more acceptable than the 
reputational façade because the reputational façade may be purely symbolic, 
while the progressive façade may accompany substantive achievements 
despite the size of significance (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). 
Furthermore, the progressive façade may also play a role in bridging between 
the rational and reputational façades, thereby easing stakeholder 
dissatisfaction and winning their approval (Cho et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the 
possible symbolic use of the progressive façade may lead to negative reactions. 
Since some stakeholders have completely different interests and some may not 
know what is truly happening behind the façade, this might attract more 
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negative reactions and greater suspicion than the other two façades. In light of 
these arguments, the following hypotheses are stated below: 
H4a. The intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for the CSR 
reputational façade than the CSR rational façade. 
H4b. The intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for the CSR 
progressive façade than CSR rational and reputational façades. 
 
 
 Research Design 
 Sample and Data Collection 
This study uses Facebook to examine the research questions because 
stakeholders’ use of novel emoticons on this platform can reveal useful details 
about their perceptions towards organisations. This study assumes that 
subscribers who follow an organisation’s Facebook page are company 
stakeholders as they voluntarily subscribe to corporate updates. S&P100 
companies are selected as the sample because this index represents the most 
visible companies in the US. Being highly visible, they face more divergent 
stakeholder demands than smaller companies and have made significant 
investments in social media (Investis, 2015). The sample period covers 24th 
February 2016 to 2nd March 2017: the choice of the start date for this sample 
period is related to the introduction of new emoticons on Facebook.   
The unit of analysis in this study is each Facebook post, which includes 
disclosures posted by companies during the sample period. To retrieve 
corporate posts, the Facebook link on corporate websites was firstly identified, 
and if unavailable, a search on Facebook for corporate pages was then 
conducted. Out of the S&P 100 companies, 16 companies either had no 
Facebook account or no content was posted during the sample period. A 
Python script was then used to download all historical post data from the 
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Facebook application programming interface (API). The retrieved data include 
the text of the published message, the publication date, the total number of 
shares, total number of emoticons (six emotions: ‘like’, ‘love’, ‘haha’, ‘wow’, 
‘sad’ and ‘angry’), the number of comments and the text of comments under 
each post.3 Three companies were further excluded from the sample due to 
missing data, which leaves a total of 81 companies with an overall 21,166 
observations in the final sample. Appendix A provides a list of companies 
included in the study. 
Next, textual analysis was performed to identify CSR-related posts. 
Computerised textual analysis is gaining in popularity in the analysis of 
accounting narratives as it allows researchers to process a large amount of 
unstructured data with greater efficiency (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). 
Following a “bag of words” approach (Loughran & McDonald, 2011), a 
dictionary (Appendix B) from GRI reporting guidelines and (KLD, 2013) was 
then devised which categorise posts into CSR (N = 7,104) and non-CSR posts 
(N = 14,062). Posts were then manually checked to eliminate any 
misclassification. Finally, manual coding of CSR-related posts 4  was then 
carried out, classifying them into three hypocrisy strategies - talk, decisions and 
actions disclosures - and the three façades - rational, progressive and 
reputational - using the coding guideline provided in Appendix B.5 
                                            
3 Total comments retrieved were 1,525,955 firm-time observations. Comment data include post 
id, comment id, parent comment id, comment texts, identity of comment author, time published 
and the number of likes a comment received. However, due to the new EU General Data 
Protection Regulation coming into effect in May 2018, comment author identity will not be 
publicly available after February 2018. 
4 The coding procedures were conducted and repeated in April, June and August 2017 to 
ensure consistent outcomes. 
5 The Cronbach Alpha was computed to check the internal consistency for hypocrisy and façade 
coding over three different time periods (April, June and August 2017). The Cronbach Alpha for 




 Empirical Model 
In order to test H1, H2a/b, the full sample (N = 21,166) is considered, 
and non-CSR disclosures are used as the baseline to capture the average level 
of stakeholder reactions when they read non-CSR disclosures. The model is 
specified as follows: 
STAK_REACTIONS = β0 + β1ACTIONS + β2TALK + β3DECISIONS + β4SIZE 
                                  + β5CHARACTER_LOG + β6URL + β7HASHTAG  
                                  + β8VISUALS + Firm Fixed Effect + ε
(2.1) 
To test H3, the effects of CSR actions disclosures versus CSR talk and 
decisions disclosures are compared. The sample is therefore restricted to CSR-
related posts (N = 7,104), and the model uses CSR talk and decision 
disclosures as the baseline to compare the effects of CSR actions disclosures 
on stakeholder reactions. The model for H3 is specified as: 
STAK_REACTIONS = β0 + β1ACTIONS + β2SIZE + β3CHARACTER_LOG  
                                  + β4URL + β5HASHTAG + β6VISUALS + Firm Fixed Effect  
                                  + ε 
(2.2) 
To test H4a/b and explore whether there is a pecking order among the 
three façades, the sample only considers CSR-related posts (N = 7,104). 
Rational façade posts are used as the baseline, and the effects of progressive 
and reputational façade posts relative to the baseline are compared. Therefore, 
the model for H4a/b is specified as follows: 
STAK_REACTIONS = β0 + β1PROGRESSIVE + β2REPUTATIONAL + β3SIZE  
                                  + β4CHARACTER_LOG + β5URL + β6HASHTAG  
                                  + β7VISUALS + Firm Fixed Effect + ε
(2.3) 
For all three models, the Negative Binomial (NB) model is used when 
the dependent variables are stakeholder general reactions (discussed further 
below), and the Logit model is used when the dependent variables are 
stakeholder specific reactions. The reasons for using the NB model to analyse 
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general stakeholder reactions are firstly because the number of likes, shares, 
and comments are positive integers, therefore the Poisson and NB models are 
more appropriate in counting variables than the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
model (Saxton & Waters, 2014). Secondly, one of the assumptions for the 
Poisson regression model is that the conditional variance should be equal to 
the conditional mean (Wooldridge, 2010). Since the number of reactions, likes 
and comments on social media have a much higher variance than the mean 
(i.e. over-dispersion), NB regression is a more appropriate choice (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 1986; Saxton & Waters, 2014). The Logit model is also used because 
specific reactions are binary variables (Wooldridge, 2010).  
 
 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
To examine stakeholder reactions, this study employs two groups of 
measures. The first group measures the intensity of stakeholder general 
reactions using the number of likes, shares and comments. The total number 
of likes (LIKES) captures general positive sentiments because this reaction 
represents a general positive stakeholder sentiment and also acts as a rough 
indicator of users’ acknowledgement after reading a post (Saxton & Waters, 
2014). The total number of shares (SHARES) reflects public resonance since 
the share reaction reflects how broadly a post is diffused among the public, and 
a high level of re-posting can increase message visibility and improve the 
perceptions of message quality and favourability leading to an enhancement of 
corporate CSR reputation (Saxton et al., 2019). The number of comments 
(COMMENTS) represents the level of engagements between stakeholders and 
47 
 
a corporate disclosure, thus the larger the number, the more engagements and 
debates are occurring in each post.  
 However, the magnitude of general reactions cannot distinguish specific 
emotions or attitudes that stakeholders express. Therefore, Facebook 
emoticons including, ‘love’, ‘wow’, ‘haha’, ‘sad’ and ‘angry’ can be used as 
measures for specific reactions. Because Facebook does not provide a 
separate button for newly introduced emoticons (users need to long-press the 
‘like’ button on smartphones or hover over the ‘like’ button on the website to 
reveal these additional emoticons), there is a real difference between posts that 
receive at least one type of emoticon and those that do not. Therefore, a dummy 
variable is created for each of these five emoticons (LOVE, WOW, HAHA, SAD 
and ANGRY), which is equal to one if each emoticon received at least one click, 
and zero otherwise.  
Furthermore, following the suggestion by Saxton and Waters (2014), this 
study also analyses the sentiment of comments (positive or negative) to reveal 
how stakeholders express their opinions towards firms’ disclosures. Consistent 
with specific emoticons, there is a real difference between people who are 
willing to write a comment under a post and those who write nothing. Unlike 
emoticons which consume less energy and time to react, people need more 
time to form their opinions and express them as comments. Thus, comments 
are more genuine representations of people’s attitudes towards firms’ CSR 
disclosures (Etter, Colleoni, Illia, Meggiorin, & D’Eugenio, 2018). Comments 
may also reflect the opinions of those who have direct experience with or those 
who may be directly affected by corporate CSR policies or practices. As a result, 
more authentic attitudes towards hypocrisy and façade strategies are reflected 
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when users write a positive or negative comment. Therefore, the sentiment of 
comments is measured using two dummy variables (POSCOMMENT and 
NEGCOMMENT). Both variables equate to one if a post received at least one 
positive comment or one negative comment, and zero otherwise. To compute 
these two variables, a computerised VADER sentiment analysis is firstly 
performed to calculate the net sentiment score of each individual comment  
(Gilbert & Hutto, 2014).6 Dummy variables are created if there is at least one 
positive or negative comment under each post. Table 2.1 summarises the 
definitions of dependent variables. 
 
Table 2.1 Dependent Variables Definitions 
Variable Name  Definition  
LIKES The total number of likes for each Facebook message. 
SHARES The total number of shares for each Facebook message. 
COMMENTS The total number of comments for each Facebook message. 
LOVE Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one love 
reaction to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
WOW Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one wow 
reaction to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
HAHA Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one haha 
reaction to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
SAD Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one sad reaction 
to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
ANGRY Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one angry 
reaction to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
POSCOMMENT Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one positive 
comment to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
NEGCOMMENT Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one negative 
comment to each Facebook message, and 0 otherwise. 
 
                                            
6 VADER sentiment analysis is conducted using programming language R. Firstly, the VADER 
lexicon is used to identity positive and negative words contained in a comment. Then the 
positive and negative score is computed by summing up values of each positive and negative 
word. Lastly, the net sentiment score of each comment is computed by taking the sum of overall 
positive and negative VADER scores.   
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 Measurement of Independent and Control Variables 
In Equations 2.1 and 2.2, the CSR actions disclosure variable 
(ACTIONS) is coded one if a post disclosed CSR actions information and zero 
otherwise. The CSR talk disclosure variable (TALK) is set to one if a post 
conveyed CSR talk information, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the CSR 
decisions disclosures variable (DECISIONS) is set to one if a post disclosed 
decisions information, and zero otherwise. 
In Equation 2.3, the rational façade variable (RATIONAL) equates to one 
if a post constructed a CSR rational façade, and zero otherwise. The 
progressive façade variable (PROGRESSIVE) is coded one if a post erected a 
CSR progressive façade, and zero otherwise. Finally, the reputational façade 
variable (REPUTATIONAL) is coded one if a post constructed a CSR 
reputational façade, and zero otherwise.   
 This study uses several variables to control for message and firm level 
characteristics.  Following the approach by Saxton et al. (2019), four message 
level control variables are included: the length of corporate disclosure, the 
inclusion of URL, the use of hashtags and the presence of photos and videos. 
Firstly, the logarithm transformation of the number of characters 7 
(CHARACTER_LOG) within each post controls for the amount of information 
communicated with stakeholders since previous socio-psychology literature 
suggests that longer texts are more persuasive than shorter texts (Chaiken & 
Eagly, 1989). Next, a dummy variable is created for the inclusion of the URL 
(URL) in each post. Hyperlinks can take users to an external web page where 
more information regarding corporate CSR activities are available, hence 
                                            
7 Number of characters in each post is calculated without including space between words. 
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stakeholders can make more informed decisions on whether and how to react 
to a post. Hashtags can initiate public discussions on a topic and increase public 
responses (Saxton et al., 2019), therefore a dummy variable (HASHTAG) is 
included to control for the use of hashtags. Lastly, a dummy variable is created 
for the presence of photos and videos (VISUALS) since visual content can 
present stakeholders with a more immediate impression of CSR information 
(Saxton & Waters, 2014) and it also generates stronger framing effect on 
people’s attitudes than texts (Powell, Boomgaarden, De Swert, & de Vreese, 
2015; Vinnari & Laine, 2017).  
The size of the firm is also controlled for firm-level characteristics. The 
logarithm transformation of company quarterly total assets is used as a proxy 
for firm size (SIZE). Size is included because larger firms have more exposure 
than smaller companies to external stakeholders, thereby attracting more 
divergent demands and reactions (Saxton et al., 2019). The quarterly total asset 
figures were retrieved from COMPUSTAT. Furthermore, to make the results 
more robust and to control for individual-specific effects on independent 
variables, the firm fixed effect is included in all models. Table 2.2 summarises 




Table 2.2 Independent and Control Variable Definiti ons 
Variable Name  Definition  
Independent Variables 
ACTIONS Hypocrisy actions disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the Facebook post discloses action information, and 0 
otherwise. 
TALK Hypocrisy talk disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
post Facebook discloses talk information, and 0 otherwise. 
DECISIONS Hypocrisy decisions disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the Facebook post discloses decision information, and 0 
otherwise. 
RATIONAL Rational façade disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
Facebook post erects rational façade, and 0 otherwise. 
PROGRESSIVE Progressive façade disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the Facebook post erects progressive façade, and 0 
otherwise. 
REPUTATIONAL Reputational façade disclosure. Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the Facebook post erects reputational façade, and 0 
otherwise. 
Control Variables 
CHARACTER_LOG Length of the Facebook post. The log transformation of the 
number of characters (without space) in each post message. 
URL Use of hyperlinks. Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post 
contains a hyperlink (i.e. "http://*"). 
HASHTAG Use of hashtags. Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post 
contains a hashtag followed by words (i.e. "#*"). 
VISUALS Presence of photos and videos. Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the post contains a photo or video. 
SIZE Firm size. The log transformation of firm's quarterly total 
assets. 
 
 Empirical Findings 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics for dependent variables. 
Panel A displays the summary statistics for general stakeholder reactions, i.e. 
the number of likes, shares and comments. The evidence shows that the 
average number of likes for each post is approximately 1,184 (SD = 10,610), 
the average number of shares is about 181 (SD = 1604), and the average 
number of comments is 54 (SD = 423). High variance confirms the choice of 
the NB model instead of the Poisson model. The wide-spanning distributions of 
all three measures suggest that there is a significant difference between posts 
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that received few or none reactions and posts that received a high intensity of 
reactions. 
 
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics - Dependent Variab les 
  N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Panel A. General reactions 
LIKES 21166 1183.67 10610.36 0 31 93 317 447450 
SHARES 21166 181.23 1604.01 0 3 13 48 94787 
COMMENTS 21166 53.84 422.59 0 1 5 20 35533 
         
Panel B. Specific reactions 
LOVE 21166 0.67 0.47 0 0 1 1 1 
WOW 21166 0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
HAHA 21166 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
SAD 21166 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 
ANGRY 21166 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
POSCOMMENT 21166 0.64 0.48 0 0 1 1 1 
NEGCOMMENT 21166 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
Notes All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
Panel B presents the evidence of specific stakeholder reactions, 
including ‘love’, wow’, ‘haha’, ‘sad’, ‘angry’, positive comment and negative 
comment. The findings show that except for LOVE, most posts have a relatively 
low percentage of receiving an emoticon, with SAD being the lowest (13%), 
followed by HAHA (24%), ANGRY (25%) and WOW (40%). The distribution of 
each emoticon also shows that over half of the posts do not receive any WOW, 
HAHA, SAD or ANGRY reaction. With regard to the sentiment of comments, 
about 64% of posts receive at least one positive comment (POSCOMMENT) 
and 44% of posts receive at least one negative comment (NEGCOMMENT). 
Although positive comments are 20% more than negative comments, over 25% 
of the posts receive at least one negative comment, suggesting that people 
have diverse views on corporate disclosures and they comment critically on 
corporate information.  
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Table 2.4 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for independent 
variables. In terms of the hypocrisy strategies used, the results show that the 
mean for ACTIONS is 0.08, which suggests that 8% of posts use hypocrisy 
actions strategies. The mean of TALK and DECISIONS is 0.22 and 0.03 
respectively, indicating that about 22% of posts employ hypocrisy talk and 3% 
use hypocrisy decisions strategies. In terms of façade posts, the reputational 
façade is the most frequent (22%) that companies try to erect on social media, 
followed by the progressive façade (9%), and the least used is the rational 
façade (3%). These results are consistent with prior findings in which a rational 
façade is more likely to be constructed in annual reports, while the other two 
façades are more likely to be found in CSR-related documents (Cho et al., 
2015). Given the nature of social media and different stakeholder groups that 
companies hope to engage with, firms are more likely to employ a reputational 
façade than progressive and rational façades in order to convey a positive 
image towards stakeholders.8 The distribution of data shows wide dispersions 
among hypocrisy and façade disclosures. More than 65% of posts do not 
employ either CSR hypocrisy or façades strategies. The reason for this positive 
skew is because the sample of corporate Facebook accounts include both 
voluntary CSR disclosures and other types of disclosure such as marketing, 
financial and general corporate information. 
  
                                            
8 Appendix D illustrates some examples of hypocrisy and façades disclosures that are identified 
in companies’ Facebook posts. 
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics - Independent and Control Variables 
  N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Panel A. Independent variables 
ACTIONS 21166 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
TALK 21166 0.22 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 
DECISIONS 21166 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 1 
RATIONAL 21166 0.03 0.16 0 0 0 0 1 
PROGRESSIVE 21166 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 
REPUTATIONAL 21166 0.22 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
         
Panel B. Control variables 
CHARACTER_LOG 21166 4.84 1.09 0 4.69 5.00 5.34 8.72 
VISUALS 21166 0.70 0.46 0 0 1 1 1 
URL 21166 0.47 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
HASHTAG 21166 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
SIZE 21166 11.44 1.13 9.44 10.54 11.42 12.00 14.75 
Notes All variables are defined in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.4 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for control variables. 
The mean of CHARACTER_LOG is 4.84 (SD = 1.09), suggesting that the 
average length of a post is approximately 126 characters. As mentioned above, 
Facebook has no restrictions on message length: the mean length is similar to 
the Twitter threshold (140 characters), suggesting that companies probably 
post identical information on both platforms. The results show that 70% of posts 
attach visual content such as photos or videos (VISUALS) and 47% of posts 
contain a hyperlink (URL). In addition, the results suggest that only 36% of posts 
include a hashtag (HASHTAG). These findings differ slightly from those found 
in Saxton et al. (2019) as Facebook disclosures are more multi-media based 
unlike Twitter which makes far more use of hashtags than photos. With regard 
to firm characteristics, the mean size of the sample is 11.44 ($92,967,000), 
reflecting the fact that the sample companies represent the largest publicly 
traded firms in the US. 
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 Correlation Analysis 
Pearson correlation analysis was performed to assess the association 
between stakeholder reactions and hypocrisy and façade disclosures, and the 
presence of multicollinearity issues. Table 2.5 presents the Pearson 
correlations-matrix results between various stakeholder reactions and 
independent variables. The results show that most of the stakeholder reactions 
are significantly correlated with the focused independent variables. In terms of 
multicollinearity, no strong correlation is found between independent variables 
and control variables as none of the correlation coefficients exceeds ±0.5. To 
further test the possible existence of multicollinearity, a VIF test is performed, 
and the results (un-tabulated) show that the highest VIF is 1.18, which is well 
below the ‘rule of thumb’ threshold (Michelon, 2011). Therefore, multicollinearity 





Table 2.5 Correlation Table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 LIKES 1           
2 SHARES 0.33*** 1          
3 COMMENTS 0.26*** 0.61*** 1         
4 LOVE 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 1        
5 WOW 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.44*** 1       
6 HAHA 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.34*** 0.44*** 1      
7 SAD 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 1     
8 ANGRY 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 1    
9 POSCOMMENT 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 1   
10 NEGCOMMENT 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 1  
11 ACTIONS 0.03*** -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** 0.03*** 0 0.03*** 0 0.01 -0.01 1 
12 TALK -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
13 DECISIONS 0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
14 RATIONAL -0.01* -0.01 -0.02* -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 
15 PROGRESSIVE 0.02* -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02** -0.07*** -0.02* -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.29*** 
16 REPUTATIONAL -0.02** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.14*** 0.26*** 
17 CHARACTER_LOG 0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.14*** 
18 VISUALS 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.02*** 
19 URL 0.01 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.02*** 
20 HASHTAG 0.02** 0.01 0.01 -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.03*** -0.01* -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.04*** 





Correlation Table (Continued) 
    12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 LIKES           
2 SHARES           
3 COMMENTS           
4 LOVE           
5 WOW           
6 HAHA           
7 SAD           
8 ANGRY           
9 POSCOMMENT           
10 NEGCOMMENT           
11 ACTIONS           
12 TALK 1          
13 DECISIONS -0.10*** 1         
14 RATIONAL 0.17*** 0.12*** 1        
15 PROGRESSIVE 0.24*** 0.21*** -0.05*** 1       
16 REPUTATIONAL 0.63*** 0.10*** -0.09*** -0.17*** 1      
17 CHARACTER_LOG 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 1     
18 VISUALS -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 0 -0.01* 1    
19 URL 0 0.02* 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.25*** 0.06*** 1   
20 HASHTAG 0.08*** 0.02** -0.01* 0.01 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0 1  
21 SIZE 0 0.02** 0.01 0.05*** -0.03*** 0 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.02** 1 




 Multivariate Analysis 
2.5.3.1 Stakeholder Reactions and CSR Hypocrisy Disclosures 
 Table 2.6 presents the results regarding stakeholder reactions to CSR 
hypocrisy disclosures. Panel A presents the results which examine general 
stakeholder reactions to CSR actions, talk and decisions disclosures using the 
NB regressions model. 9  When analysing the number of likes (Column 1) 
generated by stakeholders, ACTIONS is the only variable that shows a 
significant and positive association (β = 0.824, p < .01). Neither TALK nor 
DECISIONS has a significant effect on LIKES, suggesting that stakeholders 
may only give acknowledgement or general approval of actions disclosures. To 
interpret the impact of hypocrisy disclosures on LIKES, it is suggested that the 
coefficient is converted into an incidence rate ratio (IRR)10, which is interpreted 
as the factor change in the dependent variable for one unit change in the 
explanatory variables (Saxton & Waters, 2014). From the results, ACTIONS 
has an IRR of 2.28, suggesting that the number of likes in response to a CSR 
actions disclosure will be 2.28 times more than the number of likes in response 
to a non-CSR post.   
  
                                            
9 Standard errors in all models in this study are robust. 
10 IRR results was obtained by running the command: nbreg, irr after running each negative 
binomial regression model in STATA 
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Table 2.6 Stakeholder Reactions to CSR Hypocrisy Di sclosures  
Panel A. Negative binomial regression between general reactions and CSR hypocrisy talk, 




  LIKES SHARES COMMENTS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ACTIONS 0.824*** 0.535*** 0.449*** 
 (0.101) (0.086) (0.074) 
TALK -0.089 -0.120* -0.270*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
DECISIONS -0.113 -0.038 -0.267** 
 (0.116) (0.106) (0.107) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.061*** 0.213*** 0.122*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) 
VISUALS 0.394*** 0.404*** 0.491*** 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.048) 
URL -0.076 -0.299*** -0.245*** 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.052) 
HASHTAG 0.097 0.029 0.174*** 
 (0.060) (0.065) (0.058) 
SIZE 0.737 0.316 0.189 
 (0.543) (0.647) (0.566) 
CONSTANT -6.687 -3.894 -4.562 
 (6.025) (7.199) (6.298) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Observations 21,166 21,166 21,166 
pseudo-R2 0.0735 0.0858 0.113 






Panel B. Logit regression between specific reactions and CSR hypocrisy talk, 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ACTIONS 1.136*** 0.739*** 0.427*** 0.691*** 0.627*** 0.653*** 0.369*** 
 (0.077) (0.071) (0.076) (0.087) (0.081) (0.070) (0.071) 
TALK 0.363*** -0.242*** -0.393*** -0.233*** -0.156** 0.081 -0.276*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.062) (0.076) (0.063) (0.050) (0.053) 
DECISIONS 0.280*** -0.082 -0.180 -0.132 0.265** 0.057 -0.120 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.131) (0.155) (0.130) (0.099) (0.113) 
CHARACTER_LOG -0.071*** 0.051*** 0.030 0.030 -0.041* 0.061*** 0.064*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
VISUALS 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.402*** 0.138** 0.123** 0.262*** 0.184*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) (0.062) (0.054) (0.044) (0.046) 
URL -0.284*** -0.133*** -0.192*** -0.107* -0.064 -0.186*** -0.120** 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) 
HASHTAG 0.140*** 0.011 0.123*** 0.087 -0.013 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.056) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) 
SIZE 3.154*** 2.499*** 3.047*** 2.935*** 5.229*** -0.017 1.255*** 
 (0.438) (0.367) (0.423) (0.472) (0.472) (0.386) (0.451) 
CONSTANT -36.70*** -32.15*** -40.39*** -40.37*** -66.76*** -2.67 -15.75*** 
 (4.872) (4.678) (5.392) (6.018) (6.018) (4.308) (5.748) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 20,705 20,620 20,658 20,396 20,730 20,450 20,938 
pseudo-R2 0.331 0.276 0.254 0.202 0.335 0.296 0.337 
Log-Likelihood -8823 -10073 -8616 -6270 -7701 -9526 -9494 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically 
omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Notes Table 2.6 reports the results analysing stakeholder reactions to CSR hypocrisy disclosures used in 
Facebook posts. Panel A presents the results from regressing the number of likes (Column 1), the number 
of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) for each post on the CSR hypocrisy 
disclosure strategy (talk, decisions, or actions) used in the post. The table reports negative binomial 
coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. Panel B presents the results from 
regressing the likelihood of receiving at least one ‘love’ emoticon (Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (column 
2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive 
comment (Column 6), or a negative comment (Column 7) in each post on the organised hypocrisy 
disclosure strategy (talk, decision, or action) used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient 
estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors.  All variables are defined in Table 1.1. *, **, and *** 






When analysing how stakeholders respond by sharing posts (Column 2), 
the results show that ACTIONS attracts more shares than the baseline (β = 
0.535, p < .01). TALK, however, shows a significant negative association (β = - 
0.120, p < .10) with an IRR of 0.89, suggesting CSR talk disclosures attract 
0.89 times fewer shares than the baseline. No significant association is found 
between SHARES and DECISIONS.  
Column 3 examines how stakeholders reacted with written comments. 
Consistent with the results in the previous two columns, ACTIONS attracts 
more comments from stakeholders than the baseline (β = 0.449, p < .01), 
suggesting that stakeholders are more willing to debate and discuss on 
corporate CSR actions disclosures. In contrast, TALK and DECISIONS are 
negatively and significantly associated with COMMENTS, where TALK has a 
coefficient of - 0.270 (IRR = 0.76, p < .01), and DECISIONS has a coefficient of 
- 0.267 (IRR = 0.77, p < .05). The significant negative effects of TALK and 
DECISIONS on the number of comments may suggest two possibilities: (1) 
stakeholders think CSR talk and decisions disclosures are symbolic and convey 
little information about decision-making. Therefore, stakeholders are less willing 
to comment on them; or (2) corporate CSR talk and decisions disclosures are 
normally consistent with social norms. Because people tend to live in a “culture 
of hope” (Brunsson, 2006, p. 185), they often agree with prosocial values and 
goals that are desirable and worthy of pursuit. Consequently, people are less 
likely to criticise a goal that everyone is hoping to achieve. In this case, if 
stakeholders perceive that corporate CSR commitments and decisions are 
congruent with societal expectations, there is a lower likelihood of receiving 
negative comments. These two possibilities will be tested in later analyses. 
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In terms of the control variables, the length of disclosures and the 
presence of visual contents in a post have significant impacts on all three 
general reaction measures. The significant association between 
CHARACTER_LOG and general reactions confirms “the length implies 
strength” hypothesis (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989). The strong effect of VISUALS 
on reactions are consistent with findings in Saxton and Waters (2014) where 
visual content is also informative. Visual content can also create a stronger 
framing effect on opinions and behaviours than text (Powell et al., 2015; Vinnari 
& Laine, 2017). A significant and positive association is found between 
COMMENTS and HASHTAGS, which is consistent with the expectation that 
hashtags are used in social media to initiate discussions (Saxton et al., 2019).  
2.5.3.2 Stakeholder Specific Reactions on CSR Hypocrisy Disclosures 
 Table 2.6 Panel B presents the Logit regression results for testing H1 
and H2. Columns 1 to 3 report the relationships between CSR hypocrisy 
disclosures and positive emoticons (i.e. LOVE, HAHA and WOW). In Column 
1, ACTIONS, TALK and DECISIONS show significant and positive effects on 
LOVE. Specifically, the odds of ACTIONS receiving LOVE is 3.11711 (β = 1.136, 
p < .01) suggesting that whenever a company posts a CSR actions disclosure, 
the odds that stakeholders respond with a ‘love’ emoticon is 211.7% higher than 
responding to a non-actions disclosure. In Columns 2 and 3, ACTIONS still 
shows a significant and positive effect on WOW and HAHA. The odds of 
ACTIONS receiving WOW is 2.096 (β = 0.739) and receiving HAHA is 1.533 (β 
= 0.427), suggesting that people are impressed with corporate CSR actions 
disclosures. However, the effects of TALK on WOW and HAHA become 
                                            
11 The odds ratio of logit regression is computed as the exponential of the coefficients. 
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negative and significant at the 1% level, while the effect of DECISIONS on these 
two emoticons are no longer significant, suggesting that stakeholders are less 
impressed with what companies say and the decisions they make regarding 
CSR commitments.  
Columns 4 and 5 report the effects of CSR hypocrisy disclosures on 
negative emoticons (i.e. SAD and ANGRY). In both columns, it is highly likely 
that ACTIONS receives SAD (β = 0.691, p < .01) and ANGRY (β = 0.627, p < 
.01), indicating that there are diverse stakeholder emotions expressed towards 
CSR actions disclosures, and some stakeholders even feel disappointed or 
dissatisfied with what companies have done. However, TALK is less likely to 
receive both SAD (β = -0.233, p < .01) and ANGRY (β = -0.156, p < .05), while 
DECISIONS is more likely to receive ANGRY (β = 0.27, p < .05), but not SAD. 
The negative effect of TALK on negative emoticons is consistent with the 
findings on LOVE, suggesting that stakeholders welcome corporate CSR talk 
disclosures. However, the consistent sign between DECISIONS and ACTIONS 
on ANGRY may imply that stakeholders who believe the causality between 
decisions and actions may think decisions disclosures increase the likelihood 
of corresponding actions, hence exhibiting strong opposition towards decisions 
disclosures. 
Columns 6 and 7 report the effects of hypocrisy disclosures on the 
likelihood of receiving positive and negative comments. In both columns, it is 
likely that ACTIONS receive both a positive comment (POSCOMMENT) and a 
negative comment (NEGCOMMENT): these are both positive and significant at 
the 1% level. Consistent with the results found in emoticons, the likelihood of 
ACTIONS receiving a positive comment is also higher than receiving a negative 
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comment, suggesting that, although stakeholders have divergent opinions on 
corporate CSR actions disclosures, people tend to compliment what companies 
have done rather than criticise them. In addition, TALK is significantly and 
negatively associated with NEGCOMMENT (p < .01), but not significantly 
related with POSCOMMENT. DECISIONS is not related to either 
POSCOMMENT or NEGCOMMENT. Overall, the findings suggest that there is 
an association between stakeholder reactions and CSR talk and decisions 
disclosures, which implies that talk and decisions disclosures can satisfy 
stakeholder demands as they are more likely to attract positive reactions. The 
lower likelihood of receiving negative comments confirms the previous 
speculation in which the lower number of comments received by TALK is mainly 
driven by a decrease in negative comments. Overall, the results support both 
H1 and H2a/b. 
2.5.3.3 CSR Actions Disclosures versus CSR Talk and Decisions Disclosures 
Equation 2.2 was used to test H3 as to whether the intensity of 
stakeholder reactions on CSR actions disclosures is greater than CSR talk and 
decision disclosures. The model only considers CSR-related posts and uses 
TALK and DECISIONS as the baseline to examine the effects of ACTIONS on 
both general and specific stakeholder reactions.  
Table 2.7 Panel A presents the effects of ACTIONS on stakeholder 
general reactions. In all three columns, ACTIONS shows a significant and 
positive association with each of the general reactions, suggesting ACTIONS 
receives more likes, shares and comments than TALK and DECISIONS. These 
results confirm H3 and indicate that the intensity of stakeholder general 
reactions on CSR actions disclosure is greater than those on CSR talk and 
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decisions disclosures. The findings suggest that stakeholders tend to have 
more general approvals and higher resonance towards what companies have 
done. Because corporate CSR actions may meet some stakeholder demands 
while compromising others, CSR actions disclosures tend to attract more 
debates and discussions among stakeholders.   
In terms of control variables, only VISUALS has a significant effect on all 
three general reactions (all at 1% level), suggesting that the presence of photos 
and videos can influence stakeholder perceptions towards corporate CSR 
disclosures. The significant effects of HASHTAGS on SHARES and 
COMMENTS suggest that when a company post includes a hashtag, the topic 
becomes more explicit and the information has better quality in meeting 
stakeholder information needs (Saxton et al., 2019). As a result, people are 
more likely to share this high-quality information and to participate in the 
discussions. 
Panel B presents the Logit regression results examining stakeholder 
specific reactions to CSR actions disclosures. In accordance with H3, 
ACTIONS has stronger effects on all specific reactions than TALK and 
DECISIONS. Among these emoticons, the odds of receiving LOVE and HAHA 
are similar, but the odds of receiving WOW is 2.729 (β = 1.004, p < .01). The 
high likelihood of receiving WOW suggests that stakeholders are more 
impressed when reading what companies have done rather than what they are 
saying or decisions made on CSR issues. In terms of negative emotions, 
ACTIONS is also more likely to attract negative emoticons than TALK and 
DECISIONS, suggesting ACTIONS may not be able to meet divergent 
stakeholder demands completely as there is a high likelihood that certain 
66 
 
stakeholders will feel disappointed or dissatisfied. With regards to the sentiment 
of comments, although ACTIONS has a higher likelihood of receiving both 
POSCOMMENT (β = 0.588, p < .01) and NEGCOMMENT (β = 0.707, p < .01) 
than TALK and DECISIONS, the likelihood of receiving a NEGCOMMENT is 
higher than receiving a POSCOMMENT. This finding suggests that 
stakeholders are more likely to write negative comments under CSR actions 
disclosures than under CSR talk or decisions disclosures, further confirming the 
mitigation effect of CSR talk and decisions disclosures on negative stakeholder 
concerns.  
With regard to the control variables, SIZE increases the likelihood of 
receiving both positive (LOVE and WOW) and negative emoticons (SAD and 
ANGRY), implying that larger firms tend to face more divergent, and sometimes 
conflicting, stakeholder interests. Overall, these results support H3 and suggest 
that the intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for actions disclosures than 





Table 2.7 Intensity of Stakeholder Reaction on CSR Hypocrisy 
Disclosures 





 LIKES SHARES COMMENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ACTIONS 0.941*** 0.777*** 0.791*** 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.008 -0.009 0.080 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.054) 
VISUALS 0.136** 0.199*** 0.300*** 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.059) 
URL -0.089 -0.093 -0.006 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) 
HASHTAG 0.038 0.123* 0.168*** 
 (0.058) (0.064) (0.062) 
SIZE 0.750 0.312 0.386 
 (0.494) (0.510) (0.510) 
CONSTANT -6.479 -2.938 -6.744 
 (5.516) (5.657) (5.680) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,104 7,104 7,104 
pseudo-R2 0.110 0.097 0.125 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ACTIONS 0.864*** 1.004*** 0.858*** 0.964*** 0.790*** 0.588*** 0.707*** 
 (0.079) (0.071) (0.083) (0.098) (0.087) (0.070) (0.073) 
CHARACTER_LOG -0.064 0.001 -0.060 0.142 -0.227** 0.172** 0.055 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.089) (0.103) (0.095) (0.070) (0.077) 
VISUALS 0.301*** 0.267*** 0.078 -0.056 0.036 0.154** 0.092 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.094) (0.109) (0.094) (0.070) (0.076) 
URL -0.222*** -0.033 -0.101 0.001 0.173* -0.157** 0.098 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.097) (0.107) (0.092) (0.072) (0.079) 
HASHTAG 0.044 -0.090 0.157* 0.093 -0.070 -0.032 0.006 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.094) (0.113) (0.092) (0.066) (0.077) 
SIZE 1.875*** 1.777*** 0.932 1.890** 3.281*** 0.200 0.773 
 (0.620) (0.536) (0.652) (0.804) (0.780) (0.524) (0.645) 
CONSTANT -22.01*** -22.96*** -12.91 -27.47*** -41.18*** -5.42 -9.95 
 (6.893) (6.849) (8.318) (10.242) (9.923) (5.848) (8.220) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 6,929 6,888 6,693 6,554 6,574 6,876 6,878 
pseudo-R2 0.289 0.227 0.229 0.204 0.289 0.233 0.284 
Log-Likelihood  -3247 -3351 -2283 -1714 -2258 -3640 -3013 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically 
omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Notes Table 2.7 reports the results for the intensity of stakeholder reactions to actions disclosures in CSR 
posts. Panel A presents the results from regressing the number of likes (Column 1), the number of shares 
(Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) in each CSR post on the hypocrisy action strategy 
used in the post. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust 
standard errors, where the baseline effect is the effect of hypocrisy talk and decisions disclosure strategies 
on each stakeholder general reaction. Panel B presents the results from regressing the likelihood of 
receiving a ‘love’ emoticon (column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (Column 3), a 
‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment (Column 6), and a 
negative comment (Column 7) in each post on the hypocrisy action strategy used in the post. The table 
reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the baseline effect is 
the effect of hypocrisy talk and decisions disclosure strategies on each stakeholder specific reaction. All 
variables are defined in Table 1.1 and 1.2. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 






2.5.3.4 Stakeholder General Reactions and Façade Disclosures 
Equation 2.3 was used to test H4 and ascertains whether there is a pecking 
order effect of the three façades on stakeholder reactions. The model only 
considers CSR-related posts and uses rational façade disclosures as the 
baseline.  
Table 2.8 Panel A presents the NB regression results examining general 
stakeholder reactions to CSR progressive and reputational façade disclosures. 
The results show that PROGRESSIVE is only positively and significantly 
associated with LIKES. Its effects on SHARES and COMMENTS are positive 
but insignificant. The effects of REPUTATIONAL on all three general reactions 
are negative but insignificant. These two findings suggest that the effects of 
reputational façade disclosures on likes, shares and comments are similar to 
those in rational façade disclosures, but progressive façade disclosures receive 
more likes than the other two. When comparing the effects between 
PROGRESSIVE and REPUTATIONAL, the differences between two 
coefficients on all three reactions are significant, suggesting that although 
PROGRESSIVE and REPUTATIONAL may not have much difference in 
receiving the number of shares and comments comparing to RATIONAL, there 




Table 2.8 Intensity of Stakeholder Reaction on CSR Façade Disclosures 
Panel A. Negative binomial regressions between general reactions and CSR progressive 




  LIKES SHARES COMMENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PROGRESSIVE 0.190** 0.098 0.109 
 (0.092) (0.098) (0.098) 
REPUTATIONAL 0.050 -0.064 -0.084 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.090) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.124** 0.077 0.180*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.056) 
VISUALS 0.223*** 0.259*** 0.398*** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.063) 
URL -0.150** -0.141** -0.051 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.062) 
HASHTAG 0.062 0.147** 0.201*** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.067) 
SIZE 0.652 0.675 0.476 
 (0.502) (0.536) (0.552) 
CONSTANT -5.937 -7.252 -8.085 
 (5.632) (5.959) (6.140) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,104 7,104 7,104 
pseudo-R2 0.102 0.0923 0.117 
Log-Likelihood -44040 -30516 -20987 
Within Regression F Test  
PROGRESSIVE = 







Panel B. Logit regressions between specific reactions and CSR progressive and 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PROGRESSIVE 0.366*** 0.281** -0.0162 0.199 0.0124 -0.154 -0.0255 
 (0.129) (0.133) (0.177) (0.223) (0.156) (0.117) (0.127) 
REPUTATIONAL 0.348*** -0.0728 -0.0622 -0.104 -0.436*** -0.173 -0.389*** 
 (0.122) (0.129) (0.173) (0.219) (0.150) (0.110) (0.122) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.0354 0.106 0.0408 0.247** -0.111 0.247*** 0.131* 
 (0.0706) (0.0700) (0.0852) (0.0973) (0.0928) (0.0688) (0.0757) 
VISUALS 0.342*** 0.352*** 0.142 0.0280 0.123 0.195*** 0.163** 
 (0.0765) (0.0736) (0.0920) (0.107) (0.0927) (0.0693) (0.0757) 
URL -0.270*** -0.128* -0.157* -0.0885 0.0723 -0.201*** 0.0261 
 (0.0771) (0.0750) (0.0954) (0.105) (0.0910) (0.0723) (0.0796) 
HASHTAG 0.0267 -0.0817 0.146 0.0920 -0.0424 -0.0339 0.0287 
 (0.0698) (0.0705) (0.0934) (0.113) (0.0916) (0.0657) (0.0763) 
SIZE 1.900*** 1.797*** 0.986 1.897** 3.241*** 0.218 0.750 
 (0.620) (0.532) (0.651) (0.814) (0.772) (0.528) (0.644) 
CONSTANT -22.90*** -23.49*** -13.77* -27.73*** -40.85*** -5.665 -9.673 
 (6.893) (6.798) (8.311) (10.38) (9.823) (5.890) (8.205) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 6,929 6,888 6,693 6,554 6,574 6,876 6,878 
pseudo-R2 0.276 0.207 0.212 0.184 0.280 0.226 0.277 
Log-Likelihood -3306 -3440 -2334 -1758 -2286 -3675 -3045 
Within Regression F Test  
PROGRESSIVE 
= REPUTATIONAL 0.06 24.86*** 0.26 8.28*** 25.18*** 0.08 22.84*** 
        
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA 
automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Notes Table 2.8 reports the results for the intensity of stakeholder reactions to progressive and 
reputational façade in CSR posts. Panel A presents the results from regressing the number of likes 
(Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) in each CSR 
post on the progressive and reputational façade used in the post. The table reports negative binomial 
coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the baseline effect is the effect of 
rational façade strategy on each stakeholder general reaction. Panel B presents the results from 
regressing the likelihood of receiving a ‘love’ emoticon (Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a ‘haha’ 
emoticon (Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment 
(Column 6), and a negative comment (Column 7) in each post on the progressive and reputational façade 
used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, 
where the baseline effect is the effect of rational façade strategy on each stakeholder specific reaction. 
All variables are defined in Table 1.1 and 1.2. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 






Panel B shows the Logit regression results examining stakeholder specific 
reactions to CSR progressive and reputational façade disclosures. The results 
show that the likelihood of receiving LOVE is significant for both 
PROGRESSIVE and REPUTATIONAL, indicating that, compared to CSR 
rational façade disclosures, stakeholders are more likely to react with a ‘love’ 
towards CSR progressive and reputational façade disclosures. However, there 
is no significant difference between PROGRESSIVE and REPUTATIONAL, 
suggesting that stakeholders react similarly to these two façade disclosures. In 
Column 2, PROGRESSIVE is more likely to receive WOW compared to both 
REPUTATIONAL and RATIONAL with an odds ratio of 1.324 (β = 0.281, p < 
.05). In Columns 3 and 6, PROGRESSIVE and REPUTATIONAL have no 
significant effect on HAHA and POSCOMMENT.  
In Column 4, although PROGRESSIVE has no significant effect on SAD 
comparing to RATIONAL, it is more likely to receive SAD than 
REPUTATIONAL. This may be due to the fact that reputational façade 
disclosures are used to construct positive corporate images, so they are less 
likely to provoke negative stakeholder reactions. The mitigation effect of 
reputational façade disclosures on negative reactions is also observed in 
ANGRY (Column 5) and NEGCOMMENT (Column 7). Although 
PROGRESSIVE does not show a significant effect on ANGRY and 
NEGCOMMENT compared to RATIONAL, REPUTATIONAL has the least 
likelihood of receiving both negative reactions among the three. Combining this 
mitigation effect with its positive effect on LOVE, REPUTATIONAL has a 
stronger effect in reducing stakeholder negative reactions. In contrast, although 
PROGRESSIVE has a stronger effect on the number of likes and the likelihood 
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of receiving ‘wow’ comparing to the other two, it is also more likely to attract 
negative reactions from stakeholders than REPUTATIONAL, suggesting the 
progressive façade may share the effects of both reputational and rational 
façades on stakeholder reactions. 
Overall, H4a is partially supported as reputational façade disclosures are 
more likely than rational façade disclosures to attract positive emoticons and 
less likely to attract negative ones. H4b is also partially supported as 
progressive façade disclosures exhibit the strongest effect on the number of 
likes and the likelihood of receiving ‘wow’ reactions. 
 
 Additional Analyses 
2.5.4.1 Firm Responses to Stakeholder Reactions 
 Thus far, the study has examined how stakeholders perceive hypocrisy 
and façade disclosures on Facebook, and the results show that actions 
disclosures and progressive façade disclosures attract diverse reactions, 
especially more negative responses than other types of disclosure. Since 
stakeholders are able to write comments and express their opinions under a 
post, it is also interesting to look at the dynamism occurring between 
stakeholder comments and company replies as this can reflect a company’s 
approach towards stakeholder engagement. As a result, a post hoc research 
question has been added which examines how stakeholder reactions trigger 
subsequent corporate responses. To answer this question, the study focusses 
on CSR-related posts, the sample being grouped according to the following 
disclosure types: (1) actions disclosures, (2) talk or decisions disclosures, (3) 
progressive façade disclosures, and (4) rational or reputational façade 
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disclosures. Corporations tend not to reply to comments in most cases, but 
when they do, there is a significant difference between a post that receives a 
reply and a post that does not. As a result, a dummy variable (REPLY) is 
created to measure the likelihood that a company replies to at least one 
comment under a post. The Logit model is used to analyse company replies to 
stakeholder reactions following each type of disclosure, and is specified as 
follows: 
REPLY = β0 + β1 EMOTION_SENTIMENT + β2 COMMENT_SENTIMENT  
             + β3 EMOTIONS_LOG + β4 COMMENTS_LOG + Firm Fixed Effect 
             + Week Fixed Effect + ε 
(2.4) 
REPLY is a dummy variable which is set to one if a post has at least one 
firm reply and zero otherwise. EMOTION_SENTIMENT measures the level of 
stakeholder specific reactions after reading a post. The variable is computed 
using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Bansal 
& Clelland, 2004; Janis & Fadner, 1943). EMOTION_SENTIMENT ranges from 
-1 to +1 and a higher coefficient, suggesting the presence of more positive 
specific reactions (the sum of the number of ‘love’, ‘haha’, and ‘wow’ reactions) 
than negative ones (the sum of the number of ‘sad’ and ‘angry’ reactions). The 
number of likes is not included because stakeholders may simply click a ‘like’ 
to show their acknowledgements of the content, which may not reflect their true 




Janis-Fadner coefficient = 
e2-ec
t2
 if e > c 
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COMMENT_SENTIMENT measures the sentiment of stakeholder comments 
after reading a post. It is also calculated using the Janis-Fadner coefficient 
between the number of positive and negative comments. The logarithm 
transformation of the number of reactions (EMOTIONS_LOG12) is used to 
capture the intensity of stakeholder reactions (the sum of ‘likes’, ‘loves’, ‘hahas’, 
‘wows’, ‘sads’, and ‘angrys’). The logarithm transformation of the number of 
comments (COMMENTS_LOG 13 ) is created to control for the intensity of 
comments. Firm fixed effect is included to control for unobservable firm 
characteristics. Week fixed effect is also included to capture events that may 
affect stakeholder sentiments and firm responses during a week.   
Table 2.9 presents the results examining corporate post-disclosure 
responses to stakeholder reactions. Each column presents the effect of 
sentiment and the intensity of stakeholder emoticons as well as comments on 
the likelihood to reply. Overall, the results show that the sentiment and intensity 
of comments have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood to reply, but 
post-actions disclosures have the smallest effect. This finding suggests that 
when stakeholders make more comments and especially more positive 
comments, firms are more likely to reply. The positive effects may imply a 
                                            
12 Winsorised at 1% level. 
13 Winsorised at 2% level. 
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selective stakeholder engagement approach as companies tend to ignore 
negative comments. This positive effect on the intensity of comments is 
contrary to expectations because firms are more likely to reply when there are 
fewer comments as social media officers are less overwhelmed by an explosion 
of comments and should have more time to communicate with stakeholders. 
However, the opposite tendency suggests that corporate reply policy serves to 
manage reputational risk as more comments increase the risks of exposing 
corporate hypocrisy practices (Bebbington et al., 2008). 
In terms of the sentiment and intensity of stakeholder emoticons, 
EMOTION_SENTIMENT has little effect on the likelihood to reply except for 
post-talk and decision disclosures in which a positive effect is found. Such a 
result is consistent with the results found in COMMENT_SENTIMENT, 
suggesting that companies only respond to positive reactions. With regard to 
the intensity of stakeholder emotions, this generally has a negative effect on 
the likelihood to reply and is only significant after companies post talk or 
decisions disclosures, and rational or reputational façade disclosures. The 
negative effect is mainly driven by the intensity of positive emoticons, 
suggesting that corporations closely monitor stakeholders’ positive emotions. 
Once a large number of stakeholders demonstrates a sufficient amount of 
positive sentiments, there is no need to respond to comments.  
Overall, the results suggest that companies selectively engage with 
stakeholders. The positive effect of comment sentiments on the likelihood to 
reply indicates that companies only respond to stakeholders who are 
complimentary towards companies, while neglecting those who are critical or 
express concern about corporate CSR practices. Both the intensity of 
77 
 
emoticons and the intensity of comments have a significant effect on corporate 
responses: this suggests that companies monitor stakeholder perceptions on 
Facebook for reputational risk and legitimacy purposes rather than using the 
platform for stakeholder engagement, which is consistent with the results found 
in Gómez-Carrasco et al. (2017) and Manetti and Bellucci (2016). 
 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EMOTION_SENTIMENT -0.130 0.241* 0.178 0.175 
 (0.270) (0.132) (0.225) (0.134) 
COMMENT_SENTIMENT 0.417* 0.358*** 0.627*** 0.268** 
 (0.221) (0.121) (0.202) (0.127) 
EMOTIONS_LOG -0.022 -0.202*** -0.073 -0.253*** 
 (0.137) (0.070) (0.132) (0.069) 
COMMENTS_LOG 0.962*** 1.180*** 0.992*** 1.259*** 
 (0.146) (0.080) (0.137) (0.082) 
CONSTANT -5.964*** -4.931*** -4.252*** -4.821*** 
 (1.566) (0.992) (1.044) (1.485) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,316 4,611 1,590 4,341 
pseudo-R2 0.441 0.387 0.350 0.423 
Log-Likelihood -430.8 -1289 -486.9 -1237 
Notes Table 2.9 reports the results for the firm replies to the sentiment and intensity of comments and 
emoticons after posting each type of disclosure. EMOTION_SENTIMENT is measured by computing the 
Janis-Fadner coefficient between the number of positive emoticons (love, haha, and wow) and negative 
emoticons (sad and angry). COMMENT_SENTIMENT is measured by computing the Janis-Fadner 
coefficient between the number of positive comments and negative ones. EMOTION_LOG is the logarithm 
transformation of the total number of emoticons (like, love, haha, wow, sad, and angry). 
COMMENTS_LOG is the logarithm transformation of the total number of comments. The regression model 






2.5.4.2 Stakeholder Reactions between Consumer- and Non-Consumer-
Facing Industries 
 It is also possible that the impact of hypocrisy and façade strategies on 
stakeholder reactions are driven by the types of business and the main 
stakeholder groups they are dealing with on Facebook. Since retailers and 
consumer-facing industries are more likely to engage with individual 
consumers, while business-to-business companies are more likely to deal with 
stakeholders other than individual consumers on Facebook, it also becomes 
important to understand how different groups of stakeholders react to corporate 
CSR hypocrisy and façade disclosures. To perform this analysis, the sample 
was separated into consumer-facing and non-consumer-facing industries, and 
then stakeholder reactions to CSR actions disclosures and CSR progressive 
and reputational façade disclosures are regressed within both industry 
groups.14  Table 2.10 presents the results examining stakeholder reactions 
towards CSR actions disclosures. Panel A shows stakeholder reactions to CSR 
actions disclosures in consumer-facing industries, while Panel B shows 
stakeholder reactions in non-consumer facing industries. As per the main 
results, actions disclosures receive more likes, shares and comments than talk 
                                            
14 Consumer facing industries include multi-line insurance, property and casualty insurance, 
internet and direct marketing retail, consumer finance, diversified banks, pharmaceuticals, 
cable and satellite, hypermarkets and super centres, drug retail, movies and entertainment, 
electric utilities, automobile manufacturers, internet software and services, air freight and 
logistics, home improvement retail, packaged foods and meats, soft drinks, data processing 
and outsourced services, life and health insurance, consumer oriented system software, 
footwear, restaurants, retail REITs, integrated telecommunication services, general 
merchandise stores and managed healthcare. 
Non-consumer facing industries include biotechnology, healthcare equipment, IT consulting 
and other services, aerospace and defence, asset management custody banks, construction 
machinery and heavy trucks, oil and gas exploration and production, communication 
equipment, integrated oil and gas, diversified chemicals, electrical components and equipment, 
industrial conglomerates, investment banking and brokerage, oil and gas equipment and 
services, semiconductors, oil and gas storage and transportation, fertilizers and agricultural 
chemicals, business oriented systems software and railroads. 
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and decisions disclosures within both industries. Similarly, CSR actions 
disclosures are more likely than talk and decisions disclosures to receive all 
types of specific reactions from both consumer-facing and non-consumer facing 
industries. These results suggest that stakeholders tend to have divergent 




Table 2.10 Stakeholder Reactions on CSR Hypocrisy D isclosures between Consumer and Non-Consumer Facing  Industries 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACTIONS 1.033*** 0.803*** 0.714*** 1.020*** 0.926*** 0.946*** 0.785*** 0.667*** 0.530*** 0.630*** 
 (0.093) (0.082) (0.082) (0.121) (0.105) (0.120) (0.131) (0.125) (0.107) (0.104) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 3,212 3,212 3,212 2,957 2,975 2,947 2,906 2,919 2,904 2,965 
pseudo-R2 0.120 0.105 0.119 0.311 0.223 0.269 0.197 0.310 0.246 0.276 
Log-Likelihood -20164 -14240 -10658 -1311 -1466 -1041 -936.2 -1104 -1502 -1424 
           
Panel B. Stakeholder Reactions on CSR Hypocrisy Actions Disclosures from Non-Consumer Facing Industries 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
ACTIONS 0.859*** 0.735*** 0.850*** 0.751*** 1.074*** 0.771*** 1.168*** 0.905*** 0.658*** 0.774*** 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.106) (0.099) (0.116) (0.150) (0.124) (0.093) (0.105) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,833 3,666 3,568 3,575 3,892 3,833 
pseudo-R2 0.0761 0.0934 0.110 0.282 0.238 0.190 0.193 0.264 0.226 0.276 
Log-Likelihood -23443 -16012 -10119 -1870 -1827 -1222 -755.8 -1084 -2087 -1543 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Notes Table 2.10 reports the results on stakeholder reactions on CSR hypocrisy disclosures used in Facebook posts between consumer and non-consumer facing industries. Consumer facing 
industries include multi-line insurance, property and casualty insurance, internet and direct marketing retail, consumer finance, diversified banks, pharmaceuticals, cable and satellite, hypermarkets 
and super centres, drug retail, movies and entertainment, electric utilities, automobile manufacturers, internet software and services, air freight and logistics, home improvement retail, packaged foods 
and meats, soft drinks, data processing and outsourced services, life and health insurance, system software, footwear, restaurants, retail REITs, integrated telecommunication services, general 
merchandise stores, and managed healthcare. Panel A/B presents the results from regressing the number of likes (Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 
3) for each post on the CSR hypocrisy actions disclosure strategy in the post from consumer facing/non-consumer facing industries. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in 
brackets) robust standard errors. Panel A also presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving at least one ‘love’ emoticon (Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon 
(Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment (Column 6), or a negative comment (Column 7) in each post on the organised hypocrisy actions 
disclosure strategy used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors.  Control variables are omitted for brevity and are the same as in Table 7. 




 Table 2.11 presents the results examining stakeholder reactions towards 
CSR progressive and reputational façade disclosures. Panel A shows 
stakeholder reactions to CSR progressive and reputational façade disclosures 
in consumer-facing industries, while Panel B shows stakeholder reactions in 
non-consumer facing industries. The effects of REPUTATIONAL on 
stakeholder reactions are consistent with the main findings wherein the 
reputational façade is more likely to attract the ‘love’ emoticon than rational 
façade disclosures, and less likely to attract an ‘angry’ reaction and negative 
comments than both rational and progressive façade disclosures. This 
suggests that stakeholder groups from different industries tend to have similar 
reactions towards reputational façade disclosures. In addition, the results show 
that reputational façade disclosures receive fewer comments in consumer-
facing industries, suggesting individual consumers tend to react with emoticons 
instead of commenting under the posts.  
 In terms of progressive façade disclosures, the results show that 
PROGRESSIVE attracts more general and specific reactions from stakeholders 
in non-consumer-facing industries, while such effects, except ‘love’ reactions, 
are not significant in consumer-facing industries. This may imply that different 
types of stakeholder, possibly employees, investors, activists and institutional 
clients engage with companies on social media, indicating that social media is 




Table 2.11 Stakeholder Reactions on CSR Façade Disc losures between Consumer and Non-Consumer Facing In dustries 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PROGRESSIVE 0.060 -0.124 -0.123 0.413* 0.190 0.038 -0.443 -0.007 -0.210 -0.045 
 (0.177) (0.118) (0.143) (0.215) (0.233) (0.330) (0.325) (0.272) (0.194) (0.201) 
REPUTATIONAL -0.105 -0.085 -0.267** 0.467** -0.076 -0.061 -0.698** -0.647** -0.369** -0.328* 
 (0.189) (0.114) (0.130) (0.206) (0.226) (0.319) (0.310) (0.261) (0.185) (0.192) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,037 3,055 3,027 2,986 2,999 2,984 3,045 
pseudo-R2 0.111 0.0978 0.113 0.288 0.198 0.249 0.186 0.301 0.238 0.265 
Log-Likelihood -20372 -14356 -10734 -1390 -1552 -1085 -962.9 -1157 -1555 -1478 
Within Regression 
F Test  (Progressive 
= Reputational) 4.02** 0.24 2.34 0.26 6.12** 0.53 3.03* 25.07*** 2.4 6.66*** 
Panel B. Stakeholder Reactions on CSR Progressive and Reputational Façade Disclosures from Non-Consumer Facing Industries 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PROGRESSIVE 0.290*** 0.273** 0.267** 0.358** 0.345** -0.042 0.743** -0.046 -0.131 -0.002 
 (0.092) (0.136) (0.130) (0.164) (0.163) (0.209) (0.324) (0.193) (0.147) (0.166) 
REPUTATIONAL 0.174** -0.029 0.032 0.287* -0.073 -0.052 0.401 -0.324* -0.036 -0.441*** 
 (0.082) (0.134) (0.121) (0.154) (0.157) (0.207) (0.322) (0.186) (0.137) (0.159) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,833 3,666 3,568 3,575 3,892 3,833 
pseudo-R2 0.0689 0.0886 0.100 0.273 0.217 0.175 0.165 0.248 0.217 0.268 
Log-Likelihood -23625 -16097 -10232 -1895 -1878 -1243 -782.2 -1107 -2112 -1560 
Within Regression 
F Test  (Progressive 
= Reputational) 1.64 10.71*** 7.94*** 0.53 19.44*** 0.01 5.02** 4.7** 1.04 17.25*** 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly.  
Notes Table 2.11 reports the results on stakeholder reactions on CSR façade disclosures used in Facebook posts between consumer and non-consumer facing industries. Panel A/B presents the 
results from regressing the number of likes (Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) for each post on the CSR progressive and reputational façade 
disclosure strategy in the post from consumer facing/non-consumer facing industries. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. Panel A also 
presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving at least one ‘love’ emoticon (Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an 
‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment (Column 6), or a negative comment (Column 7) in each post on progressive and reputational façade used in the post. The table reports logistic 
coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. Within regression F test is performed by testing the difference between progressive and reputational coefficients. Control variables are 
omitted for brevity and are the same as in Table 8. All variables are defined in Table 1.1 and 1.2. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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2.5.4.3 Robustness Test 
 To eliminate the possibility that some days may have more significant 
effects on stakeholder reactions, additional robustness tests to control for day 
characteristics are conducted. The results shown in Table 2.12 are largely 
consistent with the main analysis, as the coefficients of independent variables 
changed only slightly and none of the directions is reversed. This leads to the 
conclusion that the day characteristic has no impact on findings. 
To eliminate the possibility that the findings were driven by model 
specification (NB and Logit model), OLS was also used to verify the results. In 
the OLS model, the logarithm transformation of stakeholder reactions were 
used as the dependent variables due to its heavily positive skew. Overall, the 
results shown in Table 2.13 are largely consistent with the ones in the main 





Table 2.12 Robustness Test on Stakeholder Reactions  and CSR Hypocrisy and Façade Disclosures with Day Fixed Effect 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACTIONS 0.750*** 0.562*** 0.479*** 1.140*** 0.717*** 0.408*** 0.676*** 0.614*** 0.675*** 0.352*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0525) (0.0519) (0.0804) (0.0728) (0.0783) (0.0914) (0.0841) (0.0723) (0.0734) 
TALK -0.0649* -0.107*** -0.192*** 0.367*** -0.238*** -0.387*** -0.233*** -0.134** 0.0808 -0.289*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0543) (0.0537) (0.0641) (0.0795) (0.0670) (0.0512) (0.0548) 
DECISIONS -0.00815 0.101 -0.182** 0.265** -0.111 -0.193 -0.163 0.242* 0.0628 -0.158 
 (0.0829) (0.0834) (0.0782) (0.111) (0.112) (0.135) (0.158) (0.137) (0.102) (0.117) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.0527*** 0.199*** 0.126*** -0.0776*** 0.0481** 0.0338 0.0297 -0.0402* 0.0674*** 0.0704*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0221) (0.0141) (0.0213) (0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0262) (0.0217) (0.0198) (0.0199) 
VISUALS 0.320*** 0.361*** 0.486*** 0.471*** 0.391*** 0.439*** 0.165** 0.150*** 0.275*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0326) (0.0488) (0.0463) (0.0542) (0.0644) (0.0559) (0.0450) (0.0471) 
URL -0.155*** -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.305*** -0.149*** -0.178*** -0.102* -0.0405 -0.195*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0355) (0.0518) (0.0475) (0.0521) (0.0615) (0.0553) (0.0486) (0.0492) 
HASHTAG 0.0983*** 0.107*** 0.120*** 0.197*** 0.0283 0.149*** 0.122** 0.0182 -0.00413 0.0278 
 (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0338) (0.0454) (0.0439) (0.0482) (0.0588) (0.0509) (0.0428) (0.0450) 
SIZE 1.001*** 0.888** 0.684** 0.308 0.935** 1.453*** 1.631*** 3.155*** -0.690* 0.224 
 (0.306) (0.352) (0.344) (0.448) (0.390) (0.475) (0.542) (0.528) (0.419) (0.494) 
CONSTANT -8.699** -8.671** -8.524** -5.051 -12.91** -20.31*** -20.90*** -40.10*** 6.242 0.410 
 (3.386) (3.934) (3.826) (5.026) (5.037) (6.093) (6.922) (6.805) (4.713) (6.323) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Date FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations(1) 21,166 21,166 21,166 20,702 20,614 20,646 20,219 20,721 20,449 20,933 
pseudo-R2 0.0835 0.0964 0.125 0.362 0.297 0.277 0.230 0.364 0.313 0.352 
Log-Likelihood -137849 -96773 -74700 -8409 -9772 -8349 -6031 -7367 -9295 -9278 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Notes Table 2.12 reports the results on stakeholder reactions to CSR hypocrisy disclosure used in Facebook posts with day fixed effect. Panel A presents the results from regressing the number of 
likes (Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) for each post on the CSR hypocrisy disclosure strategy (talk, decisions, or actions) used in the post. The 
table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. Panel A also presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving at least one ‘love’ emoticon 
(Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment (Column 6), or a negative comment (Column 
7) in each post on the organised hypocrisy disclosure strategy (talk, decision, or action) used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors.  All 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
PROGRESSIVE 0.114* 0.0315 0.0107 0.365*** 0.289** -0.124 0.151 -0.0627 -0.111 -0.0492 
 (0.0586) (0.0735) (0.0808) (0.137) (0.143) (0.193) (0.232) (0.167) (0.125) (0.137) 
REPUTATIONAL -0.0460 -0.185*** -0.176** 0.335** -0.0985 -0.161 -0.144 -0.523*** -0.125 -0.482*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0705) (0.0759) (0.130) (0.139) (0.191) (0.226) (0.160) (0.118) (0.133) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.143*** 0.0757* 0.175*** 0.00717 0.106 0.0764 0.242** -0.143 0.267*** 0.136 
 (0.0350) (0.0415) (0.0422) (0.0776) (0.0764) (0.0946) (0.113) (0.105) (0.0731) (0.0832) 
VISUALS 0.213*** 0.273*** 0.337*** 0.305*** 0.398*** 0.120 0.0305 0.0982 0.203*** 0.211** 
 (0.0382) (0.0434) (0.0452) (0.0849) (0.0808) (0.102) (0.117) (0.101) (0.0746) (0.0823) 
URL -0.205*** -0.150*** -0.0960** -0.381*** -0.190** -0.197* -0.0327 0.0898 -0.249*** -0.0457 
 (0.0386) (0.0440) (0.0449) (0.0869) (0.0816) (0.106) (0.120) (0.103) (0.0777) (0.0871) 
HASHTAG 0.0251 0.150*** 0.140*** 0.108 -0.101 0.192* 0.166 0.00600 -0.00785 0.0785 
 (0.0384) (0.0436) (0.0462) (0.0771) (0.0765) (0.103) (0.123) (0.102) (0.0706) (0.0824) 
SIZE 0.0550 -0.105 -0.0903 0.472 0.590 -0.0739 0.419 3.031*** 0.127 0.165 
 (0.298) (0.357) (0.408) (0.661) (0.593) (0.800) (1.088) (0.985) (0.572) (0.762) 
CONSTANT 1.590 3.410 0.0331 -6.894 -8.356 0.694 -6.253 -35.86*** -5.457 -2.196 
 (3.301) (3.983) (4.515) (7.366) (7.605) (10.22) (13.77) (12.60) (6.491) (9.731) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Date FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,104 7,104 7,104 6,766 6,791 6,347 5,700 6,278 6,833 6,758 
pseudo-R2 0.121 0.112 0.141 0.331 0.261 0.274 0.254 0.343 0.264 0.323 
Log-Likelihood -43137 -29849 -20414 -3001 -3173 -2104 -1529 -2041 -3472 -2818 
(1) I lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Panel B presents the results from regressing the number of likes (Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number of comments (Column 3) in each CSR post on the progressive and 
reputational façade used in the post with day fixed effect. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the baseline effect is the effect of 
rational façade strategy on each stakeholder general reaction. Panel B presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving a ‘love’ emoticon (Column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (Column 2), a 
‘haha’ emoticon (Column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (Column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (Column 5), a positive comment (Column 6), and a negative comment (Column 7) in each post on the progressive and 
reputational façade used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the baseline effect is the effect of rational façade strategy on each 




Table 2.13 OLS Robustness Test 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
ACT 0.751*** 0.518*** 0.346*** 0.639*** 0.258*** 0.054*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.361*** 0.136*** 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.031) (0.025) 
TALK 0.014 -0.068*** -0.115*** 0.082*** -0.187*** -0.106*** -0.006 -0.023** -0.058*** -0.104*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.015) 
DECISION -0.000 0.069 -0.061 0.047 -0.090** -0.085*** 0.001 0.037* -0.029 -0.060** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.039) (0.030) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.033*** 0.273*** 0.064*** 0.001 0.044*** 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.058*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
VISUALS 0.216*** 0.175*** 0.238*** 0.297*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.018** 0.016* 0.196*** 0.069*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) 
URL -0.143*** -0.058** -0.117*** -0.180*** -0.063*** -0.057*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.119*** -0.044*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.016) 
HASHTAG 0.060*** 0.119*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.027* 0.044*** 0.002 -0.012 0.018 -0.003 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) 
SIZE 2.169*** 0.834*** 1.087*** 2.343*** 1.234*** 1.355*** 0.347*** 0.850*** 1.158*** 1.104*** 
 (0.187) (0.209) (0.174) (0.177) (0.143) (0.144) (0.069) (0.081) (0.169) (0.131) 
CONSTANT -22.625*** -10.031*** -12.343*** -26.093*** -13.889*** -15.031*** -3.883*** -9.425*** -13.153*** -12.413*** 
 (2.072) (2.318) (1.927) (1.968) (1.593) (1.597) (0.770) (0.901) (1.873) (1.454) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 21,166 
R-squared 0.591 0.504 0.598 0.526 0.364 0.312 0.143 0.470 0.532 0.545 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
PROGRESSIVE 0.121** 0.019 0.035 0.180*** 0.152*** 0.048** 0.027 0.004 -0.006 0.029 
 (0.051) (0.058) (0.047) (0.045) (0.042) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.044) (0.035) 
REPUTATIONAL -0.000 -0.150*** -0.073* 0.184*** -0.036 0.015 -0.012 -0.074*** -0.069* -0.117*** 
 (0.047) (0.054) (0.044) (0.042) (0.038) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.041) (0.031) 
CHARACTER_LOG 0.097*** 0.054 0.119*** 0.066** 0.049* -0.001 0.030* 0.005 0.135*** 0.029 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029) (0.022) 
VISUALS 0.181*** 0.145*** 0.180*** 0.232*** 0.099*** 0.051*** 0.017 0.010 0.143*** 0.042** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020) 
URL -0.147*** -0.029 -0.042 -0.165*** -0.036 -0.006 -0.002 0.012 -0.080*** -0.010 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020) 
HASHTAG 0.003 0.098*** 0.048* 0.057* -0.011 0.013 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.027) (0.019) 
SIZE 1.379*** 0.379 0.537** 1.556*** 0.807*** 0.200** 0.234*** 0.370*** 0.561** 0.569*** 
 (0.264) (0.304) (0.246) (0.242) (0.189) (0.094) (0.084) (0.088) (0.230) (0.153) 
CONSTANT -14.001*** -3.722 -6.509** -17.624*** -9.283*** -2.272** -2.768*** -4.111*** -6.833*** -6.437*** 
 (2.936) (3.387) (2.740) (2.695) (2.101) (1.055) (0.937) (0.987) (2.559) (1.713) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 
R-squared 0.568 0.478 0.547 0.478 0.318 0.263 0.123 0.460 0.479 0.525 
Adjusted R2 0.562 0.472 0.541 0.472 0.310 0.254 0.113 0.454 0.473 0.519 
Notes Table 2.13 reports robustness test using OLS regression. Panel A reports the OLS regression on CSR hypocrisy disclosures. Panel B reports the OLS regression on progressive and reputational 
façade disclosures. LN_LIKES is the log transformation of the total number of likes. LN_SHARES is the log transformation of the total number of shares. LN_COMMENTS is the log transformation of 
the total number of comments. LN_LOVES is the log transformation of the total number of loves. LN_WOWS is the log transformation of the total number of wows. LN_HAHAS is the log transformation 
of the total number of hahas. LN_SADS is the log transformation of the total number of sads. LN_ANGRYS is the log transformation of the total number of angrys. LN_PSCOUNT is the log transformation 






 Discussion and Conclusions 
Using the organised hypocrisy theory (Brunsson, 1989, 1993, 2007) and 
organisational façade framework (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008), the purpose 
of this study is to further extend the findings in Cho et al. (2015) and investigate 
how stakeholders perceive the legitimation strategies employed in corporate 
CSR disclosures on Facebook. By focusing on the dynamic interactions 
between corporate disclosure strategies and stakeholder subsequent reactions 
at a Facebook message level, this study demonstrates that stakeholders exhibit 
diverse reactions towards corporate CSR hypocrisy and façade disclosures and 
the intensity and sentiment of their reactions also have an effect on corporate 
post-disclosure responses to stakeholder comments. 
 In examining the first hypotheses (H1), the empirical findings show that 
talk and decisions disclosures lead to positive stakeholder reactions. Brunsson 
(2007) argues that the success of employing organised hypocrisy depends on 
stakeholders’ assumptions that corporate talk leads to corresponding decisions 
and actions. The findings suggest that corporate CSR talk disclosures are more 
likely than non-CSR posts to attract ‘love’ and are less likely than non-CSR 
posts to attract negative reactions, including ‘sad’, ‘angry” and negative 
stakeholder comments. The results also show that CSR talk disclosures are 
associated with fewer shares and a lower likelihood of receiving positive 
emoticons such as ‘wow’ and ‘haha’. With regard to CSR decisions disclosures, 
it is found that these have a high likelihood of attracting both positive and 
negative emotions (‘love’ and ‘angry’), indicating that stakeholders hold 
divergent views towards corporate decisions. The empirical results confirm the 
assumption that stakeholders believe in the causal relationship among talk, 
89 
 
decisions and actions because both CSR talk and decisions disclosures are 
associated with a high likelihood of receiving ‘love’. The negative association 
between talk disclosures and stakeholder negative reactions is probably 
explained by corporate commitments and values being consistent with social 
expectations (Christensen et al., 2013). As a result, stakeholders are less likely 
to criticise a wish that everyone is hoping for (Brunsson, 2006). What’s more, 
since these expressed social and environmental commitments are often taken 
for granted by social members, corporate talk is less likely to impress 
stakeholders on Facebook resulting in a lower likelihood of receiving ‘wow’ and 
‘haha’. However, once companies have made decisions on a specific CSR 
issue, stakeholders start to show divergent views as the conflicts among them 
begin to crystallise. This is a possible reason as to why decisions disclosures 
attract opposite reactions.  As Brunsson (2007, pp. 116–117) argues: 
“Without hypocrisy, one party or interest would be completely 
satisfied and all others completely dissatisfied. With hypocrisy, 
several parties and interests can be somewhat satisfied…[because] 
neither party has their needs fully met, but neither is anyone left 
completely satisfied.” 
Because stakeholders assume that corporate decisions will increase the 
likelihood of corresponding actions, those who might benefit from such a 
decision will express strong support even though companies have not taken 
any action. In contrast, those who are concerned with other issues may express 
strong objections. However, these oppositions are only present in emoticons 
but not reflected in comments, and the result shows a high likelihood of 
receiving positive rather than negative reactions. Overall, the legitimacy of 
organisations can be maintained as stakeholders are more likely to react 
positively to talk and decisions disclosures.     
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 The second hypothesis confirms whether stakeholders react to 
corporate actions disclosures. Prior literature suggests that firm legitimacy is 
only driven by hard or factual information (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Brown et al., 
2009). Although actions disclosures are more likely to gain legitimacy from 
stakeholders (reflected in positive emotions and comments), the results show 
that they are associated with a higher likelihood of receiving negative responses 
(e.g. ‘sad’, ‘angry’ and negative comments). In contrast to previous arguments 
that corporate legitimacy can only be achieved if hard information is disclosed, 
it is more likely that actions disclosures will attract divergent stakeholder 
reactions. In fact, the presence of all talk, decisions and actions disclosures 
employed in Facebook CSR disclosures suggest that companies may need all 
three strategies to gain legitimacy. Companies need to continuously close the 
gaps among talk, decisions and actions through frequent updates on their 
progressions in order to ensure the stability of hypocrisy (Brunsson, 2007) and 
to buy more time and flexibility in meeting divergent demands (Cho et al., 2015; 
Christensen et al., 2013). Because it is impossible for companies to achieve 
progress in all areas at once, actions disclosures can never fully satisfy 
stakeholders as there are always some groups who will demand more or 
demand a response to other issues. Thus, actions disclosures attract both 
positive and negative reactions.  
When examining whether the intensity of stakeholder reaction towards 
CSR actions disclosures is greater than talk and decisions disclosures (H3), the 
results confirm this hypothesis and show that actions disclosures not only 
receive more positive stakeholder reactions but also more negative responses 
than talk and decisions disclosures. Overall, the results support organised 
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hypocrisy theory whereby talk and decisions can indeed gain a “related value” 
and partially meet divergent stakeholder interests (Brunsson, 2007). Actions 
disclosures also attract more debate among stakeholders, while talk and 
decisions can gain stakeholders’ support and ease their negative reactions. 
Therefore, this study supplements the findings in Cho et al. (2015) and 
demonstrates that hypocrisy strategies on social media can help companies 
maintain or gain legitimacy from stakeholder groups who have divergent and 
conflicting interests. 
The last set of hypotheses explores whether there is a pecking order 
among the three organisational façades. The empirical results show marginal 
support as reputational façade disclosures are more likely to attract ‘love’ and 
less likely to attract ‘sad’ and ‘angry’ responses than the rational façade: 
indeed, the effect of the reputational façade on other reactions is insignificant 
compared to the rational façade. Similarly, progressive façade disclosures 
exhibit the strongest effects only on the number of ‘likes’ and the likelihood of 
receiving ‘wow’, suggesting that stakeholders are impressed with the 
progression of companies. A possible reason for this weak support is that the 
rational façade mainly follows market logic, hence it attracts more criticism than 
the reputational façade as shareholders are probably not the main audience on 
social media. In contrast, the reputational façade presents a positive corporate 
image so it attracts more positive and fewer negative emotions. Cho et al. 
(2015) argue that the central feature of a progressive façade is innovation and 
reform in CSR practices, which, on one hand, may depart from a rational 
underpinning, but on the other hand, may also align with corporate committed 
goals and objectives. As a result, the progressive façade is more likely than the 
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other façades to receive both extreme reactions. These results also suggest 
that most CSR posts on Facebook try to erect a reputational façade, implying 
firms’ strategies to shape positive stakeholder perceptions and reduce negative 
concerns. However, the presence of the progressive façade on social media 
may also imply that companies know the sole use of a reputational façade on 
social media will increase the likelihood of exposing organised hypocrisy, hence 
the disclosure of their progression to reduce the risk of exposing hypocrisy 
(Brunsson, 2007; Cho et al., 2015).  
In additional analyses, this study investigates how companies respond 
to stakeholder comments after posting CSR disclosures. The results show that 
companies are more likely to respond when there is a high intensity of 
comments with more positive comments and less likely to do so when there is 
a high intensity of positive emotional reactions. Consistent with prior studies on 
social media stakeholder engagement (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti 
& Bellucci, 2016), companies merely use social media as a tool to manage 
stakeholder perceptions for legitimacy or reputation risk management purposes 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). Once a large number of stakeholders under a post 
express compliments, those who have criticisms tend to be ignored. As Cho et 
al. (2015, p. 91) discuss in their study, whether organised hypocrisy and 
organisational façades bring any beneficial change to firms and the wider 
society is still questionable. Organised hypocrisy and organisational façade 
strategies present a dubious advantage as they can be used for both good and 
bad intentions. Engaging in hypocrisy and façade strategies may be a 
necessary choice for companies to achieve long-term CSR commitments, but 
such progress can only be established under a pro-active stakeholder 
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engagement approach (Bebbington et al., 2007; Thomson & Bebbington, 
2005). Prior studies often show that corporate engagement on social media are 
largely based on one-way communication, and that stakeholder concerns and 
criticism are often neglected (Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; 
Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). While companies use talk 
and decisions disclosures to construct rational, progressive and rational 
façades, they also need to actively seek stakeholder opinions. Therefore, 
companies need to actively engage with stakeholders on social media and turn 
their aspirational talk and decisions into realities (Christensen et al., 2013).  
 
 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Researc h 
 This study is not without limitations. Firstly, it assumes that the users on 
social media are stakeholders of a company and their reactions reflect their 
perceptions towards corporate disclosures. Although the separation between 
consumer and non-consumer facing industries may provide some glimpse into 
the reactions of different stakeholder groups, their profiles cannot be precisely 
identified and categorised in this study. Furthermore, companies may disclose 
different strategies depending on the importance of stakeholders (Brunsson, 
2007). Future studies may be necessary to conduct surveys or interviews to 
explore how stakeholders from different groups may perceive hypocrisy and 
façade strategies, and how companies select strategies according to 
stakeholder salience level (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Secondly, this study 
only focuses on a single social media platform (i.e. Facebook). As Cho et al. 
(2015) suggest, companies may try to erect discrepant façades across various 
platforms, such as annual reports, CSR reports, corporate websites, Twitter, 
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YouTube, Facebook and so on. Therefore, in order to reveal more insight into 
how façades are erected towards stakeholders and how stakeholder 
perceptions differ among them, more case studies are needed to focus on firm-
level disclosures and assess all CSR communication platforms. Thirdly, this 
study cannot differentiate between accounts that are operated by firms or an 
outsourced PR company. Third-party PR firms may employ more sophisticated 
sentiment monitoring software with the objective of maintaining high level 
positive reactions. As a result, those companies may not pay attention to the 
issues that people criticise, but only emphasise the positive opinions of users 
on social media. Future studies may conduct qualitative research by going 
behind the stage and exploring how corporate social media officers (or third-
party PR firms) engage with their (or their clients’) stakeholders.  
 
 Managerial Implications 
Despite the presence of the limitations outlined above, this study may 
provide some guidance to managers. An over-emphasis on the number of 
positive emoticons and comments that stakeholders provide on Facebook may 
potentially mislead managers in assuming that corporate legitimacy can be 
obtained by merely erecting rational, progressive and reputational façades 
using talk and decisions disclosures. Managers should understand that 
divergent stakeholder interests present on social media will never allow 
companies to achieve positive reactions from all stakeholders at one time. 
Positive reactions obtained from talk and decisions disclosures may persist in 
the short term, but not in the long run (Christensen et al., 2013). Therefore 
managers should pay close attention to the countersignals that stakeholders 
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are sending (Saxton et al., 2019) and actively engage with people who have 
concerns. Although actions disclosures may attract both positive and negative 
reactions, companies should not over-use talk and decisions disclosures while 
reducing their actions disclosures. In order to bring potential improvements to 
corporate CSR practices, managers should frequently update their CSR 







3 Social Media Engagement of Advocacy NGOs and 
Stakeholder Support – The Case of the Greenpeace 
“Save the Arctic” Campaign 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how social media may assist Advocacy 
NGOs (A-NGOS) in enhancing their downward accountability. A-NGOs play an 
important role in society in improving social justice and promoting social change 
for marginalised groups (Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017). While it is widely agreed that 
A-NGOs have upward accountability towards patrons or donors who provide 
funds for sustaining their work (Agyemang, O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Awumbila, 
2017; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007), several studies 
argue that A-NGOs are also accountable to a broad range of stakeholders who 
are directly and indirectly impacted by outcomes resulting from advocacy 
activities (Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006; O’Dwyer, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008, 2010; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). According to this view, every 
stakeholder has a basic right to express opinions and participate in decisions 
on matters that may affect themselves (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman 
& Bennett, 2004), and the need for such engagement grows when the potential 
impacts on that individual stakeholder intensify (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b).  
To discharge downward accountability, A-NGOs are required to actively 
engage with stakeholders to help them assess the nature and impact of 
advocacy activities, and then to improve the effectiveness of mission attainment 
and long-term sustainable social impacts (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). Through active stakeholder engagement, A-
97 
 
NGOs are able to consult and ascertain the actual needs of stakeholders and 
respond to those whom they seek to assist (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004). A-NGOs also communicate and disseminate 
information regarding their advocated issues, findings and progress made 
through engagement in order to raise stakeholder awareness; identify 
(potential) stakeholders upon whom their work may have an impact (Unerman 
& O’Dwyer, 2006b); seek stakeholder support on advocacy activities to facilitate 
future collective actions (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Gallhofer, 
Haslam, Monk, & Roberts, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and bring about 
potential environmental and social changes (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Islam 
& van Staden, 2018; King & Soule, 2007; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). 
Several accounting studies have examined a number of mechanisms used 
by A-NGOs to communicate with stakeholders such as press release (Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2014), counter accounts (Denedo, Thomson, & Yonekura, 
2017; Dey, Russell, & Thomson, 2010; Laine & Vinnari, 2017; Thomson, Dey, 
& Russell, 2015; Tregidga, 2017), social account and auditing (Ebrahim, 2003; 
O’Dwyer, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008) and focus groups (Agyemang, 
Unerman, Awumbila, & O’Dwyer, 2009). However, in all these studies, 
considerable obstacles for greater downward accountability are still present. 
Firstly, A-NGOs face difficulties in identifying and engaging with (potential) 
stakeholders to raise awareness and consult their opinions about advocacy 
activities on a large scale, which may result in a failure to recognise the broader 
impacts that these activities have on stakeholders, and increase the risk of a 
narrow approach to accountability (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This inability to 
engage with a wide range of stakeholders may also lead to another obstacle: 
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the difficulty in making stakeholders understand the importance of advocated 
issues and in obtaining their support for the work of A-NGOs (Denedo et al., 
2017; Irvine & Moerman, 2017; Laine & Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017). The 
lack of stakeholder support may hinder the effectiveness of future mission 
attainment and the generation of potential social and environmental changes 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).  
In recent years, social media have become a key platform for NGO-
stakeholder engagement (Arnaboldi et al., 2017; Guo & Saxton, 2018; Lovejoy 
et al., 2012; Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Xu & Saxton, 2018). Social media are 
renowned for both high interactivity between disseminators and audiences 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2018; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & 
Bellucci, 2016; Neu et al., 2019; She & Michelon, 2019) and high autonomy in 
content production without being constrained by the limitations of traditional 
media (Castelló et al., 2013; Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Lee et al., 
2013). Social media also have the advantage of wide information dissemination 
at a relatively low cost (Blankespoor, 2018; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). As 
such, social media have the potential to enhance A-NGO accountability by 
facilitating large-scale stakeholder engagement (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; 
Gallhofer et al., 2006; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Gómez-Carrasco & 
Michelon, 2017; Neu et al., 2018, 2019; Unerman & Bennett, 2004).  
Previous literature mainly focuses on how A-NGOs use social media 
features such as hashtags, URLs or “mentions” to attract stakeholder attention 
and accumulate social media capital on application platforms (Guo & Saxton, 
2018; Lovejoy et al., 2012; Saxton & Waters, 2014; Xu & Saxton, 2018). 
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However, more work is needed into how A-NGOs communicate advocacy 
information with stakeholders and whether such engagement may generate an 
impact outside social media platforms (Neu et al., 2018, 2019; Quinn, Lynn, 
Jollands, & Nair, 2016; Saxton & Wang, 2013; Xu & Saxton, 2018). This 
question has become particularly pertinent given the increasing criticism of 
social media “clicktivism” – a like-clicking activity (Morozov, 2009; White, 2010) 
and the use of social media for non-public-interested purposes (Flyverbom et 
al., 2019; Neu et al., 2018).  
Drawing on Castells' (2011, 2012, 2013) network-making power 
perspective, this chapter examines how A-NGOs communicate advocacy 
information to attract stakeholder engagement, and whether the effectiveness 
and global dissemination of advocacy information may lead to the attainment of 
large-scale stakeholder support outside social media. Castells (2011, 2012, 
2013) argues that social media have the ability to promote an alternative 
worldview through its dialogic function (programming capacity), and the ability 
to widely disseminate information to reach a wider, global society (switching 
capacity). Both capacities play an influential role in forming collective actions 
(Castells, 2011, 2012, 2013). To attract stakeholder engagement, A-NGOs may 
communicate advocacy information that appeals to logic and emotions with 
(potential) stakeholders (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Castells, 2012; Vinnari 
& Laine, 2017). The scale of stakeholder engagement may also be widened by 
cooperating with multiple social media accounts to increase the extent of 
information dissemination (Castells, 2013). Through social media engagement, 
a broad range of stakeholders can learn about and express opinions on how 
advocated issues may have an impact their lives, and then decide whether to 
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give support to A-NGO activities (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). The support gained from these 
stakeholders will allow A-NGOs to better identify who their work might have an 
impact on (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008) and further engage with them to 
increase the success of future campaigns (Castells, 2012, 2013; Irvine & 
Moerman, 2017; Laine & Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017).  
This study relies on the Greenpeace “Save the Arctic” (STA) campaign 
as the empirical setting. The STA is a global campaign which began in 2012 
and aims to tackle climate change and reduce corporate irresponsible 
environmental practices in the Arctic region (Allsopp, Santillo, & Johnston, 
2012; Greenpeace International, 2012). With the rising global temperature, 
glaciers and sea ice are disappearing and the sea level is rising, threatening 
millions of lives on the planet (Greenpeace International, 2019). By employing 
a unique dataset of internal Greenpeace petition signups (i.e. the proxy for 
stakeholder support) from over 236 countries and a sample of 8,336 
Greenpeace Facebook messages related to the STA campaigns in 29 
languages, this study examines Greenpeace Facebook engagement and its 
direct impact on the online petition signups for the STA campaign. After 
analysing social media engagement at the message level, this study finds that 
stakeholder engagement is positively related to the level of emotional appeal 
expressed in both textual and visual advocacy information, and, in particular, 
stakeholder engagement is driven by the use of negative emotive words and 
visuals containing Arctic animals. This study also finds that the level of logical 
appeal (which is the amount of specific information communicated in textual 
content) has a positive effect on message shares and reactions with positive 
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emoticons. The study then examines the effect of social media engagement on 
stakeholder support at both the Greenpeace Facebook account and network 
levels. This study finds that two factors lead to stakeholder support outside 
social media platforms (i.e. online petition signups): (1) the effectiveness of 
advocacy information in attracting stakeholder engagement (measured using 
Facebook emoticons, shares and comments that advocacy information 
attracts); and (2) the global dissemination of advocacy information (measured 
using the percentage of Greenpeace Facebook accounts involved in posting 
STA messages). Overall, the results suggest that social media can help A-
NGOs engage with stakeholders concerning an advocated issue, and that A-
NGOs can obtain large-scale stakeholder support beyond social media 
platforms through the use of social media (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; 
Guo & Saxton, 2018; Neu et al., 2018, 2019; She & Michelon, 2019; Xu & 
Saxton, 2018).  
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it extends 
NGO accounting and accountability literature by illustrating the potential of 
social media in enhancing the downward accountability of A-NGOs (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). Several studies have criticised 
the potential use of social media for non-public-interested purposes (Flyverbom 
et al., 2019; Neu et al., 2018) and the meaningless like-clicking activities under 
social media messages (Morozov, 2009; White, 2010). Given the important role 
of A-NGOs in advancing social interests (Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017; Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2006b), it is important to understand how social media may facilitate 
NGO-stakeholder engagement processes and their impact on stakeholder 
decision-making outside social media platforms (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 
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2017; Guo & Saxton, 2018; Neu et al., 2018, 2019; She & Michelon, 2019; Xu 
& Saxton, 2018). Employing Castells' (2011, 2012, 2013) network-making 
power theory and the unique data on Greenpeace online petition signups, this 
study shows that Greenpeace communicates emotional and specific advocacy 
information in Facebook posts to invite stakeholder assessment of and opinions 
about advocacy activities. The study also shows that the effectiveness and 
dissemination of advocacy information allow Greenpeace to obtain large-scale 
stakeholder support outside social media platforms. The study therefore 
highlights how social media can be used to help A-NGOs overcome the 
difficulties of inadequate stakeholder engagement (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b) and a lack of 
stakeholder support (Irvine & Moerman, 2017; Laine & Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 
2017) when fostering greater downward accountability.  
Second, this study adds to the literature by examining stakeholder 
reactions towards the information and strategies used in A-NGO 
communication. Extensive studies propose a number of strategies that A-NGOs 
or activist groups use in their communication to attract stakeholder attention 
and influence decision-making (Benford & Snow, 2000; Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017; Saxton & Guo, 2014; Saxton & Waters, 2014; 
Vinnari & Laine, 2017). The majority of these studies focus on communication 
strategies from a “preparer’s perspective” (Benford & Snow, 2000; Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017; Vinnari & Laine, 2017), and several recent 
studies have begun to explore the effect of interactive features such as 
hashtags, URLs and photos on stakeholder attention (Saxton & Guo, 2014; 
Saxton & Waters, 2014). However, the way in which stakeholders react to 
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textual and visual advocacy information remains unclear. This question is 
particularly important given the considerable difficulties that A-NGOs face in 
reaching potential stakeholders: it can therefore help them make a more 
effective assessment of the nature and impact of advocacy activities (O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008). By exploiting the unique interactive features on Facebook, 
this study finds that textual advocacy information that contains more emotive 
words, more specific terms, and visuals that show live beneficiaries of the 
advocacy campaign are more effective in attracting stakeholder engagement 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2017; Vinnari & 
Laine, 2017). In summary, these findings provide guidance on the approaches 
which A-NGOs can use to communicate with potential stakeholders on social 
media.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 
discusses the relationship between A-NGO accountability and stakeholder 
engagement. Section 3.3 discusses the role of social media in facilitating 
stakeholder engagement. Section 3.4 presents the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses development. Section 3.5 presents the research design, followed 
by Section 3.6 which presents the empirical findings. Lastly, Section 3.7 
concludes and discusses relevant implications for A-NGOs, limitations and 
ideas for future research. 
 
 A-NGO Accountability and Stakeholder Engagement 
A-NGOs engage in activities which involve raising public awareness, 
seeking stakeholder support, lobbying and campaigning to promote certain 
social and environmental interests and outcomes (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b, 
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2006a). Due to the potentially political nature of these activities and unintended 
consequences that may arise, a broad range of stakeholders may be directly or 
indirectly impacted (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). 
Therefore, it is argued that A-NGOs not only have upward accountability 
towards donors and patrons who provide access to key financial resources in 
sustaining advocacy activities (Agyemang et al., 2017; Awio, Northcott, & 
Lawrence, 2011; Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007), but also downward accountability to a range of stakeholder 
groups including individuals, communities, institutions and the environment in 
general (Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). As a result, every 
stakeholder enjoys the basic right to participate and express opinions on 
matters that may affect their lives, regardless of the power that the individual 
stakeholder holds in relation to others (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004). Furthermore, the greater the impact these activities have on 
individual lives, the greater the desire these stakeholders have to express their 
opinions and participate in the decision-making process (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2006b).  
 O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) argue that stakeholder engagement plays 
an important role in helping A-NGOs enhance downward accountability. 
Stakeholder engagement is defined as a process in which organisations 
actively communicate with stakeholders to understand their interests and 
enhance transparency regarding organisational practices to facilitate better 
stakeholder decision-making (Bebbington et al., 2007; O’Dwyer, 2005). 
Through active stakeholder engagement, A-NGOs can consult and ascertain 
the actual needs of these stakeholders, and incorporate these needs into the 
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planning and operation of A-NGO activities (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004). A-NGOs also communicate and disseminate 
advocacy information to raise stakeholder awareness, identify (potential) 
stakeholders upon whom their work may have an impact, and keep 
stakeholders informed about the findings and progress they have made on 
advocated issues. Once (potential) stakeholders understand the importance of 
advocacy activities and the impacts that may arise, they may provide support 
to A-NGOs works by signing petitions, making donations, joining protests and 
changing personal behaviours, thereby contributing to future collective actions 
(Davis et al., 2005; Gallhofer et al., 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and 
increasing the influence of A-NGOs on potential environmental and social 
change (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Islam & van Staden, 2018; King & Soule, 
2007; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009).  
 Several accounting studies have examined various mechanisms that A-
NGOs use to understand stakeholder needs, engage with stakeholders on 
advocated issues, and seek their support. However, these studies tend to 
conclude that considerable obstacles for enhanced downward accountability 
are still present. For example, O’Dwyer (2005) examines how a social 
accounting process evolves in an Irish overseas aid agency and how it can be 
used to enhance downward accountability. He finds that the organisation only 
uses social accounting as a management control device when external 
pressures which threaten key NGO objectives can be effectively managed. He 
also finds that the extreme power imbalance between stakeholders and the 
organisation leads to stakeholder voices largely being silenced or neglected 
during the decision-making process, raising significant accountability issues. In 
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the same vein, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) examine how social accounting 
is used in Amnesty Ireland and they find that the organisation faces difficulties 
in engaging with a broad range of stakeholders. This eventually results in a 
situation in which the organisation focuses solely on upward accountability and 
prioritising the need of donors over other stakeholders.  
 The lack of large-scale stakeholder engagement not only leads to the 
failure to acknowledge the implications of A-NGO work on stakeholders, but 
also results in a lack of support and understanding from these stakeholders, 
affecting long term mission attainment and social changes (Denedo et al., 2017; 
Irvine & Moerman, 2017; Laine & Vinnari, 2017; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Tregidga, 2017). For example, Denedo et al. (2017) find that although the A-
NGO in their case study perceives the Oil Spill Monitor (OSM) to be a useful 
tool in making local human rights issues more visible, the power relations 
between oil companies and the local people are still imbalanced, even after 
having built coalitions with investors, supranational political institutions, judicial 
systems and international rule enforcers. This finding suggests that large-scale 
stakeholder support may be necessary to exert greater public pressure on oil 
companies. Similarly, Tregidga (2017) examines how a social movement 
organisation uses shadow reports to challenge a target corporation. Consistent 
with the findings in Denedo et al. (2017), she finds that although the 
accountants perceive shadow reports to be a useful tool in facilitating 
corporation-stakeholder engagement, the effects on the target company are 
limited. This is largely due to the failure of the activist organisation and its 
shadow reports in obtaining public support, casting significant doubts on the 
legitimacy status of the organisation.  
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 Irvine and Moerman (2017) explore how an activist organisation uses 
the internet and social media to disseminate campaign information and exert 
pressure to bring about corporate engagement. However, the target company 
eventually refused to engage with the activist organisation as the campaign 
information failed to exert significant public pressure on the company. Finally,  
Laine and Vinnari (2017) examine how animal activists create and use video 
clips showing the unfair treatment of farm pigs to challenge industrial meat and 
dairy production in Finland. However, they find that these video clips only create 
a small-scale social effect. They conclude that the failure to generate a large 
wave of stakeholder support is due to two main reasons. Firstly, activists place 
significant trust in stakeholders in a passive manner, and they assume that their 
advocacy information will raise awareness among the public. Secondly, 
activists fail to disseminate advocacy information to the wider society, thereby 
failing to raise large-scale stakeholder awareness. The above findings suggest 
that large-scale stakeholder engagement and their support are closely linked to 
the enhancement of A-NGO downward accountability. 
 
 Social Media and Stakeholder Engagement 
The unique features of social media - high interactivity, high autonomy and 
a wide dissemination - make them a potentially powerful mechanism for 
stakeholder engagement. High interactivity is rooted in a two-way dialogic 
communication function in which A-NGOs are able to disseminate information 
and stakeholders can respond with emoticons, shares and comments (Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2018; Guo & Saxton, 2018). This function gives stakeholders 
more channels to express their “voices” (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; 
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Neu et al., 2018, 2019; She & Michelon, 2019) hence empowering them during 
the engagement process (O’Dwyer, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004). A-NGOs also enjoy a large degree of autonomy in 
content production as they are able to communicate advocacy information with 
stakeholders without being restricted by the limitations of traditional media 
(Etter et al., 2018, 2019). Consequently, advocacy information can reach 
stakeholders more freely and the needs and opinions of stakeholders can be 
sought directly (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; 
She & Michelon, 2019; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Since these characteristics 
offer A-NGOs and stakeholders a dialogic engagement experience (Unerman 
& Bennett, 2004), social media can facilitate engagement with a broad range of 
stakeholders, and large-scale stakeholder consensus and support can be 
sought (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Guo & Saxton, 2018; Manetti & Bellucci, 
2016; Neu et al., 2019; She & Michelon, 2019; Unerman & Bennett, 2004).  
While extensive studies have tried to examine the use of social media by 
corporations (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Blankespoor et al., 2014; Gómez-
Carrasco et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2018; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Yang & Liu, 
2017), only a few have explored the use of social media by A-NGOs (Lovejoy 
& Saxton, 2012; Lovejoy, Waters, & Saxton, 2012; Saxton, Guo, Chiu, & Feng, 
2011; Saxton & Waters, 2014). For example, Saxton and Waters (2014) classify 
1,000 NGO social media messages into fundraising, event promotion and calls 
for action, and find that messages that call for action are more likely to attract 
stakeholder engagement than messages related to fundraising and event 
promotion. Similarly, based on a sample of 219,915 tweets posted by 145 A-
NGOs in 2013, Guo and Saxton (2018) find that the use of social media features 
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such as hashtags, URLs and the presence of photos help to attract more 
stakeholder engagement. However, these studies only focus on the type of 
messages and the interactive features employed in these messages, while the 
effect of information communicated on stakeholder engagement is not 
examined. Further exploration into the effects of communicated information 
may be important in helping stakeholders assess the nature and impact of 
advocacy activities. 
Since A-NGOs engage with stakeholders to consult their opinions and seek 
their support, social media engagement has also become a key intermediate 
process in achieving subsequent social outcomes (Guo & Saxton, 2018; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Xu & Saxton, 2018). For example, studies have 
found that social media messages have a positive effect on the accumulation 
of social media capital such as the number and the diversity of social media 
followers, the centrality of the organisation in its social media network, and the 
frequency of interactions between stakeholders and NGOs (Guo & Saxton, 
2018; Saxton & Guo, 2014; Xu & Saxton, 2018). However, these studies still 
limit their attention within the realm of social media, while the influence of A-
NGO social media engagement on stakeholder decision-making beyond social 
media platforms remains questionable (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Neu et al., 2018; 
Quinn et al., 2016; She & Michelon, 2018).  
 
 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
 Network-Making Power Theory 
In his seminal work Communication Power, Castells (2013) argues that 
digital communication networks have become a key domain in power-making. 
110 
 
In order to influence power dynamism within society, both existing power 
holders (i.e. corporations) and actors of social change (e.g. A-NGOs) seek to 
exert their influence through network-making power, which consists of two 
important abilities: programming capacity and switching capacity (Castells, 
2011, 2012, 2013). 15  Programming capacity is defined as the ability to 
determine the worldview of a network. Through the exercise of programming 
capacity, existing power holders are able to manage stakeholder worldviews 
and actions through communication, and to ensure the acceptance of 
communicated ideas within the network (Castells, 2011). Switching capacity 
refers to the ability to create a strategic network by sharing a common worldview 
and cooperating on information dissemination (Castells, 2013). By creating a 
massive communication network, information can be disseminated to 
individuals around the world thus creating a world-wide acceptance of a 
promoted worldview (Castells, 2013).  
A-NGOs also rely on both programming and switching capacity to 
disseminate information and engage with stakeholders on an alternative 
worldview, thus reaching a consensus among a broad range of stakeholders 
on the advocated issue and forming potential network power to bring future 
social changes (Castells, 2013). Due to their unique feature of high interactivity 
and high autonomy, online self-communication networks such as social media 
may help A-NGOs strengthen their programming and switching capacity, 
generating greater network-making power (Castells, 2011, 2012, 2013). In 
                                            
15  Castells (2013) argues that the definition of power holders are not only restricted to 
individuals but may include states, corporations, and their associated networks. Similarly, 
actors of social change are also not only limited to individual activists, but may include NGOs, 
social societies, and their associated networks. 
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order to strengthen programming capacity, A-NGOs may communicate with 
stakeholders about an advocated issue in a strategic and dialogic way (Manetti 
& Bellucci, 2016), thereby raising their awareness and allowing them to assess 
and express opinions on activities that may affect them (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008). Social media may also help A-NGOs to strengthen their switching 
capacity by increasing the scale of information dissemination across the 
communication network and reaching a broad range of stakeholders on a global 
scale (Castells, 2012, 2013). Indeed, Castells argues: 
“… the more the movement is able to convey its messages over the 
communication networks, the more citizen consciousness rises, and 
the more the public sphere of communication becomes a contested 
terrain, and the lesser will be the politicians’ capacity to integrate 
demands and claims with mere cosmetic adjustments.” (Castells, 
2012, p. 237) 
Therefore, the exercise and consolidation of both capacities can help A-NGOs 
identify and engage with (potential) stakeholders on social media networks and 
obtain their support on advocated issues. This, in turn, allows A-NGOs to form 
a large network of stakeholders to whom they can report progress and consult 
again in future (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b).  
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the 
ability of social media to enhance A-NGO accountability (Halupka, 2014; Karpf, 
2010; Shulman, 2009).16 Some studies argue that social media have turned 
NGO-stakeholder engagement into a mere “like-clicking activity” (Gerlitz & 
Helmond, 2013), and stakeholders who respond to online messages have no 
further intention in showing support beyond application platforms (Morozov, 
2009; White, 2010). For example, Drumbl (2012) investigates the search 
                                            
16 This phenomenon is referred as “clicktivism” or “slacktivism”. 
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volume index of the Kony 2012 campaign 17  and finds that NGO online 
messages have a limited shelf life. Using multiple fields and experimental 
settings, Kristofferson, White, & Peloza (2013) find that participants who 
express support for a social cause on Facebook are less likely to provide 
contributions to a subsequent and more meaningful helping task. In the same 
vein, after performing a series of experiments, Cornelissen, Karelaia, & Soyer 
(2013) find that participants who follow a charity on Facebook write fewer 
requested slogans and make fewer donations than those who do not follow the 
account. 
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework for Network-Making P ower 
 
 
However, some studies challenge the above view and argue that “social 
media engagement” is not a derogatory term. When stakeholders react to A-
NGOs’ social media messages, they are directly engaging with a political 
“Object”, i.e. the messages that may help them reflect on their worldview 
concerning an underlying political “Cause”, i.e. the voices of marginalised 
groups (Halupka, 2014, p. 120). Therefore, social media is seen as an 
extension and replacement of old-fashioned engagement mechanisms such as 
                                            
17 Kony 2012 is a short documentary film produced by Invisible Children, Inc. with an aim to 
make Uganda cult and militia leader Joseph Kony globally known and get him arrested by the 
end of 2012.  
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paper-based posters and reports, and this kind of media may help achieve 
better advocacy outcomes (Halupka, 2014; Karpf, 2010). Prior empirical studies 
also provide evidence supporting the above view. For example, after analysing 
1.5 million tweets generated by customers and trade union towards major 
Spanish banks, Gómez-Carrasco and Michelon (2017) find the intensity of 
stakeholder tweets can indirectly affect financial stakeholders’ investment 
decisions. Similarly, studies document that people who have one or multiple 
social media accounts have more online political expressions (Gil de Zúñiga, 
Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014) and active protest participation (Harlow, 2011; 
Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013). While the personal use of social 
media may influence individual political activities, questions remain as to how 
A-NGOs might use social media to facilitate stakeholder engagement and 
obtain their support on advocacy activities in order to enhance accountability.  
 
 Hypotheses Development 
A-NGOs may employ various communication strategies in advocacy 
messages to attract stakeholder engagement (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Lovejoy et 
al., 2012; Saxton & Waters, 2014). Castells (2013) argues that information that 
appeals to logic and emotions plays an important role when communicating with 
stakeholders and influencing their decision-making. To help stakeholders better 
assess the impact of advocacy activities and express their opinions, A-NGOs 
may frame advocacy information that appeals to logic by including factual and 
specific terms related to an issue (Benford & Snow, 2000; Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017; Snow & Benford, 1988). The inclusion of factual 
and specific terms not only adds credibility to the advocated issue (Brennan & 
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Merkl-Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017), but also provides quality information that can 
help stakeholders make better-informed decisions (Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016; 
Michelon et al., 2015). For example, by analysing reports and press releases 
published by Greenpeace over toxic chemicals issue, Brennan and Merkl-
Davies (2014) find that this A-NGO uses a large number of scientific terms and 
the names of independent parties to support the credibility of their claims. 
Similarly, after analysing the number of specific terms included in the risk-factor 
disclosures in 10-K reports, Hope et al. (2016) find that the inclusion of more 
specific disclosures benefit the users of the information through enhanced 
quality. As a result, stakeholders are more likely to engage with information that 
has a high level of logical appeal.  
Compared to logical appeal, emotions can have both direct and indirect 
effects on stakeholder decision-making. On one hand, emotions directly 
influence stakeholder decisions as stakeholders tend to assess a situation with 
information that is aligned with intentions (Castells, 2013). On the other hand, 
emotions indirectly affect decision-making by limiting the number of options 
available. For example, studies find that emotions influence people’s economic 
decision-making even though they arise from an irrelevant prior event (Lerner, 
Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). Prior studies also document evidence regarding 
the extensive use of emotional appeal in A-NGO communications. For example, 
Rodriguez (2016) finds that NGOs post personal stories of LGBTI refugees and 
asylum seekers to invoke feelings of empathy and sympathy. Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies (2014) find that Greenpeace uses metaphors that are linked to 
strong emotions to influence stakeholder opinions about more stringent 
environmental regulation. Similarly, by analysing video clips filmed by animal 
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activists, Vinnari and Laine (2017) find that activists create visual messages 
which appeal to stakeholders’ sense of morality in order to shorten the distance 
between audiences and the distant suffering of ‘others’: in their case, pigs in 
Finnish farms. As a result, advocacy information that appeals to both logic and 
emotions may help A-NGOs attract stakeholder engagement and enable 
stakeholders to better assess advocated issues. Therefore, following this 
stream of argument, the first set of hypotheses are: 
H1a. The level of stakeholder engagement is positively associated 
with the level of logical appeal in advocacy information. 
H1b. The level of stakeholder engagement is positively associated 
with the level of emotional appeal in advocacy information. 
 
A-NGOs not only engage with stakeholders to help them assess the 
nature and the impact of the advocated issue, but they also exercise 
programming capacity to actively encourage stakeholders to show support on 
these important advocacy activities. Prior studies show that A-NGOs frequently 
engage with stakeholders on social media to accumulate social media capital 
(Guo & Saxton, 2018; Saxton & Guo, 2014; Xu & Saxton, 2018), and this 
accumulated capital is considered a crucial resource in facilitating future 
charitable donations (Saxton, 2018; Saxton & Wang, 2013) and mission 
attainment (Harlow, 2011; Valenzuela, 2013). As a result, the number of 
stakeholders who wish to support advocacy activities depends on how effective 
the advocacy information is in attracting stakeholder engagement. Following 




H2. The level of stakeholder support is positively associated with the 
effectiveness of advocacy information in attracting stakeholder 
engagement at the account level. 
 
To obtain stakeholder support on a large scale, A-NGOs not only exercise 
programming capacity to ensure the effectiveness of advocacy information in 
attracting stakeholder engagement, but they also use switching capacity to 
widely disseminate advocacy information and reach more stakeholders without 
temporal and spatial restrictions (Castells, 2012, 2013). One way to escalate 
an advocated issue from local to global is by encouraging individual 
stakeholders to share messages on their own social media networks (Huang & 
Sun, 2014). For example, studies find that the number of followers is positively 
associated with the amount of charitable donations (Saxton & Wang, 2013) and 
the acquisition of social media capital (Saxton & Guo, 2014). However, this 
method may be slow in creating a global influence as most social media 
messages stop disseminating after two rounds of re-posting (Huang & Sun, 
2014). Castells (2012, 2013) argues that A-NGOs may generate global 
influence by creating a strategic network with other social media accounts. 
Through the cooperation with multiple accounts that have a diversified 
background of stakeholders, advocacy information can reach a global scale 
within a short time frame, enabling more stakeholders to be aware of an 
advocated issue. This large-scale stakeholder engagement may significantly 
increase the likelihood of obtaining global support (Castells, 2013; Xu & Saxton, 




H3a. The level of stakeholder support is positively associated with 
the effectiveness of advocacy information in attracting stakeholder 
engagement at the network level. 
H3b. The level of stakeholder support is positively associated with 
the dissemination of advocacy information at the network level. 
 
3.5. Research Design 
3.5.1. Greenpeace “Save the Arctic” Campaign 
The empirical setting of this study is based on the Greenpeace “Save the 
Arctic” campaign. “Save the Arctic” (STA) is a global campaign which began in 
2012, and advocates actions to mitigate climate change and to safeguard Arctic 
nature, wildlife, (such as polar bears, walruses, bowhead whales, arctic foxes 
and harps seals), and over 4 million indigenous people living around the area 
from irresponsible corporate exploitation (Allsopp et al., 2012; Greenpeace 
International, 2012). Since its initial launch, the main targeted corporations to 
date include oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Gazprom, Cairn Energy, 
Statoil and ExxonMobil, retail businesses like LEGO (due to its relationship with 
Shell), seafood-related businesses including McDonald’s, Tesco, Young’s and 
Iglo (due to their irresponsible fishing activities in the Arctic area), and state 
authorities such as the US, Norwegian, Russian and Canadian governments  
(Greenpeace International, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). During the 
campaign period, Greenpeace achieved a number of significant advances in 
terms of raising global awareness on climate change and protesting against 
Arctic oil drilling by states and corporations. For example, Shell abandoned its 
oil drilling plan in Alaska in 2015. Global brands such as McDonald’s and Tesco 
ceased further expansion of cod fishing in the Arctic area in 2016. Greenpeace 
also successfully filed lawsuits against oil corporations for the use of seismic 
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blasting at the Clyde River area in Canada in 2016, and against the Norwegian 
government for permitting Arctic oil drilling in 2018. Since all these 
achievements cannot be made without the support from Greenpeace 
stakeholders and the general public, social media may offer valuable insights 
into the growth of this kind of “people power” (Kenyon, 2010). 
 
3.5.2. Sample and Data Collection 
 This study relies on a unique dataset of the Greenpeace STA online 
petition signups as a direct measure for stakeholder support outside social 
media platforms, and it assesses the effects of Greenpeace social media 
engagement on stakeholder support both nationally and globally. The 
proprietary data has been contributed by Greenpeace and contains weekly STA 
signups from over 236 countries and regions between 1st January 2015 and 
12th February 2018.18 The employment of this dataset provides an opportunity 
to directly assess the effects of A-NGOs’ social media engagements on global 
stakeholder support, where no previous study has done so. 
The sample includes all Greenpeace international and national 
Facebook accounts and posts related to the STA campaign during the sample 
period. 19  Greenpeace Facebook accounts were identified through links on 
Greenpeace international and regional websites. After excluding offices that are 
                                            
18  The data only contains statistical information and no information is provided regarding 
supporters’ identity. 
19 The reason for choosing Facebook is due to its heavy use by Greenpeace. According to a 
web traffic report generated by SimilarWeb (https://www.similarweb.com), for the period 
between November 2017 and January 2018, channels that direct web traffic to the STA 
campaign website (www.savethearctic.org) include social media (54.39%), links from the 
Greenpeace website (18.94%), emails (12.8%) and others (13.87%). Among social media 
channels, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram accounted for 87.02%, 7.39%, 4.78% 
and 0.65% respectively. The heavy use of Facebook by Greenpeace is also confirmed by the 
Greenpeace social media team.   
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no longer available or lacking a Facebook account, the final sample consists of 
51 Greenpeace Facebook accounts covering five geographical regions and 50  
countries and territories (Appendix E).20 Python was used to scrape a total of 
76,670 posts from these accounts using the Facebook Application Programme 
Interface (API) on 13th February 2018. The retrieved data include message ID, 
message text, link name, type of media included, message published time and 
all engagement metrics (i.e. comments, shares and Facebook emoticon 
reactions: like, love, wow, haha, sad and angry). 
 
3.5.3. Developing a Dictionary 
 Following prior studies (Loughran & McDonald, 2016; She & Michelon, 
2019), this study employs a dictionary-based approach to identify STA-related 
posts among other Greenpeace campaigns. The dictionary was constructed 
using messages posted by the STA Facebook account, 21  STA campaign 
messages on the Greenpeace international office website, and a report about 
the Arctic wildlife published by the Greenpeace Scientific Unit (Allsopp et al., 
2012). The final English dictionary constitutes 103 unique lexicons shown in 
Appendix F.22 
Because the sample accounts contain messages in 29 languages, a 
dictionary was constructed for each language.23 Following Limoncelli (2016), 
                                            
20 Some Facebook accounts are shared by several national offices hence the number of nations 
covered is greater than sample accounts. 
21 The STA Facebook account name was @arctic.rising during the sample collection period. Its 
current name is @peoplevsoil.  
22 To develop the dictionary, a textual analysis is performed on these documents to determine 
word frequency and then lexicons that are related to the Arctic and the STA campaign are 
manually selected. All words were normalised (stemmed, lower-capitalised and removing 
stopwords) before the analysis. 
23 The final complete dictionary used for textual analysis is available on request.   
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this study employs Google Translate and Wikipedia to identify translated 
lexicons as prior studies find that the accuracy of Google Translate is 
reasonable (Limoncelli, 2016), and both Google Translate and Wikipedia have 
been widely used by translation professionals (Alonso, 2015). To construct 
these dictionaries, firstly, STA campaign pages written in local languages on 
Greenpeace regional websites were located, and then the Google web 
translation function was used to locate and validate words on these website 
pages. Wikipedia was also used to identify scientific terms in corresponding 
languages. Extra lexicons were added to the dictionary due to various 
expressions in some languages. Wherever possible, these dictionaries were 
validated with native speakers.   
 
3.5.4. Selecting Messages Using Textual Analysis 
 To identify STA-related information from other campaign information, 
textual analysis was performed using two approaches: (1) the score-based 
approach, and (2) the pattern-based approach. The score-based approach 
involves assigning a score to each lexicon contained in the dictionary and then 
selecting messages based on the total score. While most of the Arctic-related 
lexicons in the dictionary are assigned with a value of one, terms that are 
strongly related to the Arctic such as “savethearctic”, “polar”, “arctic”, “alaska”, 
and “bowhead whale” are assigned with a high value score to reduce the risk 
of a Type 1 error.24 Additional exclusion words are added and assigned with a 
                                            
24  These terms include “Arctic”, “polar”, “Baffin”, “bowhead”, “Greenland”, “Narwhal”, 
“peoplevsarcticoil” and “Savethearctic”. “Savethearctic” is a hashtag used during the campaign 




high negative score to further eliminate a Type 2 error.25 The pattern-based 
approach was used for languages that are not included in the textual analysis 
package (mainly Asian languages) and involved identifying characters that 
were matched with lexicons contained in the dictionary. To reduce the risk of 
Type 2 errors, more exclusion words were included to avoid texts being 
misclassified. After carrying out the above process, the final sample constitutes 
8,336 STA-related Facebook posts. 
 
3.5.5. Validation 
The validation for information classification was conducted through two 
sources: (1) a crowdsourcing website, and (2) manual validation. 
Crowdsourcing validation involves uploading texts to a website where human 
contributors conduct verifications or classifications. In recent years, 
crowdsourcing websites, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turks and Figure Eight 
(formerly known as Crowdflower), are gaining popularity in conducting 
experiments, classifying data and creating training programs for machine 
learning within the accounting literature (Ku & Firoozi, 2017; Rennekemp, 
2012). Due to the large variety of languages involved, this study uses Figure 
Eight to classify messages that were posted in English, Spanish and German 
language accounts, constituting 41.12% of the sample accounts.26 To conduct 
                                            
25 The threshold for classifying an Arctic-related message is a minimum score of 5. The reason 
for choosing 5 is because this study assigns 5 or 10 to words that are strongly Arctic-related 
and -7 to exclusion words. Therefore, a text will be classified as a sample observation if it 
contains at least one high score word and one low score word. However, if a text contains an 
exclusion word, it needs at least two strongly related words and three weakly related words, 
hence the possibility of Type 2 is significantly lower. The exclusion words include issues such 
as deforestation, Antarctic, nuclear energy, and coal burning as they are related to other 
Greenpeace activities. 




the crowdsourcing validation, 441, 210 and 120 observations were randomly 
selected from the English, Spanish and German language accounts 
respectively. Some pre-test questions were set to preclude non-eligible 
contributors. To improve coding reliability, Figure Eight requires at least three 
people to classify each observation and an aggregated confidence score is 
computed based on the agreement among them. The final classification 
outcome is chosen based on the response with the highest confidence score. 
For manual validation, 10 observations were randomly selected from each of 
the remaining 30 accounts (300 observations in total) and then Google 
Translate was used to verify messages. Appendix G presents the performance 
of manual and computerised classification. All tasks scored an accuracy above 
90% and a high inter-coder agreement for crowdsourcing validations. 
Therefore, the classification performance is considered reasonable. 
 
3.6.  Empirical Models 
3.6.1. Message Level 
Only English Facebook posts are analysed at the message level due to 
the limited functionality available in R Quanteda. Following prior studies (Saxton 
& Waters, 2014; She & Michelon, 2019), the Negative Binomial (NB) model is 
used to test H1a and H1b: 
STK_ENGij  = β0 + β1TEXT_LOGij + β2TEXT_EMOij + β3VISUAL_EMOij  
                   + β4HASHTAGij + β5URLij + β6VIDEO_LENij  + β7TIME_TRENDij  
                   + Account Fixed Effect + ε
(3.1) 
where ij denotes Facebook post i in account j. 
 STK_ENG is the level of stakeholder engagement at the message level 
which is measured using the number of total emoticons (EMOTICON), the 
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number of shares (SHARE), the number of comments (COMMENT), the 
number of positive emoticons (EMO_POS: the sum of like, love, haha and 
wow), and the number of negative emoticons (EMO_NEG: the sum of sad and 
angry). Emoticons reflect stakeholders’ emotional reactions towards Facebook 
posts and indicate how stakeholders are persuaded by A-NGOs’ advocacy 
information (Saxton & Waters, 2014; She & Michelon, 2019). Shares indicate 
how well advocacy information resonate among stakeholders and their 
willingness to further disseminate the information (Saxton et al., 2019). 
Comments indicate the level of stakeholder discussion and the expression of 
their opinions on advocacy information (Saxton & Waters, 2014).  
 TEXT_LOG is the level of logical appeal in textual content. Similar to 
prior studies (Hope et al., 2016), this study uses the spaCy Named Entity 
Recognition package to identify the number of specific terms communicated in 
a Facebook post scaled by the length of the post. TEXT_EMO captures the 
emotional appeal in textual content and is calculated as the number of emotive 
words scaled by the length of the post.27 The total number of emotive words 
were identified using the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary (LSD) which contains 
about 4,500 unique positive and negative phrases and is specifically developed 
for political communication (Young & Soroka, 2012).28 To ensure the validity of 
both measures, 50 Facebook posts that are classified as high and low logical 
appeal as well as emotional appeal were randomly selected and then validated 
by three research assistants. The consistency rate between the computerised 
                                            
27 Sample messages are pre-processed using a script developed by Luxon (2017) to replace 
contractions, punctuation and negations.  
28 In LSD, “shell” is a negative sentiment word. However, it is also a specific term referring to 
Shell Oil Company, a main target by Greenpeace during the campaign. To reduce the 




measure and human coding is 0.92 and 0.82 for logical appeal and emotional 
appeal respectively, with inter-coder agreements of 0.87 and 0.76 respectively. 
VISUAL_EMO captures the emotional appeal in visual content: this is 
equal to one if a Facebook post contains images or videos showing Arctic 
wildlife and/or environment and zero otherwise. Indeed, prior literature suggests 
that the presence of suffering beneficiaries can elicit a higher level of emotions 
(Vinnari & Laine, 2017). Python and Google TensorFlow were used firstly to 
train 150 images for each of the ten categories - polar bears, bowhead whales 
and narwhals, walrus, Arctic owls, Arctic foxes, reindeers, Arctic seals, Arctic 
landscape, humans and oil platforms - and then the trained algorithm was used 
to determine the likelihood of a test image belonging to each of the ten 
categories.29 Videos were coded manually.   
 Control variables. Following prior studies (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Saxton 
et al., 2019; Saxton & Waters, 2014; She & Michelon, 2019; Yang & Liu, 2017), 
a dummy variable is equal to one if a Facebook post contains a hashtag, and 
zero otherwise (HASHTAG); and a dummy variable is equal to one if a 
Facebook post contains a link to an external website, and zero otherwise (URL). 
The natural logarithm of the total number of seconds a video lasts 
(VIDEO_LEN) is included to control for the effect of video length on audience 
reactions. Because Facebook API does not provide historical data on follower 
size and previous studies indicate that follower size may increase in the long 
run (Guo & Saxton, 2018), a time trend variable that ranks Facebook post 
publication time in an ascending order is included to control for the potential 
                                            
29 The threshold for deciding its category is a minimum likelihood of 70%. Performance is 
compared by choosing a threshold likelihood ranging from 50% to 95% with an interval of 5%. 
70% gives the highest accuracy in classifying both “Arctic animal” and “environment” (0.94 and 
0.9 respectively).  
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growing trend of fan size over time (TIME_TREND). Account fixed effect is also 
added to capture other unobservable, time-invariant account-level 
characteristics. Standard errors are robust and clustering at the account level. 
 
3.6.2. Account Level 
The following NB model is used to test H2: 
NATION_SUPPORTnt = β0 + β1ACC_EFFECTnt + β2NUM_POSTSnt  
                                    + β3NATION_GTRENDnt + β4NATION_NEWSnt + β5GDPnt  
                                    + β6FHInt + Country Fixed Effect + Week Fixed Effect + ε 
(3.2) 
where nt denotes country n in week t. 
NATION_SUPPORT is the level of stakeholder support at the account 
level which is measured using weekly Greenpeace STA petition signups 
received in a sample country. Since the 46 Greenpeace Facebook accounts 
cover 50 countries and territories,30 this analysis includes 8,300 country-week 
observations.31 ACC_EFFECT  is the effectiveness of advocacy information in 
attracting stakeholder engagement at the account level, measured using the 
natural logarithm of the weekly total number of emoticons, shares, comments, 
positive emoticons and negative emoticons that STA Facebook posts receive 
alternatively.32 
 Control Variables. Since the level of stakeholder engagement is 
positively associated with the number of  social media messages posted (Guo 
                                            
30 Some Facebook accounts are used in more than one country or territory.  
31 The number of weeks covered by the sample period is 166 weeks. The week number used 
by Greenpeace in the STA dataset is calculated by taking every 7 days from the first day of the 
year and the remaining days as the last week of the year. For example, the total number of 
days in 2015 is 365 days. Therefore, 1/1/2015 to 7/1/2015 is week 1 and the remaining days 
(i.e. only 31/12/2015) is in week 53 instead of being in week 1 2016. In this case, 2015, 2016, 
and 2017 each has 53 weeks, and 2018 has 7 weeks. 
32 A value of one was added before taking natural logarithm transformation for metrics with a 
zero value. To ensure robustness of the results, 0.0001 was added as an alternative constant 
before taking natural log transformation. The results are presented in robustness analyses. 
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& Saxton, 2018), the number of STA Facebook messages posted 
(NUM_POSTS) is included to control for the frequency of engagement. 
Following prior studies on the role of media in agenda-setting (Aerts & Cormier, 
2009; Deegan et al., 2002), the Google trends volume search indicator (SVI) is 
employed to capture online media exposure (NATION_GTREND), and the 
number of newspaper articles is used as a measure for offline media exposure 
(NATION_NEWS). Prior studies find that Google trends data are positively 
associated with the volume of news coverage (Weeks & Southwell, 2010) and 
it also has potential in reflecting public attention (Zhi, Joseph, & Gao, 2011). 
Therefore, the inclusion of Google trends can control for situations in which 
stakeholders visit the STA petition page through an online search engine or 
online media outlet. Weekly Google trends data are retrieved from its API by 
searching for “Arctic” in each sample country. Local newspaper articles 
containing the keyword “Arctic”, or its translated phrase are retrieved from Nexis 
UK. Major publication articles are searched and used for countries with many 
news outlets. The model also controls for the level of economic development 
(GDP) and the political freedom (FHI) for each country as prior studies suggest 
that both macro-level factors influence political participation (Sofie, Marc, & 
Ellen, 2010). GDP is the natural logarithm of each country’s annual GDP per 
capita. It is measured in US dollars and is retrieved from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) database.33 FHI is the annual Freedom House Index 
between 2015 and 2018 where a higher FHI indicates a higher level of political 
freedom (Sofie et al., 2010). The Freedom House Index data is retrieved from 
                                            
33 2018 GDP per capita is estimated as of 18th May 2018. 
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the Freedom House website.34 Finally, country fixed effect is used to control for 
other unaccounted, time-invariant, country-level characteristics such as culture 
and people’s habits in using social media, and week fixed effect is used to 
account for unobserved events that may arise in a week. Standard errors are 
robust and clustering at the country level. 
 
3.6.3. Network Level 
The following NB model is used to test H3a and H3b: 
WORLD_SUPPORTt = β0 + β1NET_EFFECTt + β2NET_EXTENTt  
                                   + β3WORLD_GTRENDt + β4WORLD_NEWSt + β5STA_EVENTt  
                                   + Year Fixed Effect + ε 
(3.3) 
where t detonates week t during the sample period. 
 WORLD_SUPPORT is the level of stakeholder support globally which is 
measured using the total weekly number of Greenpeace STA petition signups 
from over 236 countries. NET_EFFECT is the effectiveness of advocacy 
information in attracting stakeholder engagement at the network level, which is 
measured using the natural logarithm of the weekly total number of emoticons, 
shares, comments, positive emoticons and negative emoticons that STA 
Facebook posts receive alternatively. 35  NET_EXTENT is the extent of 
advocacy information disseminated on the network, measured using the 
percentage of Greenpeace Facebook accounts which participated in the 
dissemination process. 
                                            
34 Freedom house website: https://freedomhouse.org. Annual FHI is computed based on the 
level of democratic freedom in the previous year. 
35  To increase the robustness of results, I add 0.0001 before taking natural logarithm to 
measure effectiveness of advocacy information. The results (un-tabulated) are consistent with 
the main findings. 
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 Control variables. Global Google trends (WORLD_GTREND) and global 
newspaper articles (WORLD_NEWS) are included to control for both online and 
offline media exposure. WORLD_GTREND is the global search volume for 
“Arctic” during the sample period. Global newspaper articles are retrieved from 
Nexis UK by searching for “Arctic” in world major newspaper publications. 
STA_EVENT is a dummy variable that is equal to one if any STA event happens 
in a given week, and zero otherwise. The information regarding major events 
was identified from Greenpeace International press releases by searching for 
the keyword “Arctic”. Year fixed effect is used to account for unobserved events 
that may arise in a year. Standard errors are robust. All variables employed in 




Table 3.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Name  Definition  
Message Level  
STK_ENG The natural logarithm of 1) EMOTICON: the number of total emoticons, 2) 
SHARE: the number of shares, 3) COMMENT: the number of comments, 
4) EMO_POS: the number of positive emoticons, and 5) EMO_NEG: the 
number of negative emoticons. 
TEXT_LOG The number of specific phrases detected using spaCy Entity Recognition 
package divided by the total number of words in a message. Specific 
information includes numbers, time, date, location, countries, and 
organisation. 
TEXT_EMO The total number of LSD positive and negative emotive words identified 
divided by the total number of words in a message text 
VISUAL_EMO A dummy variable which sets to 1 if an image or video contains Arctic 
wildlife or natural environment and 0 otherwise. 
HASHTAG A dummy variable which equals 1 if a message contains a hashtag and 0 
otherwise. 
URL A dummy variable which equals 1 if a message contains a link to external 
website and 0 otherwise. 
VIDEO_LEN The natural logarithm of the total number of seconds a video lasts. 
TEXT_EMO_POS The number of LSD positive words identified divided by the total number of 
words in a message text 
TEXT_EMO_NEG The number of LSD negative words identified divided by the total number 
of words in a message text 
ANIMAL_IMAGE A dummy variable which sets to 1 if an image contains Arctic animal and 0 
otherwise 
ENVIRON_IMAGE A dummy variable which sets to 1 if an image contains Arctic 
landscape/environment and 0 otherwise 
ANIMAL_VIDEO A dummy variable which sets to 1 if a video contains Arctic animal and 0 
otherwise 
ENVIRON_VIDEO A dummy variable which sets to 1 if a video contains Arctic 
landscape/environment and 0 otherwise 
TIME_TREND An increasing discreet variable showing the growing trend of fan size over 
time 
Account Level  
NATION_SUPPORT The natural logarithm of the weekly number of people who sign up to 
Greenpeace STA petition in a given country/territory. 
ACC_EFFECT The natural logarithm of the total number of emoticons 
(ACC_EMOTICON), shares (ACC_SHARE), comments 
(ACC_COMMENT), positive emoticons (ACC_EMO_POS), and negative 
emoticons (ACC_EMO_NEG) that STA Facebook messages receive 
alternatively in a given week.  
NUM_POSTS Weekly number of Facebook messages posted by a Greenpeace account 
NATION_GTREND The weekly Google trends SVI searching "Arctic" in a given 
country/territory. 
NATION_NEWS The weekly number of newspaper articles containing the keyword "Arctic" 
or translated phrase in a given country/territory. 
GDP The natural logarithm of annual GDP per capita (GDP) in a given 
country/territory between 2015 and 2018. 
FHI The annual Freedom House Index (FHI) in a given country/territory 
between 2015 and 2018. 
Network Level  
WORLD_SUPPORT The natural logarithm of the weekly number of people who sign up to 
Greenpeace STA petition across the world. 
NET_EFFECT The natural logarithm of the total number of emoticons (NET_EMOTICON), 
shares (NET_SHARE), comments (NET_COMMENT), positive emoticons 
(NET_EMO_POS), and negative emoticons (NET_EMO_NEG) that STA 
Facebook messages receive alternatively in a given week. 
NET_EXTENT The number of Greenpeace Facebook accounts that are connected to or 
switched on in given week to help post messages about STA divided by 
the total number of Greenpeace Facebook accounts. 
WORLD_GTREND Global weekly Google trends SVI searching "Arctic" in a given week. 
WORLD_NEWS The number of world major publication newspaper articles containing the 
keyword "Arctic" in a week. 
STA_EVENT A dummy variable that equals to 1 if any major STA event happens in a 
given week and 0 otherwise. 
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3.7. Empirical Findings 
3.7.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for variables at the message, 
account and network levels. As indicated in Table 3.2 Panel A, the average 
number of stakeholder engagement that each English Facebook post receives 
is a total of 1,575 emoticons, 859 shares and 68 comments. Further separating 
emoticons into positive and negative, an English Facebook post, on average, 
receives 1,463 positive emoticons and 221 negative emoticons. With regard to 
the level of logical and emotional appeal in textual content, each English 
Facebook post contains a mean of 8.28% specific terms and 7.44% emotive 
words. 30.5% of posts include images or videos containing “Arctic animal” 
and/or “environment”. As indicated in Table 2.2 Panel B, Greenpeace national 
accounts receive a mean of 460 petition signups each week. Regarding the 
effectiveness of advocacy information at the account level, STA Facebook 
posts on average receive 15.89 emoticons, 8.29 shares and 3.35 comments 
every week.36 In Table 2.2 Panel C, the mean weekly global STA petition 
signups amount to 24,772. STA Facebook posts on average receive 46,027.76 
total emoticons, 15,756.37 shares and 1,088.98 comments. Moreover, 42.2% 
of Greenpeace accounts on average participated in disseminating STA 
information every week.  
 
  
                                            
36 Values are presented before taking natural log transformation. 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  N Mean St. Dev.  Min P25 Median  P75 Max 
Panel A. Message Level 
STK_ENG         
EMOTICON 1,527 1,574.86 2,949.57 0 206 567 1,673 37,324 
SHARE 1,527 858.94 3,785.85 0 45 174 577 101,027 
COMMENT 1,527 68.18 315.45 0 6 19 55 10,337 
EMO_POS 1,527 1,462.65 2,820.30 0 175.5 501 1,581.5 37,324 
EMO_NEG 773 221.40 862.45 0 1 12 116 16,772 
TEXT_LOG 1,527 8.28 4.71 0 5.09 7.69 10.81 33.33 
TEXT_EMO 1,527 7.44 4.15 0 4.76 7.14 9.68 27.27 
VISUAL_EMO 1,527 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 
HASHTAG 1,527 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 
URL 1,527 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
VIDEO_LEN 1,527 1.63 2.27 0 0 0 4.16 8.22 
Panel B. Account Level 
NATION_SUPPORT 8,300 459.75 2,105.17 0 10 45 233 111,337 
ACC_EFFECT         
ACC_EMOTICON 8,300 2.77 3.45 0 0 0 6.30 12.38 
ACC_SHARE 8,300 2.12 2.86 0 0 0 4.73 11.46 
ACC_COMMENT 8,300 1.20 1.77 0 0 0 2.49 9.29 
ACC_EMO_POS 8,300 2.72 3.40 0 0 0 6.16 12.38 
ACC_EMO_NEG 5,250 1.26 2.21 0 0 0 1.95 9.76 
NUM_POSTS 8,300 0.91 1.55 0 0 0 1 18 
NATION_GTREND 8,300 43.20 21.20 0 30.96 44.71 57.57 100 
NATION_NEWS 8,300 1.28 4.03 0 0 0 1 103 
GDP 8,300 9.77 1.10 6.82 9.08 9.95 10.68 11.70 
FHI 8,300 81.76 18.96 20 77 89 96 100 
Panel C. Network Level 
WORLD_SUPPORT 166 24,772.52 27,913.19 122 7,499 14,807 32,257 187,533 
NET_EFFECT         
NET_EMOTICON 166 10.74 1.52 0 10.28 10.97 11.49 13.61 
NET_SHARE 166 9.67 1.52 0 9.08 9.81 10.54 12.79 
NET_COMMENT 166 6.99 1.26 0 6.47 7.06 7.72 9.91 
NET_EMO_POS 166 10.59 1.57 0 10.01 10.76 11.46 13.61 
NET_EMO_NEG 105 8.41 1.57 0 7.90 8.66 9.23 10.75 
NET_EXTENT 166 0.42 0.16 0 0.31 0.41 0.53 0.94 
WORLD_GTREND 166 73.10 10.49 57 65 71.64 80.11 98.86 
WORLD_NEWS 166 13.83 6.55 2 9 12 18 35 
STA_EVENT 166 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 





3.7.2. Correlation Analysis 
 Table 3.3 provides the Pearson correlation matrices of variables used in 
three levels of analyses. Most pairs of independent and control variables used 
in analyses have correlation coefficients of less than ±0.5. However, 
NUM_POSTS has a high correlation with ACC_EMOTICON, ACC_SHARE, 
ACC_COMMENT, ACC_EMO_POS, and ACC_EMO_NEG. This is because 
the number of messages posted are directly linked to the number of 
stakeholders engaging with the advocacy information. FHI and GDP also have 
a high correlation at the national-account level. At the global-network level, 
NET_EXTENT and NET_EMO_NEG have a correlation coefficient of 0.5. To 
ensure there is no bias in the models due to multicollinearity, the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each regression analysis were computed: the highest 
VIF at each level of analysis is 1.20, 2.34, and 2.49 respectively. Therefore, the 





Table 3.3 Correlation Table 
Panel A. Message Level  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1. EMOTICON 1           
2. SHARE 0.58*** 1          
3. COMMENT 0.48*** 0.39*** 1         
4. EMO_POS 0.98*** 0.52*** 0.45*** 1        
5. EMO_NEG 0.54*** 0.65*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 1       
6. TEXT_LOG 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.01 1      
7. TEXT_EMO 0.04 0.08** 0.06* 0.04 0.08* 0.08** 1     
8. VISUAL_EMO 0.07** 0.11*** 0 0.05 0.14*** -0.06* -0.02 1    
9. HASHTAG -0.06* -0.04 -0.04 -0.06* 0 0.02 0.01 -0.04 1   
10. URL -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.07** -0.14*** -0.07* -0.03 0.01 -0.21*** -0.05 1  
11. VIDEO_LEN -0.01 0.09*** 0.08** -0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.24*** 0.04 -0.17*** 1 
Panel B. Account Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1. NATION_SUPPORT -          
2. ACC_EMOTICON 0.23*** -         
3. ACC_SHARE 0.26*** 0.96*** -        
4. ACC_COMMENT 0.27*** 0.93*** 0.95*** -       
5. ACC_EMO_POS 0.23*** 1*** 0.96*** 0.93*** -      
6. ACC_EMO_NEG 0.17*** 0.84*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.82*** -     
7. NUM_POSTS 0.23*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.66*** -    
8. NATION_GTREND 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.1*** 0.1*** -   
9. NATION_NEWS 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.1*** 0.18*** 0.15*** -  
10. GDP 0.06*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.2*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.14*** - 
11. FHI 0.05*** 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.12*** 0.1*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.66*** 
Panel C. Network Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1. WORLD_SUPPORT -          
2. NET_EMOTICON 0.25**  -         
3. NET_SHARE 0.31*** 0.9*** -        
4. NET_COMMENT 0.29*** 0.77*** 0.81*** -       
5. NET_EMO_POS 0.29*** 0.98*** 0.87*** 0.75*** -      
6. NET_EMO_NEG -0.07 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.59*** 0.61*** -     
7. NET_ENG_EXTENT 0.59*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.5*** 0.07 -    
8. WORLD_GTREND -0.09 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.2*  -0.19 0.03 -   
9. WORLD_NEWS -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.16*  -  
10. STA_EVENT 0.25**  0 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.15 0.36*** -0.16*  0.02 - 
Notes All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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3.7.3. Multivariate Results 
3.7.3.1. Message level 
 Table 3.4 presents the results for examining the relationship between 
the level of stakeholder engagement and the level of logical and emotional 
appeal in advocacy information. The results show that EMOTICON (β = 0.012, 
p < .05), SHARE (β = 0.029, p < .05) and EMO_POS (β = 0.013, p < .05) are 
positively associated with TEXT_LOG, while COMMENT and EMO_NEG show 
no significant relationship. These results indicate that stakeholders are more 
likely to share or react with positive emoticons towards information containing 
more specific terms. With regard to the level of emotional appeal, all five 
measures of stakeholder engagement are positively associated with 
TEXT_EMO, suggesting information containing more emotive words are more 
likely to attract stakeholder engagement. When compared to TEXT_LOG, 
TEXT_EMO only has a stronger effect on EMO_NEG (F test = 20.38, p < .01), 
while no significant difference is found on other engagement measures, 
suggesting that emotional appeal and logical appeal have similar effects on 
stakeholder engagement. In relation to visual content, while EMOTICON (β = 
0.147, p < .01), SHARE (β = 0.614, p < .01), and EMO_NEG (β = 1.162, p < 
.01) are positively associated with VISUAL_EMO, COMMENT is negatively 
related (β = -0.216, p < .05) and EMO_POS shows no significant relationship. 
These results suggest that stakeholders are less willing to make comments or 
react with positive emoticons after seeing visuals containing “Arctic animals” 
and “environment”. Overall, the findings support H1a and H1b where 
stakeholder engagement is positively associated with the level of logical and 
emotional appeal in advocacy information.  
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Table 3.4 NB Regression Analysis of the Logical and  Emotional Appeal in 
Advocacy Information on the Stakeholder Engagement at Message Level 
 
  
 Dependent variable: 
STK_ENG  
EMOTICON SHARE COMMENT EMO_POS EMO_NEG  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEXT_LOG 0.012** 0.029** 0.013 0.013** -0.040 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.033) 
TEXT_EMO 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.054** 0.030*** 0.058*  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.031) 
VISUAL_EMO 0.147*** 0.614*** -0.216** 0.032 1.162***  
(0.044) (0.211) (0.103) (0.040) (0.249) 
HASHTAG -0.296** -0.418 -0.449** -0.313** 0.044  
(0.145) (0.256) (0.205) (0.144) (0.299) 
URL -0.198** -0.295 -0.472** -0.241** 0.454**  
(0.098) (0.191) (0.200) (0.115) (0.210) 
VIDEO_LEN -0.019 0.132*** 0.148*** -0.020 -0.021  
(0.029) (0.050) (0.048) (0.030) (0.031) 
TIME_TREND -0.002*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CONSTANT 5.776*** 4.062*** 2.082*** 5.797*** 2.360***  
(0.131) (0.206) (0.227) (0.166) (0.271) 
Account FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 773(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.0407 0.0374 0.0401 0.0416 0.0297 
Log Likelihood -12063 -10650 -7268 -11920 -3735 
Within Regression F Test  
TEXT_LOG = 
TEXT_EMO 
2.25 0.21 1.31 1.65 20.38*** 
 Notes (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 
2016. Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016.
Table 3.4 reports the results on Negative Binomial analysis of the logical and emotional appeal in 
advocacy information on stakeholder engagement at message level. Column 1 to 5 presents the results 
from regressing the number of emoticons (Column 1), shares (Column 2), comments (Column 3), positive 
emoticons (Column 4), and negative emoticons (Column 5) on the level of logical (TEXT_LOG) and 
emotional appeal in textual (TEXT_EMO) and visual contents (VISUAL_EMO) of advocacy information.  
TEXT_LOG = TEXT_EMO shows the within regression F test on the difference between two variable 
coefficients. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 
errors clustering at account level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance 







Table 3.5 presents the results examining the effect of the individual 
information component on the level of stakeholder engagement by further 
separating TEXT_EMO into positive (TEXT_EMO_POS) and negative 
emotional appeal (TEXT_EMO_NEG) and VISUAL_EMO into 
ANIMAL_IMAGE, ENVIRON_IMAGE, ANIMAL_VIDEO and 
ENVIRON_VIDEO. As indicated in Table 3.5, while the coefficients of 
TEXT_LOG are consistent with the ones in the main finding, the effects are not 
significant. This is probably due to the substitution effect between specific 
information and visuals (as reflected in the correlation coefficient of -0.06, p < 
.1 in Table 3.3) in which Greenpeace may communicate less specific 
information when posting visuals containing “Arctic animal” and “environment”. 
In terms of the sentiment of textual content, TEXT_EMO_POS has a positive 
relationship with EMO_POS, and a negative relationship with SHARE and 
EMO_NEG, suggesting advocacy information that appeals to positive emotions 
are more likely to attract stakeholder positive emoticons but less likely to attract 
shares and negative emoticons. All five engagement measures are positively 
associated with TEXT_EMO_NEG, suggesting that the effect of emotional 
appeal on stakeholder engagement is driven by negative emotive words. With 
regard to the level of emotional appeal by visual content, images showing Arctic 
animals are positively associated with EMOTICON and EMO_POS, but 
negatively related to EMO_NEG. The presence of videos showing Arctic 
animals is positively related to EMOTICON and SHARE but not COMMENT. 
The presence of videos showing the Arctic environment is negatively 
associated with EMOTICON, COMMENT and EMO_POS. These results 
suggest that stakeholders are more likely to engage on visuals showing Arctic 
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animals instead of the environment. Overall, these results suggest that 
advocacy messages containing more negative emotive words and visuals of 
live beneficiaries are effective in attracting stakeholder engagement (Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2014; Castells, 2013; Vinnari & Laine, 2017). 
 
Table 3.5 Additional NB Regression Analysis of Posi tive and Negative 
Emotional Appeal on Stakeholder Engagement at Messa ge Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 STK_ENG 
 EMOTICON SHARE COMMENT EMO_POS EMO_NEG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEXT_LOG 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.010 -0.051 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.036) 
TEXT_EMO_POS 0.013 -0.019* -0.001 0.020* -0.077*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) 
TEXT_EMO_NEG 0.044** 0.074*** 0.100** 0.039* 0.145*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.039) (0.022) (0.046) 
ANIMAL_IMAGE 0.201* 0.152 -0.021 0.194* -0.968*** 
 (0.106) (0.181) (0.262) (0.109) (0.337) 
ENVIRON_IMAGE -0.152 -0.169 -0.269 -0.201 0.460 
 (0.164) (0.194) (0.237) (0.177) (0.303) 
ANIMAL_VIDEO 0.517*** 1.314*** 0.281 0.307*** 1.712*** 
 (0.119) (0.354) (0.185) (0.110) (0.534) 
ENVIRON_VIDEO -0.374* -0.278 -0.809*** -0.340* -0.066 
 (0.203) (0.351) (0.218) (0.182) (0.359) 
HASHTAG -0.315** -0.506** -0.473*** -0.318** -0.278 
 (0.134) (0.220) (0.176) (0.132) (0.398) 
URL -0.156* -0.227 -0.353** -0.202* 0.323 
 (0.094) (0.163) (0.160) (0.117) (0.279) 
VIDEO_LEN -0.013 0.110** 0.163*** -0.008 -0.039 
 (0.037) (0.056) (0.050) (0.040) (0.038) 
TIME_TREND -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CONSTANT 5.897*** 4.526*** 2.320*** 5.849*** 3.051*** 
 (0.154) (0.192) (0.265) (0.179) (0.383) 
Account FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 773(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.0423 0.0425 0.0458 0.0425 0.0402 
Log Likelihood -12042 -10593 -7225 -11909 -3695 
 Note (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 
2016. Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 
2016. 
Table 3.5 reports the results on additional Negative Binomial analysis of the emotional appeal in advocacy 
information on stakeholder engagement at message level. Column 1 to 5 presents the results from 
regressing the number of emoticons (Column 1), shares (Column 2), comments (Column 3), positive 
emoticons (Column 4), and negative emoticons (Column 5) on the level OF positive and negative 
emotional appeal in textual contents as well as the presence of Arctic wildlife image, Arctic environment 
image, Arctic wildlife videos, and Arctic environment videos in advocacy information. The table reports 
negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors clustering at account level. 
All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 





3.7.3.2. Account Level  
Table 3.6 reports the results examining the relationship between 
stakeholder support and the effectiveness of advocacy information in attracting 
stakeholder engagement at the account level. As indicated by the table, 
NATION_SUPPORT is positively associated with all five measures of message 
effectiveness (ACC_EMOTICON, ACC_SHARE, ACC_COMMENT, 
ACC_EMO_POS and ACC_EMO_NEG). When analysing the effect 
individually, ACC_COMMENT has the strongest effect on national petition 
signups, followed by ACC_SHARE and ACC_ EMO_NEG. These results 
indicate that advocacy information that is effective in attracting stakeholder 
comments, shares and negative emotional reactions can convince stakeholders 
to sign up to petitions on the STA website. Overall, the results support H2 in 
that social media engagement in advocacy activities can help A-NGOs obtain 





Table 3.6 NB Regression Analysis of the Effectivene ss of Advocacy 
Information on the Level of Stakeholder Support at Account Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 NATION_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ACC_EFFECT      
ACC_EMOTICON 0.072***     
 (0.013)     
ACC_SHARE  0.094***    
  (0.016)    
ACC_COMMENT   0.155***   
   (0.029)   
ACC_EMO_POS    0.072***  
    (0.014)  
ACC_EMO_NEG     0.085*** 
     (0.015) 
NUM_POSTS 0.112*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.114*** 0.161*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) 
NATION_GTREND 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NATION_NEWS -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP 0.013 -0.044 -0.113 -0.003 -1.128 
 (1.726) (1.693) (1.684) (1.725) (1.643) 
FHI 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
CONSTANT 5.912 6.304 7.112 6.057 14.643 
 (15.475) (15.193) (15.123) (15.461) (15.065) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,300 8,300 8,300 8,300 5,250(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.154 
Log Likelihood -43842 -43830 -43829 -43846 -26436 
 (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 2016. 
Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016. 
Table 3.6 reports the results on Negative Binomial analysis of the effectiveness of advocacy information 
on the level of national stakeholder support. Column 1 to 5 presents the results from regressing the natural 
log of weekly total number of national petition signups on the weekly total number of emoticons, shares, 
comments, positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that STA messages receive alternatively. The 
table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors clustering at 
country level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 







3.7.3.3. Network Level  
Table 3.7 reports the results which examine the relationship between the 
level of global stakeholder support and the effectiveness and dissemination of 
advocacy information at the network level. With regard to the effectiveness of 
advocacy information, the level of global stakeholder support is positively 
associated with NET_EMOTICON, NET_SHARE, NET_COMMENT and 
NET_EMO_POS. However, no significant relationship is found between 
WORLD_SUPPORT and NET_EMO_NEG. This is probably due to the reduced 
number of observations for negative emoticons. Overall, the findings suggest 
that advocacy information that is effective in attracting stakeholder engagement 
can also convince stakeholders to subsequently sign up petitions. With regard 
to the extent of advocacy information dissemination, WORLD_SUPPORT is 
positively associated with NET_EXTENT in all models, suggesting that the 
cooperation with other Greenpeace Facebook accounts to disseminate 
information regarding advocated issues can lead to more petition signups 
across the world. Thus, the results support H3a and H3b where the 
effectiveness and dissemination of advocacy information help A-NGOs to 
obtain global stakeholder support.37 
  
                                            
37 The Durbin-Watson test is run to identify any auto-correlation issues in stakeholder petition 
signups. The coefficient is 2.2278 (p = 0.1533), indicating no presence of autocorrelation.  
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Table 3.7 NB Regression Analysis of the Effectivene ss and Dissemination 
of Advocacy Information on the Level of Stakeholder  Support at Network 
Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 WORLD_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NET_EFFECT      
NET_EMOTICON 0.264***     
 (0.039)     
NET_SHARS  0.256***    
  (0.047)    
NET_COMMENT   0.262***   
   (0.099)   
NET_EMO_POS    0.286***  
    (0.040)  
NET_EMO_NEG     0.062 
  
   (0.085) 
NET_EXTENT 3.008*** 3.014*** 2.990*** 2.839*** 4.738*** 
 (0.610) (0.614) (0.700) (0.609) (0.729) 
WORLD_GTREND -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011* -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
WORLD_NEWS -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
STA_EVENT -0.038 -0.033 -0.079 -0.049 -0.160 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.170) (0.172) (0.231) 
CONSTANT 6.650*** 6.734*** 7.512*** 6.548*** 8.770*** 
 (0.573) (0.598) (0.743) (0.565) (0.965) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 166 166 166 166 105(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.0431 0.0427 0.0409 0.0439 0.0475 
Log Likelihood -1766 -1766 -1770 -1764 -1096 
 (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 2016. 
Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016. 
Table 3.7 reports the results on Negative Binomial analysis of the effectiveness and dissemination of 
advocacy information on the level of global stakeholder support. Column 1 to 5 presents the results from 
regressing the natural log of weekly total number of global petition signups on the weekly total number of 
emoticons, shares, comments, positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that STA messages receive
alternatively. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 
errors. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 






3.7.4. Robustness Analyses 
3.7.4.1. OLS Models  
Following Guo and Saxton (2018), the above regressions were re-run 
using the OLS models with dependent variables measured using the natural 
logarithm. A constant of one is added to zero values before the log-
transformation. Table 3.8 presents the OLS model results for all three level 
analyses. Overall, the results are largely consistent with the main findings, 
except for TEXT_LOG where it has a strong positive effect on COMMENT and 
a negative effect on EMO_NEG, while no effect is found on EMOTICON, 
SHARE and EMO_POS.  
3.7.4.2. Measuring Emotional Appeal Using Hu & Liu (2004) Dictionary 
 To test the robustness of H1 analysis, this study uses an alternative 
sentiment dictionary developed by Hu and Liu (2004) to re-compute the number 
of emotive words. Hu and Liu (2004) create a well-known sentiment dictionary 
for social media content used in prior accounting studies (Bartov et al., 2017). 
Table 2.9 provides the NB regression results using the Hu and Liu (2004) 
sentiment dictionary. While HL_SENT has a consistent sign with the main 
findings, only EMOTICON, EMO_POS and EMO_NEG show a significant 
positive relationship. Since Hu and Liu (2004) was not specifically developed 
for political communication, the power in measuring the sentiment of a political 




Table 3.8 Sensitivity Analysis – OLS Model 
Panel A. OLS Regression Analysis of the Logical and Emotional Appeal in Advocacy 
Information on Stakeholder Engagement at Message Level 
 Dependent variable: 
STK_ENG 
 EMOTICON SHARE COMMENT EMO_POS EMO_NEG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEXT_LOG 0.006 -0.000 0.011*** 0.008 -0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) 
TEXT_EMO 0.018* 0.021** 0.009 0.015 0.041** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
VISUAL_EMO 0.312*** 0.569*** 0.144 0.242*** 1.131*** 
 (0.063) (0.083) (0.083) (0.063) (0.159) 
HASHTAG -0.220** -0.352** -0.283** -0.222** -0.119 
 (0.077) (0.109) (0.103) (0.075) (0.180) 
URL 0.078 0.209 0.072 0.010 0.308* 
 (0.101) (0.128) (0.110) (0.131) (0.156) 
VIDEO_LEN -0.031* 0.042 0.052* -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.027) (0.014) (0.046) 
TIME_TREND -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CONSTANT 5.057*** 3.062*** 1.502*** 5.083*** 0.866*** 
 (0.074) (0.091) (0.061) (0.096) (0.130) 
Account FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 773(1) 
Adjusted R2 0.511 0.417 0.340 0.517 0.226 
Panel B. OLS Regression of Effectiveness of Advocacy Information on the Level of Stakeholder 
Support at Account Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 NATION_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ACC_EFFECT      
ACC_EMOTICON 0.068***     
 (0.011)     
ACC_SHARE  0.093***    
  (0.015)    
ACC_COMMENT   0.146***   
   (0.027)   
ACC_EMO_POS    0.069***  
    (0.012)  
ACC_EMO_NEG     0.087*** 
     (0.013) 
NUM_POSTS 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) 
NATION_GTREND 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
NATION_NEWS -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP 0.224 0.157 0.084 0.210 -0.006 
 (1.321) (1.285) (1.274) (1.318) (1.390) 
FHI -0.032* -0.032* -0.033* -0.032* -0.016 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
CONSTANT 6.113 6.715 7.476 6.237 6.911 
 (11.513) (11.212) (11.105) (11.485) (12.786) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,300 8,300 8,300 8,300 5,250(2) 




Panel C. OLS Regression Analysis of the Effectiveness and Dissemination of Advocacy 
Information on the Level of Stakeholder Support at Network Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 WORLD_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NET_EFFECT      
NET_EMOTICON 0.270***     
 (0.038)     
NET_SHARE  0.278***    
  (0.040)    
NET_COMMENT   0.299***   
   (0.088)   
NET_EMO_POS    0.282***  
    (0.039)  
NET_EMO_NEG     0.148** 
     (0.062) 
NET_EXTENT 2.949*** 2.843*** 2.910*** 2.863*** 4.521*** 
 (0.523) (0.517) (0.676) (0.526) (0.637) 
WORLD_GTREND -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010* -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
WORLD_NEWS -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
STA_EVENT 0.003 0.011 -0.059 -0.019 -0.069 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.170) (0.172) (0.214) 
CONSTANT 6.259*** 6.306*** 6.958*** 6.236*** 7.361*** 
 (0.529) (0.515) (0.560) (0.525) (0.623) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 166 166 166 166 105(3) 
Adjusted R2 0.649 0.652 0.637 0.652 0.666 
Note (1)-(3) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 
2016. Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016. 
Table 3.8 reports the results on the robustness rests of main analyses using OLS models. Panel A 
presents the OLS results from regressing the number of emoticons (Column 1), shares (Column 2), 
comments (Column 3), positive emoticons (Column 4), and negative emoticons (Column 5) on the level 
logical and emotional appeal in textual and visual contents of advocacy information. Panel B presents the 
OLS results from regressing the natural log of weekly total number of national petition signups on the 
weekly total number of emoticons, shares, comments, positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that 
STA messages receive alternatively. Panel C presents the OLS results from regressing the natural log of 
weekly total number of global petition signups on the weekly total number of emoticons, shares, comments, 
positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that STA messages receive alternatively. The table reports 
OLS coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 




Table 3.9 Sensitivity Analysis: NB Regression Resul ts of the Logical and 
Emotional Appeal on Stakeholder Engagement Using Hu  & Liu (2004) 
Dictionary 
 Dependent variable: 
STK_ENG 
 EMOTICON SHARE COMMENT EMO_POS EMO_NEG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEXT_LOG 0.016*** 0.037*** 0.022** 0.017*** -0.035 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.036) 
HL_EMO 0.040** 0.031 0.064 0.037* 0.105*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.051) (0.021) (0.020) 
VISUAL_EMO 0.136*** 0.620*** -0.219** 0.020 1.147*** 
 (0.037) (0.197) (0.086) (0.034) (0.241) 
HASHTAG -0.274** -0.405 -0.435** -0.291** 0.110 
 (0.140) (0.247) (0.185) (0.137) (0.396) 
URL -0.220** -0.320* -0.498** -0.260** 0.349** 
 (0.102) (0.191) (0.206) (0.115) (0.164) 
VIDEO_LEN -0.021 0.133*** 0.145*** -0.021 -0.031 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.044) (0.028) (0.038) 
TIME_TREND -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CONSTANT 5.922*** 4.287*** 2.368*** 5.955*** 2.307*** 
 (0.103) (0.196) (0.238) (0.138) (0.162) 
Account FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 773(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.0405 0.0368 0.0391 0.0414 0.0302 
Log Likelihood -12065 -10656 -7275 -11923 -3734 
Note (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 
2016. Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016
Table 3.9 reports the results on Negative Binomial analysis of the level of logical and emotional appeal on 
stakeholder engagement at message level using Hu & (Liu 2004) sentiment dictionary. Column 1 to 5 
presents the results from regressing the number of emoticons (Column 1), shares (Column 2), comments 
(Column 3), positive emoticons (Column 4), and negative emoticons (Column 5) on the level emotional 
appeal in textual and visual contents of advocacy information measured using Hu & Liu (2004) sentiment 
dictionary. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 
errors clustering at account level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance 






3.7.4.3. Alternative Measure of Advocacy Information Effectiveness 
 To ensure the robustness of H2 analyses, 0.0001 was added instead of 
one before the log-transformation as an alternative measure of the 
effectiveness of advocacy information. Table 3.10 presents the results of H2 by 
adding 0.0001 before log-transformation. The results are consistent with the 
main finding. To ensure the robustness of H3 analyses, 0.0001 was also added 
instead of one before the log-transformation as an alternative measure of the 
effectiveness of advocacy information. Table 3.11 presents the results of H3 






Table 3.10 Sensitivity Analysis: NB Regression Anal ysis of the 
Effectiveness of Advocacy Information on the Level of Stakeholder 
Support at Account Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 NATION_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ACC_EFFECT      
ACC_EMOTICON_AC 0.027***     
 (0.005)     
ACC_SHARE_AC  0.031***    
  (0.005)    
ACC_COMMENT_AC   0.042***   
   (0.006)   
ACC_EMO_POS_AC    0.027***  
    (0.005)  
ACC_EMO_NEG_AC     0.034*** 
     (0.005) 
NUM_POSTS 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032) 
NATION_GTREND 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NATION_NEWS -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP 0.108 0.122 0.062 0.102 -1.221 
 (1.757) (1.738) (1.743) (1.756) (1.647) 
FHI 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
CONSTANT 5.395 5.188 5.955 5.451 16.000 
 (15.715) (15.554) (15.604) (15.710) (15.139) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,300 8,300 8,300 8,300 5,250(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.154 
Log Likelihood -43856 -43852 -43829 -43858 -26429 
(1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 2016. 
Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016. 
Table 3.10 Panel A reports the sensitivity analyses results on Negative Binomial analysis of the 
effectiveness of advocacy information on the level of national stakeholder support using an alternative 
constant added before log transformation. A constant of 0.0001 is added before taking the log 
transformation of independent variables. Column 1 to 5 presents the results from regressing the natural 
log of weekly total number of national petition signups on the weekly total number of emoticons, shares, 
comments, positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that STA messages receive alternatively. The 
table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors clustering at 
country level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 





Table 3.11 NB Regression Analysis of the Effectiven ess and 
Dissemination of Advocacy Information on the Level of Stakeholder 
Support at Network Level 
 Dependent variable: 
 WORLD_SUPPORT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NET_EFFECT      
NET_EMOTICON_AC 0.128***     
 (0.020)     
NET_SHARE_AC  0.137***    
  (0.021)    
NET_COMMENT_AC   0.150***   
   (0.027)   
NET_EMO_POS_AC    0.134***  
    (0.021)  
NET_EMO_NEG_AC     0.084** 
     (0.034) 
NET_EXTENT 3.505*** 3.413*** 3.339*** 3.439*** 4.465*** 
 (0.546) (0.549) (0.549) (0.544) (0.735) 
WORLD_GTREND -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
WORLD_NEWS -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
STA_EVENT -0.042 -0.029 -0.052 -0.046 -0.109 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.170) (0.171) (0.235) 
CONSTANT 7.835*** 7.793*** 8.177*** 7.830*** 8.710*** 
 (0.580) (0.579) (0.595) (0.577) (0.719) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 166 166 166 166 105(1) 
Pseudo R2 0.0423 0.0426 0.0418 0.0427 0.0491 
Log Likelihood -1767 -1767 -1768 -1766 -1094 
 (1) Observations reduced because Facebook introduced 5 additional emoticons after 26th February 2016. 
Positive emoticons have full sample because the number of likes is available prior to February 2016. 
Table 3.11 reports the sensitivity analyses results on Negative Binomial analysis of the effectiveness and 
dissemination of advocacy information on the level of global stakeholder support using alternative 
constant added before log transformation. A constant of 0.0001 is added before taking the log 
transformation of independent variables. Column 1 to 5 presents the results from regressing the natural 
log of weekly total number of global petition signups on the alternative measure of the weekly total number 
of emoticons, shares, comments, positive emoticons, and negative emoticons that STA messages receive 
alternatively. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 
errors. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 






3.8. Conclusions, Discussions, and Implications for  Future 
Research 
Drawing on Castells' (2011, 2012, 2013) network-making power 
perspective, this chapter examines how A-NGOs communicate advocacy 
information with stakeholders in social media to attract their engagement, and 
whether such engagement can obtain large-scale stakeholder support beyond 
social media platforms. By focusing on the Greenpeace “Save the Arctic” 
campaign and its social media engagement at the message, account and 
network levels, this study documents evidence that Greenpeace communicates 
advocacy information that appeals to logic and emotions to attract stakeholder 
engagement on social media, and such engagement can help Greenpeace 
obtain large-scale stakeholder support outside social media platforms. 
The first set of hypotheses examines the relationship between the level 
of stakeholder engagement and the level of logical and emotional appeal in 
advocacy information. The findings show that the amount of specific terms is 
positively associated with stakeholder engagement with emoticons (mainly 
positive emoticons) and shares. The number of emotive words, especially 
negative words used in textual content, have a positive effect on five alternative 
engagement measures. However, compared to emotional appeal in textual 
content, logical appeal has a similar effect on stakeholder engagement. While 
social media content is more likely to contain partial views, inaccurate facts and 
emotionally charged information (Etter et al., 2019), the findings suggest that 
stakeholder worldviews are not easily changed purely by emotional appeal. 
Instead, stakeholders also use specific information to assess the impact of 
advocacy activities on their lives. Therefore, instead of over-focusing on the role 
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of emotions in attracting stakeholder engagement (Castells, 2013; Etter et al., 
2019), the findings indicate an equal role between logical and emotional appeal 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017). Visual content such as images 
or videos showing Arctic animals are more likely to attract emoticons and 
shares. The evidence supports claims made in previous literature that 
stakeholders react to communication strategies used in both textual and visual 
content (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Giorgi, 2017; Vinnari & Laine, 2017), 
suggesting the power of A-NGOs in influencing stakeholder worldviews.  
The second and third set of hypotheses examine the relationship 
between the level of stakeholder support and the effectiveness and 
dissemination of advocacy information at the account and network level. The 
results show that the engagement between Greenpeace and stakeholders may 
facilitate the attainment of national stakeholder support, and the dissemination 
of information may increase their influence by allowing more stakeholders to 
express their opinions on the advocated issue, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of obtaining large-scale stakeholder support across the world. Thus, the 
findings provide support to Castells' (2011, 2012, 2013) predictions that social 
media may help A-NGOs improve their network-making power so that a broad 
range of stakeholders can be engaged and a stronger collective power can 
potentially be formed. The findings also add to prior studies by showing that 
social media engagement can create an impact beyond application platforms, 
suggesting that social media engagement is an important activity in assisting 
A-NGO mission attainment and long term social impacts (Gómez-Carrasco & 
Michelon, 2017; Guo & Saxton, 2018; Neu et al., 2018; Quinn et al., 2016; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Xu & Saxton, 2018). Thus this study highlights the 
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potential of social media in helping A-NGOs identify and engage with 
stakeholders and enhance their downward accountability (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b). 
This study opens several avenues for future research. First, prior studies 
argue that establishing stakeholder engagement in social media is the first step 
to help A-NGOs achieve impact in the “real” world  (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Neu 
et al., 2018; Xu & Saxton, 2018). While this study provides evidence that social 
media engagement can help Greenpeace obtain large-scale stakeholder 
support beyond social media platforms, petitions are still based online: how 
online signups may be transformed into substantive organisational outcomes 
remains unclear (Neu et al., 2018). As A-NGOs are required to focus on long-
lasting social impacts for marginalised beneficiaries (Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017; 
O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, 2010; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b), the long-term 
effect of social media engagement needs further exploration. 
Second, Castells (2013) argues that switching capacity involves 
connecting to various networks to increase the extensiveness of engagement. 
While this study only focuses on cooperation within Greenpeace networks, 
inter-organisational networks may also have an effect on movement outcomes 
(Islam & van Staden, 2018; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2015). Therefore, the 
formation of an alliance between different A-NGOs’ social media accounts may 
help engage with stakeholders from diversified demographic, geographical and 
political backgrounds. Recent global campaigns on plastic pollution is an 
anecdotal example in which multiple NGOs form an alliance (e.g. Plastic 
Pollution Coalition and #breakfreefromplastic movement) in raising awareness 
of the severity of plastic pollution in the ocean. Therefore, future research can 
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explore how inter-organisational networks facilitate A-NGOs’ social media 
engagement and the roles networks may play in affecting movement outcome. 
Finally, while social media engagement measures may be used as 
indicators in accounting the impact of advocacy campaigns and evaluating 
campaign outcomes (Arnaboldi et al., 2017), over-emphasis on quantitative 
measurement may also lead to a myopic view where the importance of actual 
engagement and its impact on long-term mission achievement may be 
undermined (Ebrahim, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, 2010). In addition, A-
NGOs might also run into danger by providing exaggerated or misleading 
information to attract stakeholder engagement, just like the recent examples in 
the US Election and the Brexit referendum (Gorodnichenko, Pham, & Talavera, 
2018). Therefore, future studies can explore how A-NGOs perceive the use of 
social media in decision-making, performance evaluation and downward 
accountability processes (Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017). 
This study is not without limitations. First, due to the limited data which 
is publicly available, the focus is on a single A-NGO: this narrow scope may not 
lead to a generalisability of findings across A-NGOs in social media. While the 
results may not be generalizable to all NGO social media accounts, they may 
share similar patterns with accounts that are specifically used to communicate 
advocacy information and seek stakeholder support. Despite this limitation, this 
study moves towards understanding how social media engagement contributes 
to A-NGO downward accountability processes and their social impact beyond 
online platforms. Future studies may extend the findings in this study by 
including more A-NGOs that use social media to communicate advocacy 
information and seek stakeholder support. Second, despite efforts made to 
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identify Arctic-related messages and the use of crowdsourcing and manual 
verification to validate performance, textual analysis inherently contains 
classification errors. In addition, the bag-of-words approach may have 
limitations in measuring the level of emotional appeal as it does not consider 
the position as well as the sequence of words in a sentence. Future research 
may use more sophisticated algorithms to reveal more nuanced details on the 
narratives in NGO social media communication. Finally, the use of control 
variables, fixed effects and robustness tests should mitigate concerns about 
causality. However, the research design cannot exclude the possibility that 
other unobservable factors that are both internal and external to Greenpeace 
international and regional offices (e.g. governance characteristics, budget 
allocation and connection to other NGO networks) are also driving the 






4 B Corp Governance and Social Media Engagement 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the effect of B Corp governance 
mechanisms on the extent and quality of social media engagement. B Corp is 
a certification status awarded to for-profit firms whose owners voluntarily pursue 
both financial and corporate social responsibility (CSR) objectives and have 
met rigorous standards regarding CSR policies and practices set out by B Lab, 
the certifying body (Hiller, 2013; Romi et al., 2018; Serafeim et al., 2017). 
Initially created by B Lab in 2006 with an aim of campaigning “a global 
movement of people using business as a force for good” (Cao et al., 2017, p. 
3), the number of B Corps has grown to over 2,500 in 60 countries over the last 
decade (B Lab, 2018d; Cao et al., 2017). Some noticeable examples include 
Patagonia and Ben & Jerry’s in the United States, SustainAbility and Bulb in the 
United Kingdom, Natura in Brazil, and Animikii in Canada (B Lab, 2019a). 
The increasing exposure of B Corp in the business community has 
attracted academic attention, mainly due to the co-existence of dual missions 
and its standardised assessment of CSR transparency and accountability 
practices (André, 2012; Cao et al., 2017; Hiller, 2013; Moroz, Branzei, Parker, 
& Gamble, 2018; Romi et al., 2018). Several studies have explored the 
determinants in choosing the B Corp certification, the effect of certification on 
firm practices and B Corp financial performance. However, there has been very 
little research into and how B Corp firms discharge stakeholder accountability  
(André, 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Baudot, Dillard, & Pencle, 2019; Ebrahim 
et al., 2014). This question is particularly important given the equal status of 
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shareholders and stakeholders38 in its dual-mission model (Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Haigh, Walker, Bacq, & Kickul, 2015; Moroz et al., 
2018) and the pressing call for a greater corporate responsibility towards 
stakeholders (Gray, 2006).  
Due to the co-existence of financial and CSR objectives, B Corp firms 
face a mission drift risk in which the pressure for financial sustainability “crowds 
out” the mission for CSR impacts, increasing the risk of reverting the dual-
mission model back to the traditional shareholder-centric paradigm (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Cornforth, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
To prevent mission drift, it is important to communicate CSR-related information 
to diversified stakeholders groups (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus & Vaccaro, 
2017; Winkler, Brown, & Finegold, 2018), and social media have recently 
become a popular platform which firms can use to undertake such activity and 
enhance their accountability (Besiou, Hunter, & Van Wassenhove, 2013; 
Castelló et al., 2013; Fieseler & Fleck, 2013; Lyon & Montgomery, 2013; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Whelan et al., 2013). Despite the potential benefits 
that social media may bring, recent studies also document the use of social 
media for legitimacy and public relation purposes, questioning whether they 
promote greater stakeholder accountability (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Gómez-
Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; She & Michelon, 2019; Yang & 
Liu, 2017). As a result, understanding how B Corp firms use social media to 
engage with stakeholders and which factors influence their social media 
engagement activities may shed more light on B Corp accountability practices. 
                                            
38 Stakeholders here refer to employees, customers, community, suppliers, environment, and 
the general public. 
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Corporate governance is believed to a critical factor in determining 
accountability and transparency practices in business (Brennan & Solomon, 
2008). The type of governance mechanisms ranges from external means, such 
as regulations and markets, to internal means including the board of directors, 
share ownership, charter provisions and managerial incentives (Gillan, 2006). 
Prior literature find that governance mechanisms can improve firm transparency 
by limiting earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Peasnell, 
Pope, & Young, 2005), reducing impression management in narrative 
disclosures (Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011), increasing voluntary financial 
(Lim, Matolcsy, & Chow, 2007) and social and environmental disclosures 
(Chan, Watson, & Woodliff, 2014; Mallin, Michelon, & Raggi, 2013) in annual 
reports, and enhancing social and environmental performance (Jo & Harjoto, 
2012; Mallin & Michelon, 2011). Given the uniqueness of the B Corp dual-
mission model and its associated governance mechanisms that protect the 
interests of stakeholders, it deserves our attention to gain further insight into 
the role of corporate governance in enhancing stakeholder accountability in an 
alternative organisational context (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brennan & Solomon, 
2008; Levillain & Segrestin, 2019; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2016).  
This study posits that B Corp governance mechanisms play an important 
role in influencing social media engagement activities. More specifically, it 
focuses on three governance mechanisms that are explicitly required and 
assessed by B Lab: legal responsibility, ethical standards and mission-
alignment policies. This study examines the effects of these mechanisms on 
the extent and quality of social media engagement on Twitter. The legal 
responsibility mechanism refers to the extent to which a firm incorporates 
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stakeholder considerations into its legal structure. In the B Corp case, firms can 
choose to sign a private agreement with B Lab, amend the corporate charter or 
convert to Benefit Corporation. However, the level to which stakeholders are 
considered in the legal responsibility varies as the private agreement gives the 
lowest legal protection, while the Benefit Corporation status gives the highest 
protection. The second mechanism, ethical standards, refers to the 
establishment of programmes and policies that ensure the integrity and ethical 
compliance of the firm. Examples include prevention, monitoring and reporting 
of anti-corruption activities, code of ethics, training on code of ethics, and its 
breach policy. The third mechanism, mission-alignment policies, refers to the 
implementation of policies or strategies to align firm operations with their CSR 
objectives and in achieving their CSR mission. Examples include policies on 
materiality assessment, board review on CSR performance, CSR-related 
managerial job descriptions, CSR-linked managerial compensation contracts, 
employee training on CSR performance, and the existence of a formal CSR-
oriented mission statement. These three governance mechanisms are 
measured using B Impact Assessment (BIA) Mission-Locked score, Ethics 
score, and Mission & Engagement respectively.  
With regard to the extent and quality of social media engagement, the 
extent refers to the level of two-way dialogic communication between the firm 
and its stakeholders regarding CSR practices. Following Lee et al. (2013), the 
extent is measured using the number of firm-initiated and stakeholder-initiated 
CSR-related tweets alternatively. Quality refers to how effective a firm is in 
communicating CSR information with its stakeholders, and the effective 
communication framework proposed in Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2018) is 
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used to develop a social media engagement quality index based on the concept 
of intertextual connectivity, intentionality, informativity, acceptability and 
situationality.  
By scraping and classifying CSR-related tweets posted by 1,074 U.S. B 
Corp firms certified between 2014 and 2018 and those posted by stakeholders 
towards the firm, this study finds that the extent of social media engagement is 
positively associated with the comprehensiveness of mission-alignment 
policies in both the assessment year and the following year. The findings also 
show that the quality of social media engagement is positively associated with 
the level of B Corp legal responsibility, the level of ethical standards and the 
comprehensiveness of mission-alignment policies in both the assessment year 
and the following year. When analysing the effect of B Corp governance 
mechanisms on each quality dimension (i.e. intertextual connectivity, 
intentionality, informativity, acceptability and situationality), all three 
governance mechanisms are positively related to the intention to engage with 
stakeholders regarding CSR issues (i.e. intentionality). Furthermore, firms with 
more comprehensive mission-alignment policies initiate CSR-related tweets 
with high intertextual connectivity, informativity, acceptability and situationality 
for stakeholders. Overall, this study documents evidence that B Corp 
governance mechanisms positively influence social media engagement 
activities. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it contributes 
to the B Corp literature by highlighting the role of B Corp governance 
mechanisms in enhancing stakeholder accountability practices. While 
extensive studies have examined governance mechanisms in either 
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conventional corporations or non-governmental organisations (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008; Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer, 2005), their influence on the 
accountability practice in hybrid organisations remain under-explored (Battilana 
& Lee, 2014; Brennan & Solomon, 2008; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2016). The B 
Corp governance model is unique in accommodating both shareholder and 
stakeholder interests (André, 2012; Hiller, 2013; Munch, 2012), and there has 
been increasing academic interest into governance mechanisms in alternative 
organisational forms (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brennan & Solomon, 2008; 
Levillain & Segrestin, 2019; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2016). Correspondingly, this 
study adds to the previous literature by documenting evidence that B Corp legal 
responsibility, ethical standards and mission-alignment policies improve the 
extent and quality of social media engagement, illustrating the importance of B 
Corp governance mechanisms in promoting stakeholder accountability.  
Second, this study makes a methodological contribution to the social and 
environmental accounting literature by employing a machine-learning approach 
in classifying CSR-related information. While machine-learning classification 
has been used in the analysis of financial reports (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010), 
very few studies apply this method in a social and environmental accounting 
context. Compared to manual (Deegan et al., 2002; Michelon et al., 2015) and 
dictionary-based textual analysis (Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Loughran & 
McDonald, 2011; She & Michelon, 2019), machine learning classification 
requires no dictionary beforehand. This advantage offers more flexibility and 
higher accuracy when classifying information with no consistent pattern or 
expression. This study therefore provides an empirical illustration of the use of 
machine learning algorithms in classifying CSR-related big data. 
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Thirdly, this study contributes to the accounting and social media 
literature by developing a social media engagement quality index. Since firms 
are able to use social media for legitimacy purposes and to hinder stakeholder 
accountability (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; She & 
Michelon, 2019), it is not only important to investigate the extent and the type 
of CSR information communicated in social media (Lee et al., 2013; Saxton et 
al., 2019; She & Michelon, 2019), but also the quality of such communication 
(Mallin et al., 2013; Michelon et al., 2015). Employing the effective 
communication model proposed in Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2018), this study 
develops an index to measure the quality of social media engagement on CSR-
related issues, and provides a detailed picture into how B Corp firms engage 
with stakeholders in each quality dimension. 
Lastly, this study has some managerial implications for firms that wish to 
obtain B Corp certification or adopt a dual-mission model. While the findings 
show that that the extent and quality of social media engagement are mainly 
driven by mission-alignment policies, B Corp legal responsibility and ethical 
standards still have a positive influence on social media engagement quality. 
Furthermore, although Benefit Corporation status has no effect on either the 
extent or the quality of social media engagement, the interaction effect between 
Benefit Corporation status, ethical standards and mission-alignment policies 
can further improve the extent of social media engagement. These findings 
indicate that multiple governance mechanisms may jointly enhance stakeholder 
accountability and prevent mission drift risk. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give 
a brief overview of hybrid organisation, social enterprise and B Corp. Section 
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4.4 provides a literature review on B Corp. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 discuss B Corp 
mission drift risk and the role of social media in enhancing stakeholder 
accountability. Section 4.7 develops the hypotheses and Section 4.8 presents 
the research design. Sections 4.9 and 4.10 present and discuss the main 
findings and additional analyses. Section 4.11 concludes the chapter and 
discusses limitations.  
 
 Hybrid Organisation and Social Enterprise 
 Hybrid organisations are defined as entities that adopt structures or 
practices which allow the co-existence of multiple organisational identities, 
forms, and/or institutional logics (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty, Haugh, & 
Lyon, 2014). Traditionally, organisations are categorised into three forms: 
private sector, public sector and non-profit-sector, and their identities, forms 
and logics are distinctly different from each other (Billis, 2010). Private-sector 
organisations adopt a market-based economic principle where their operations 
are driven by the maximisation of financial returns, owned by shareholders, 
sourced through investment and revenues, and governed according to the size 
of share ownership. Public sector organisations adopt a public benefit and 
collective choice principle where operations are sustained through taxation, 
owned by the state and citizens, and governed according to the principle of 
public elections. Non-profit sector organisations adopt a commitment to a 
specific social and environmental mission, owned by members, funded through 
donations and membership fees, and governed by privately elected 
representatives. However, in recent years, the boundary between these 
distinctive sectors has been blurring worldwide, and a growing number of new 
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hybrid organisational forms have emerged on the market because of a variety 
of legislative and social innovations (Santos et al., 2015). Among them, the 
fastest growing hybrid organisation is social enterprise (Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Haigh et al., 2015). 
 Social enterprises encompass both the logic of generating revenue from 
commercial activities to sustain financial continuity and the logic of pursuing 
CSR missions (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Haigh et al., 2015; Santos et al., 2015). Unlike traditional private-sector 
organisations which prioritise the goal of maximising financial returns for their 
owners above all other interests, social enterprises adopt a dual-mission logic 
where both financial sustainability and CSR impacts are equally important to 
the very existence of the business (Doherty et al., 2014; Haigh & Hoffman, 
2014). The first social enterprises can be traced back to the 1960s and 70s 
(Haigh et al., 2015), with several variants depending on geographical and legal 
contexts (Doherty et al., 2014). For example, in the United Kingdom, 
businesses that wish to become a social enterprise are allowed to register as a 
Community Interest Company (CIC) (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Nicholls, 2010). 
Similarly, in the United States, businesses can adopt legal forms such as 
Flexible Purpose Corporation, Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C), or 
Benefit Corporations (André, 2012; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Haigh et al., 2015; 
Hiller, 2013). Apart from the adoption of a legal form, businesses may also 
voluntarily pursue third-party certifications which assure their socially 
responsible practices (Cao et al., 2017; Cornforth, 2014; Stubbs, 2017b). 
Certification can be used as a mechanism to mitigate regulatory risk, signal, 
and assure the quality of products and services. It can also release hidden 
163 
 
information about a firm’s CSR impacts to stakeholders (Moroz et al., 2018). 
Some noticeable examples include LEED for green building, and Fair Trade for 
coffee. However, these certifications are only applicable to the practice or 
product of a particular firm (Moroz et al., 2018; Stubbs, 2017b). In recent years, 
a new form of business-wide certification called “B Corporation” (B Corp)39 is 
emerging and has quickly become a popular trend among the business 
community to demonstrate their dual-mission commitments (Cao et al., 2017; 
Moroz et al., 2018; Romi et al., 2018; Stubbs, 2017b).   
 
 Background on B Corp 
 To become a B Corp company, a firm must meet stringent standards set 
out by B Lab with regard to CSR performance, transparency and governance 
(B Lab, 2019b; Serafeim et al., 2017). To meet the performance requirement, 
B Lab requires the firm to take the B Impact Assessment (BIA) – a questionnaire 
developed by B Lab to examine firm performance in areas including employees, 
community, environment and customers.40  B Lab also requires the firm to 
change its governance model by considering stakeholder interests during 
decision-making processes and it evaluates the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms in protecting stakeholders and aligning the firm’s CSR mission 
with its business operations. The assessed firm receives a pre-determined 
score after choosing relevant options in each question, and a minimum total 
                                            
39 Some academic papers refer to B Corporation as “Certified B Corporation” or “Certified B 
Corp”. However, some studies often mix the concept of B Corporation with Benefit Corporation 
and use them interchangeably. The distinction between the two concepts is discussed in the 
following section.  
40 The current version of BIA assessment is Version 6, effective from January 2019. The 
versions covered in this study only include Versions 4 and 5, effective from January 2014 and 
January 2016 respectively.  
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score of 80 out of 200 secures the certification (Cao et al., 2017; Moroz et al., 
2018; Serafeim et al., 2017).  After the assessment, the firm receives a B Impact 
Report that displays an overall score as well as individual scores for each sub-
area assessed.41 The firm must publicly display its scores on the B Lab website 
to meet the transparency requirement. Since the BIA score is computed 
consistently across firms, stakeholders can be better informed by comparing 
and assessing B Corp performance both longitudinally and cross-sectionally 
(Romi et al., 2018). After the initial certification, a re-assessment is required 
every three years (B Lab, 2018b) and 10% of certified B Corps are subject to a 
random audit by B Lab every year (Cao et al., 2017).42  
Some B Corp firms can also adopt a Benefit Corporation status. 
Although both forms originated from B Lab and share some common 
accountability characteristics, their legal statuses are different (Hiller, 2013). 
The key distinction is that B Corp refers to firms (regardless of the legal form) 
that voluntarily pursue both financial and CSR objectives and are awarded the 
B Corp status after meeting B Lab requirements. In contrast, a Benefit 
Corporation is a legal corporate form that is created and promoted by B Lab 
and has been legislated by over 34 U.S. states which legally recognise a 
director fiduciary duty towards stakeholders (Hiller, 2013; Serafeim et al., 2017). 
A firm that is incorporated as a Benefit Corporation may not necessarily follow 
B Lab standards and become a B Corp, and a firm that is certified as a B Corp 
may not necessarily be a Benefit Corporation. However, there is a connection 
between the two, as one of the legal requirements for being a Benefit 
                                            
41 The complete list of questions in the B Impact Assessment can be accessed at B Lab website 
https://bimpactassessment.net/.  
42 Prior to July 2018, this re-certification period was every two years. 
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Corporation is to gain a third-party audit on its CSR performance and B Lab can 
be appointed as the auditor. Therefore, a Benefit Corporation that is certified by 
B Lab will automatically become a B Corp. In addition, B Lab also encourages 
B Corp firms that are headquartered in states with Benefit Corporation 
legislation to become a Benefit Corporation within four years of the effective 
date of the introduction of Benefit Corporation legislation, or two years of initial 
B Lab certification, whichever is later, to be re-certified. In addition, both 
organisational forms have no tax advantage compared to conventional 
companies (B Lab, 2019b). Further, there are some costs involved in adopting 
each organisational form. B Corp firms are required to pay B Lab an annual 
membership fee from $500 to $50,000 based on their size (Cao et al., 2017). 
Firms that wish to be incorporated as a Benefit Corporation will also incur some 
costs. While the direct cost of filing a new legal form in the US is usually around 
$100 to $200, indirect costs such as attorney fees and the amount of time and 
resources required for preparatory work will vary depending on firm age, size, 
and the complexity of the capital structure (B Lab, 2016; Serafeim et al., 2017).  
  
 Literature Review on B Corp 
 Existing literature so far have examined questions such as the 
determinants of seeking B Corp certification, the impact of B Corp certification 
on firm practices, and how they perform financially.  
 Determinants in Seeking B Corp Certification 
 Prior studies find that the adoption of B Corp certification is subject to 
both micro- and macro-level factors. At the micro level, a firm’s pre-existing 
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CSR values, the need to improve CSR practices and gain legitimacy, and the 
mutual benefits gained from a network of good businesses are key motives for 
B Corp adoption (Gehman & Grimes, 2016). Leadership also plays a role as 
firms with female and ethnic minority owners are more likely to be certified 
(Grimes, Gehman, & Cao, 2018; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Yang, 2018). At the 
macro level, industry and regional characteristics determine B Corp 
certification. For example, Harjoto et al. (2018) find that firms in states with more 
Democratic party supporters, a lower hourly wage, higher unemployment, and 
a larger religious population are more likely to seek certification. Similarly, 
Grimes et al. (2018) find that women-owned firms operating in industries and 
states with weak sustainability norms, low mimic pressure to pursue B Corp, 
and a low concentration of women-owned businesses are more likely to qualify 
for and seek B Corp certification. 
 
 The Impact of B Corp Certification on Firm Practic es 
Another stream of literature examines how B Corp certification 
influences firm practices. For example, after conducting interviews with B Corp 
managers, fund managers and B Lab staff, Sharma, Beveridge, and Haigh 
(2018) find that B Corp firms change practices over time as managers undergo 
assessment and reassessment for certification. In the same vein, Muñoz, 
Cacciotti, and Cohen (2018) explore the timing and process of firms which 
incorporate pro-CSR missions into their organisations, and they find that B Corp 
certification interacts with the business process by triggering different decisions 
on how pro-social organisations are organised. B Corp certification may also 
cause unintended outcomes. For example, Conger, McMullen, Bergman, and 
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York (2018) examine how B Corp certification leads entrepreneurs to re-
evaluate company activities and opportunities, and they find that some 
entrepreneurs abandon efforts to pursue a prosocial ideal after receiving B Corp 
certification as they realise that it is impractical to continue doing so. 
  
 B Corp Financial Performance 
 Since B Corp firms are for-profit businesses, scholars also enquire 
whether they can “do good and do well” in terms of outperforming their non-B 
Corp peers financially and surviving in the long run. Findings to date are largely 
inconclusive. For example, by comparing B Corp firms with a sample of public 
firms and non-B Corp private firms, Chen and Kelly (2015) find that B Corp firms 
only outperform public companies on sales growth rates, but no superior 
performance is found in employee productivity growth rates when compared 
against the performance of private firms. Furthermore, they do not find any 
significant correlation between B Corp financial performance and CSR 
performance. Similarly, by analysing B Corp firms in Italy, Gazzola et al. (2019) 
find that CSR performance has no impact on firm profit. One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that B Corp certification may cause internal 
organisation disruption among young and small-size firms which may 
subsequently lead to a short-term growth slowdown (Parker, Gamble, Moroz, & 
Branzei, 2018).  
However, some studies find that B Corp firms exhibit stronger financial 
performance than their non-B Corp peers. For example, Romi et al. (2018) find 
that B Corp firms exhibit higher one- and three-year sales growth rates than 
non-B Corp peers. When examining whether CSR performance affects financial 
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performance, they find that firms that perform well in Customer and Employee 
areas have better sales growth and employee productivity respectively. In the 
same vein, by comparing the capital structure of a matched sample between B 
Corp firms and non-B Corp peers, Siqueira, Guenster, Vanacker, and Crucke 
(2018) find that B Corp firms have 40% to 13% lower gearing ratios and up to 
four times greater leverage stability over time than non-B Corp firms.  
To sum up, while the existing literature has examined the determinants 
in seeking B Corp certification and the effect of this certification on firm practices 
and financial performance, how B Corp firms perform in terms of enhancing 
stakeholder accountability is still under-examined. Given that the creation of 
financial sustainability and CSR impacts are equally important to B Corp firms 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Haigh et al., 2015; Moroz et al., 
2018), scholars are also calling for more research into understanding how B 
Corp firms establish accountability practices, and which mechanisms are 
available to protect the interests of stakeholders (André, 2012; Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Baudot et al., 2019; Ebrahim et al., 2014).  
 
 B Corp Stakeholder Accountability and Mission Drif t Risk 
B Corp firms have the potential to drive change and bring about higher 
stakeholder accountability as they internalise CSR missions into firm 
operations, reduce negative impacts and increase positive impacts, and 
establish a mutually beneficial relationship with stakeholders (Hiller, 2013; 
Stubbs, 2017a, 2017b; Wilburn & Wilburn, 2014). For example, compared to 
other sustainable businesses, B Corp firms are more likely to donate profits to 
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charity, install on-site renewable energy, use suppliers from low-income 
communities, cover some health insurance cost for employees, have women 
and minorities in management, and provide employees with more training and 
development opportunities (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2014).  
However, some studies question the ability of B Corp firms in promoting 
stakeholder accountability as they face inherent accountability issues. Firstly, B 
Corp membership fees may create a conflict of interest as B Lab’s financial 
dependence on members may run the risk of setting lower quality standards, 
potentially creating a misleading picture about companies’ CSR performance 
(André, 2012, 2015; Hemphill & Cullari, 2014). Furthermore, since the BIA is 
based on self-reported documentation (Cummings, 2012), firms may 
exaggerate reports on CSR practices (André, 2012, 2015; Munch, 2012), 
making B Corp certification a symbolic and greenwashing tool (André, 2012; 
Rodrigue, Magnan, & Cho, 2013). Finally, no detailed information is provided 
on publicly disclosed BIA scores, making it difficult for external stakeholders to 
assess the information (André, 2012). Thus some firms may simply reach the 
minimum BIA threshold with no further improvement and “hide” among others 
to take advantage of the collective reputation benefits (Gamble, Parker, & 
Moroz, 2019). 
In addition to the issues above, prior studies argue that B Corp firms are 
more likely to face mission drift risk which may threaten the fundamental idea 
of a dual mission model. Mission drift risk is defined as “a process of 
organisational change, where an organisation diverges from its main purpose 
or mission” (Cornforth, 2014, p. 4). While all types of organisations may face 
this risk to a certain extent, it is particularly problematic for B Corp firms as they 
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pursue both financial and CSR objectives (Cornforth, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 
2014). Commercial pressure is cited as the main driver for mission drift 
(Weisbrod, 2004), although some scholars point out that dependence on other 
major funders such as the government or foundations may also create this 
problem (Jones, 2007). The reliance on commercially generated profits may 
force B Corp firms to prioritise the interests of shareholders (or funders) over 
stakeholders, leading to undesirable consequences (Cornforth, 2014). For 
example, organisational members who have two objectives (commercial and 
CSR) may have an identity clash, leading to inter-personal conflict (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010). This dualism may also result in an unbalanced allocation of 
limited resources between commercial and CSR activities (Battilana & Lee, 
2014). If conformance to financial pressures persists, it would be difficult for 
firms to maintain a hybrid purpose over time (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Therefore, 
the prevention of mission drift risk is particularly important to the long-term 
survival of B Corp firms.  
Several studies recognise the importance of stakeholder engagement in 
managing mission drift risk (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus 
& Vaccaro, 2017; Winkler et al., 2018). Stakeholder engagement is defined as 
a process in which firms establish a dialogue with stakeholders to constantly 
communicate information about their CSR activities, and consult with 
stakeholders in order to assess and improve CSR practices (Bebbington et al., 
2007; Greenwood, 2007; Thomson & Bebbington, 2005; Unerman & Bennett, 
2004). This timely engagement is particularly important if stakeholders rely 
heavily on a firm’s product or service. For example, a dual-mission optical 
company may provide eyeglasses to low-income individuals and communities. 
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If increasing financial pressure forced the company to charge a higher price, 
these low-income customers would have to bear the increased costs, 
compromising the CSR commitments of the company (Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
As a result, stakeholder engagement plays a vital part in understanding the 
views of stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2007; Thomson & Bebbington, 2005; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004) and ensuring the successful achievement of dual 
objectives (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus & Vaccaro, 2017). The importance of 
stakeholder engagement in promoting accountability is also documented in 
prior empirical studies. For example, after analysing two Italian social 
enterprises, Ramus and Vaccaro (2017) find that stakeholder engagement can 
counter-balance mission drift risk by helping directors re-embed previously 
abandoned pro-social values, and facilitate communication with external 
stakeholders about their re-established commitments. In the same vein, Mason 
and Doherty (2016) document that the directors of three Fair Trade social 
enterprises actively involve producers in board meetings and provide training 
to help them take up board positions.   
 
 Social Media Engagement and B Corp Accountability 
In recent years, the rise of social media has given firms an additional 
platform for the creation of dialogue with diversified stakeholders and the 
collection of their opinions for decision-making on a large scale (Castelló et al., 
2013; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Prior studies find that firms with better 
governance and CSR performance are more likely to engage with stakeholders 
on social media. For example, Yang, Liu, and Zhou (2016) investigate a sample 
of UK FTSE 350 firms and find that firms with larger board size, more female 
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directors and more frequent board meetings are more active in disclosing 
financial information on social media. Lee et al. (2013) find that firms with higher 
CSR ratings adopt social media earlier, have more stakeholders following the 
account, and receive more dialogue from stakeholders. This finding is also 
echoed in Huang, Lu, and Su (2016) where they find that firms with better 
environmental performance adopt Twitter earlier, disclose more prosocial 
information, and enable more stakeholders to follow their accounts. Similarly, 
Saxton et al. (2019) examine stakeholder reactions to Fortune 500 Twitter 
messages and find that firms that post tweets containing CSR topics such as 
the environment and education are more likely to attract stakeholder reactions. 
Other studies also find that social media engagement may help firms boost 
corporate reputation (Eberle et al., 2013), mitigate negative public perceptions 
during firm crisis (Cade, 2018; Elliott et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2015), reduce 
information asymmetry and increase transparency (Blankespoor et al., 2014; 
Lei, Li, & Luo, 2018; Prokofieva, 2014). 
Meanwhile, some studies also question the ability of social media to 
enhance accountability due the poor operationalisation and potential motives of 
stakeholder engagement on social media in seeking to maintain legitimacy   
(Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 
2001; She & Michelon, 2019). For example, Manetti and Bellucci (2016) find 
that only a small number of firms engage with stakeholders on social media, 
and the quality of this engagement is very low. Similarly, Gómez-Carrasco et 
al. (2017) document that banks disengage stakeholders on Twitter by 
communicating supplementary instead of core CSR activities in attempting to 
restore their image during a legitimacy crisis. She & Michelon (2018) find that 
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firms use hypocrisy talk and decisions strategies on Facebook to manage 
stakeholder perceptions and camouflage CSR practices. Firms also disclose 
financial information opportunistically on Twitter to influence investor 
perceptions and shape a positive image (Jung et al., 2018; Yang & Liu, 2017).  
The discussions above indicate that social media engagement can easily 
be transformed into a public relation exercise to maintain legitimacy which 
ultimately hinders firm accountability to stakeholders. Since the prevention of 
mission drift risk is considered to be closely linked to B Corp stakeholder 
engagement activities, and corporate governance systems regulates firms’ 
accountability processes (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Owen et al., 2001; Ramus & 
Vaccaro, 2017; Unerman & Bennett, 2004), it is important to understand the 
role of B Corp governance mechanisms in influencing social media 
engagement activities. 
 
 Hypotheses Development 
It is believed that corporate governance has a central function in 
preventing mission drift risk and maintaining social enterprise joint 
accountability (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Cornforth, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
Traditionally, the notion of corporate governance is rooted in a shareholder-
oriented approach where governance mechanisms protect shareholder 
interests (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). However, given the equal importance of 
financial and CSR objectives, the B Corp governance model adopts a 
stakeholder-oriented approach in which its mechanisms ensure accountability 
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to all stakeholders and the achievement of CSR commitments (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008).  
The governance system underlying B Corp is unique, as B Lab requires 
firms that wish to be certified to adopt a mission-aligned governance model (B 
Lab, 2016). B Lab defines mission-aligned governance as a “governance model 
that embeds a purpose beyond creating profit and requires directors to consider 
the impact of their actions on stakeholders as well as shareholders” (B Lab, 
2016, p. 2). The key aim of this model is to build the preservation of a CSR 
mission and stakeholder interests into the firm’s governance structure (B Lab, 
2016). This would involve the firm in actively implementing various mechanisms 
and/or policies to protect stakeholders’ interests during the decision-making 
process (B Lab, 2016). This study focuses on three governance mechanisms 
that are explicitly required and assessed by B Lab with regard to the prevention 
of mission drift and the protection of stakeholders, and it examines their effects 
on the extent and quality of social media engagement with reference to legal 
responsibility, ethical standards and mission-alignment policies.   
 
 Legal Responsibility 
There are three main options that a B Corp firm can adopt to incorporate 
stakeholder interests into its legal structure (B Lab, 2016). The first is to sign a 
term sheet (B Corp Agreement) with B Lab. The sheet states that directors shall 
consider the impact of business decisions not only on shareholders but also on 
a range of stakeholders. However, this term sheet is a private agreement 
between the firm and B Lab (Hiller, 2013), and the violation of relevant terms 
will only lead to the revocation of B Corp status (B Lab, 2018a). The second 
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method is to amend the corporate charter by including a stakeholder provision. 
Although this method gives the firm a higher legal responsibility to stakeholders 
than the first, directors are still only permitted, but not obligated, to consider 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it is up to the court to determine whether directors 
have a responsibility to stakeholders under the business judgement rule and 
constituency statutes (Hiller, 2013). The last and the most stringent method is 
to convert to a Benefit Corporation that explicitly states a director’s obligation to 
consider the impact of business decisions on a range of stakeholders, including 
employees, suppliers, customers, the environment and the local community (B 
Lab, 2016; Munch, 2012; Serafeim et al., 2017). Unlike the previous two 
methods which can be easily overturned and ignored (Cornforth, 2014), this 
legal obligation extends the director’s fiduciary duty beyond shareholders, and 
gives him/her more flexibility and reduced liability when making decisions 
concerning stakeholders (B Lab, 2016; Hiller, 2013; Munch, 2012; Serafeim et 
al., 2017). It is argued that by assigning directors a legal obligation, this gives 
stakeholders the highest level of protection and safeguards the firm’s CSR 
mission (B Lab, 2016; Cornforth, 2014; Hiller, 2013; Levillain & Segrestin, 
2019).  
However, several studies also cast doubt on the role of director 
obligations in enhancing stakeholder accountability as the Benefit Corporation 
legislation only permits shareholders to file legal claims against any 
mismanagement, and stakeholders cannot sue the firm (Munch, 2012). 
Therefore, the lack of enforceability may give directors opportunities to use B 
Corp as a legitimacy tool, and pursue profits without being penalised by 
stakeholders (André, 2012, 2015; Munch, 2012). Nevertheless, Hiller (2013) 
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disagrees with the above view and argues that directors will weigh different 
interests equally during decision-making and that no interest can take 
precedence. Therefore, it would be simplistic to conclude that the inclusion of 
stakeholder consideration in the director’s fiduciary duty is a symbolic move for 
corporate legitimacy (Hiller, 2013). He further argues that the inclusion of 
stakeholder consideration reflects a strong demonstration of the firm’s CSR 
value, thus reducing the likelihood of greenwashing (Hiller, 2013). Following 
this stream of argument, firms with a higher level of legal responsibility to 
stakeholders are expected to actively communicate with them in order to seek 
their opinions and provide stakeholders with high quality CSR-related 
information. This, it is argued, leads to more extensive and higher quality social 
media engagement. Correspondingly, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1a. The extent of social media engagement is positively 
associated with the level of B Corp legal responsibility to 
stakeholders. 
 
H1b. The quality of social media engagement is positively 




 Ethical Standards 
 In addition to legal responsibility, B Lab assesses a firm’s ethical 
programmes including prevention, monitoring and reporting of anti-corruption 
activities, code of ethics, training on code of ethics, and its breach policy to 
safeguard stakeholder interests. Although legal responsibility may give 
stakeholders a certain level of protection, it alone is not sufficient in the 
prevention of mission drift as directors and managers may merely tick boxes on 
regulatory requirements without implementing any substantive actions 
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(Rossouw, 2005a). Previous literature argues that high stakeholder 
accountability is achieved when directors and managers conform to the spirit, 
standards and substance of good governance (Arjoon, 2005; Rossouw, 2005a). 
A high ethical standard not only includes comprehensiveness in developing and 
implementing codes of conduct (Erwin, 2011), but also policies on code 
violation handling, whistle-blowing reporting, and employee training on ethical 
programmes (Schwartz, Dunfee, & Kline, 2005). As a result, the ethical 
standards set by management are central to the overall ethical environment of 
the firm, and ethical compliance across all firm members ensures the long-term 
preservation of a CSR mission (Rose, 2007; Schwartz et al., 2005). The way in 
which a firm treats its stakeholders reflects its ethical standards, so it is 
expected that companies with more ethical programmes are more sensitive to 
stakeholder demands, and such ethical sensitivity will result in more extensive 
and higher quality social media engagement (Rossouw, 2005a, 2005b; 
Schwartz et al., 2005). Prior empirical evidence also supports this positive 
relationship. For example, Erwin (2011) proposes that high-quality codes of 
conduct must include public availability, commitments from the leadership, high 
readability, the presence of code breach policy and reporting, embedding 
corporate commitments & values, firm- and industry-specific risk topics, the 
provision of comprehension aids to stakeholders, and an effective style of 
presentation. By employing this quality index and analysing its association with 
CSR performance, Erwin (2011) finds that firms with higher quality codes of 
conduct exhibit higher CSR rankings and better ethical behaviours. This finding 
indicates that high ethical standards can lead to positive organisational 
outcomes. Moreover, Winkler et al. (2018) compare the relationship between 
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employee involvement/ownership and external stakeholder engagement in a 
sample of conventional businesses and B Corp firms, and they find a positive 
relationship only for B Corp firms. They argue that employees who are 
motivated by their firm’s ethical leadership hold a long-term view about the 
firm’s CSR mission, therefore they are more active in engaging with external 
stakeholders. Lastly, Miller-Stevens, Taylor, Morris, and Lanivich (2018) 
examine the value differences between leaders of social enterprises and non-
profit organisations and find that leaders from both organisations share similar 
values in integrity, trust, accountability and responsiveness, thus indicating a 
high ethical value among social enterprise employees. Based on the above 
argument, the second set of hypotheses is as follows: 
 H2a. The extent of social media engagement is positively 
associated with the level of B Corp ethical standards. 
 
H2b. The quality of social media engagement is positively 
associated with the level of B Corp ethical standards. 
 
 
 Mission-Alignment Policies 
 B Lab also encourages B Corp firms to actively implement policies that 
protect stakeholders and preserve the CSR mission (B Lab, 2016). These 
mission-alignment policies include materiality assessment, board reviews on 
CSR performance, CSR-related managerial job descriptions, CSR-linked 
managerial compensation contracts, employee training on CSR performance, 
and the existence of a formal CSR-oriented mission statement. The reasons for 
the implementation of these policies are as follows. First, an extensive literature 
has established that directors have both a monitoring function and a service 
function in providing advice and resources to CEOs on CSR management 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Therefore, having 
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an explicit policy for board review of CSR performance may significantly 
influence CSR outcomes, leading to higher stakeholder accountability (Dixon-
Fowler, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 2017; Mallin et al., 2013; Peters & Romi, 2014). 
For example, Mallin et al. (2013) analyse 100 U.S. Best Corporate Citizens in 
the period 2005 to 2007 and they find that firms with a CSR committee have 
superior CSR performance to those without such a committee. Similarly, Dixon-
Fowler et al. (2017) find that the presence of a board environmental committee 
and an environmental manager leads to higher environmental performance. In 
the same vein, Peters and Romi (2014) find that the presence of a board 
environmental committee and a chief sustainability officer increases the 
likelihood of Greenhouse Gas disclosure.  
Second, CSR-related managerial job descriptions and compensation 
contracts can align the interest of managers with the firm’s long-term CSR 
mission (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Good CSR performance requires time 
and resources, and sometimes unforeseen problems may create risks; as a 
result, managers may have lower incentives to allocate and invest resources in 
CSR activities (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Russo & Fouts, 1997). Berrone 
and Gomez-Mejia (2009) argue that linking CSR performance to managerial job 
descriptions and compensation contracts can help the board assess 
managerial decisions, and at the same time compensate for the higher risk 
faced by managers in CSR investment (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). This 
view is supported by several empirical studies. For example, Hong, Li, and 
Minor (2016) find that the use of CSR-linked managerial compensation 
contracts leads to better CSR performance. Haque (2017) finds that CSR-linked 
compensation policies are positively related to the carbon reduction initiatives 
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of UK firms. In the same vein, Flammer, Hong, and Minor (2019) find that CSR-
linked managerial compensation contracts have a positive effect on a firm’s 
long-term orientation, firm value, CSR initiatives, GHG emission reduction and 
green innovations. Finally, Al-Shaer and Zaman (2017) find that both board-
level sustainability committees and sustainability reporting assurance have a 
positive effect on the use of CSR-linked compensation contracts, suggesting 
that firms with more intense monitoring on CSR issues are more likely to 
monitor managerial behaviours and their achievement of CSR objectives. 
However, several studies also criticise the symbolic function of CSR 
policies in legitimacy building and stakeholder management (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004; Cho & Patten, 2007; Rodrigue et al., 2013). For example, Rodrigue et al. 
(2013) focus on a sample of environmentally sensitive firms and find no 
significant relationship between the presence of an environmental committee 
and environmental performance. Along the same line, Peters, Romi, and 
Sanchez (2018) find no significant relationship between the appointment of a 
corporate sustainability officer and a firm’s subsequent environmental 
performance. Some studies also question the ability of CSR-linked 
compensation contracts to promote stakeholder accountability. For example, 
Cordeiro and Sarkis (2008) examine the relationship between CSR-linked 
executive compensation contracts and environmental performance for a 
sample of U.S. S&P 500 firms in 1996, and they only find a positive relationship 
in firms that link the absolute level (no industry adjustment) of compliance and 
spill indices to CEO compensation. No relationship is found when using toxic 
emission level and the use of industry adjusted environmental performance. 
Such a weak relationship between CEO compensation and environmental 
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performance may imply the exertion of managerial power on the compensation 
committee to weaken the effect of CSR-linked compensation on CSR 
performance. They conclude that firms may utilise the linkage between CEO 
compensation and environmental performance for a symbolic purpose rather 
than a substantive purpose. In addition, Francoeur, Melis, Gaia, and Aresu 
(2017) find that environment-friendly firms pay their CEOs less total 
compensation and rely less on incentive-based compensation than 
environmentally careless firms because CEOs feel rewarded by playing an 
overseeing role in environmentally-friendly firms. Their findings question the 
validity of financial incentives in motivating CEOs to promote environmental 
performance and enhancing stakeholder accountability. 
While the presence of a single policy may hint towards a symbolic motive 
behind CSR management, the adoption of multiple policies may indicate a 
firm’s real commitments to a CSR mission, thus promoting higher stakeholder 
accountability (Shaukat, Qiu, & Trojanowski, 2016). Furthermore, since B Corp 
CSR policies are certified and randomly audited by a third-party organisation 
(i.e. B Lab), the credibility of these policies can be enhanced (Ballou, Chen, 
Grenier, & Heitger, 2018; Brown-Liburd & Zamora, 2014). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the more comprehensive mission-alignment policies a firm 
implements, the more active the firm is in engaging with stakeholders regarding 
CSR issues, thus preventing mission drift risk. Following the above argument, 
the third set of hypotheses as formulated as follows: 
H3a. The extent of social media engagement is positively 





H3b. The quality of social media engagement is positively 
associated with the comprehensiveness of B Corp mission-
alignment policies. 
 
 Research Design 
 Sample and Data Collection 
This empirical analysis considers U.S. B Corps that were certified 
between 2014 and 2018. U.S. B Corp firms were selected because the B Corp 
movement originated in the U.S, and about 62% of B Corps are from North 
America (Serafeim et al., 2017). The complete list of 1,450 B Corp firms and 
related firm information were retrieved from the B Lab database on data.world 
as of 20th February 2019 (B Lab, 2018c).43  
Next, B Corp Twitter accounts were identified through firm websites. If 
no link was found, the firm’s name was manually sought on Twitter. After 
excluding firms without a Twitter account and those that were inactive during 
the sample period, the process yielded 1,089 distinct firms. By further excluding 
samples with missing data on other firm characteristics, this process yielded a 
final sample of 1,074 distinct firms with 1,520 firm-year observations. Table 4.1 
shows the statistics of U.S. B Corps. By breaking down the final sample 
according to industry characteristics, Education & Training Services, Media, 
and Consumer Products & Services are the top three industries active on 
Twitter, while financial service, building, and health & human services have the 




                                            
43 The data can be retrieved from https://data.world/blab/b-corp-impact-data. 
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Table 4.1 Twitter Adoption and Activity by U.S. B C orps and by Industry 
 All 
Twitter 
Adoption Active Twitter Final Sample 
Industry  N N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Agriculture 31 26 83.9 26 83.9 25 81% 
Building 71 49 69.0 40 56.3 38 54% 
Business Products & Services 508 399 78.5 373 73.4 366 72% 
Consumer Products & Services 420 376 89.5 354 84.3 351 84% 
Education & Training Services 44 41 93.2 40 90.9 39 89% 
Energy & Environmental Services 71 59 83.1 52 73.2 52 73% 
Financial Services 154 103 66.9 93 60.4 93 60% 
Health & Human Services 36 28 77.8 22 61.1 21 58% 
Legal Services 28 20 71.4 19 67.9 19 68% 
Media 24 21 87.5 21 87.5 21 88% 
Restaurant, Hospitality & Travel 28 22 78.6 21 75.0 21 75% 
Retail 29 27 93.1 23 79.3 23 79% 
Transportation & Logistics 6 5 83.3 5 83.3 5 83% 
Total 1,450 1,176 81.1 1089 75.1 1074 74% 
 
Twitter Advanced Search and Python were used to scrape all tweets 
posted by Twitter active B Corps in the assessment year as well as the following 
year. 44  Stakeholder-initiated tweets that mention or directly comment on a 
sample firm during the sample period were also retrieved. The initial number of 
B Corp tweets amounted to 634,165, and the total number of stakeholder-
initiated tweets amounted to 288,641. After excluding firm retweets and firm 
replies, this process yielded 552,679 firm-initiated tweets.45 To measure the 
extent and quality of B Corp social media engagement, data analysis began 
with the classification of CSR-related tweets and the CSR topics communicated 
using the Naïve Bayes Algorithm in R Quanteda.  
  
 Naïve Bayes Classification 
The Naïve Bayes text classification is a statistical machine-learning 
approach that classifies a textual document (doc) into a specific category (cat) 
                                            
44 Twitter Advanced Search allows the search for tweets that are posted by a specific twitter 
account and the time periods in which they are posted. Tweets that were scraped were posted 
by all Twitter active firms to increase the algorithm training sample. 
45 When using Twitter Advanced Search, the server does not return tweets that are directly 
reposted by the firm through the “retweet” button. The retweets here refer to tweets that have 
“RT” at the start of the message.  
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from a set of possible pre-determined categories (cats = {cat1, cat2, …, catn}) 
based on the maximum likelihood of that text being associated with that 
category (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010). Mathematically, the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm determines the specific category (cat), in which a textual document 





  Since P(doc) remains constant throughout different categories, it can be 




Lastly, the Naïve Bayes algorithm assumes that the probability of each 
word (w1, w2, … wn) appearing in a document is conditionally independent. This 
assumption ignores the sequence of words as well as the presence or absence 
of other words in the same document (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010). As a result, 







Several studies have employed the Naïve Bayes algorithm to analyse 
accounting documents and have shown satisfactory performance in classifying 
the tone as well as the topic of a given sentence. It is argued that the key 
advantage of this algorithm is the ‘naïve’ assumption which simplifies the 
calculation of the probability and avoids the problem of multi-dimensionality (Li, 
2010). Although some words are more likely to appear jointly with other words 
in reality, studies prove that this assumption has little effect on the classification 
performance (Lewis, 1998). Second, the Naïve Bayes algorithm is the most 
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established method for textual analysis as other machine-learning algorithms 
are relatively new and more akin to a “black box”, i.e. it is difficult to understand 
how they operate (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). Lastly, the supervised 
machine-learning approach allows researchers to set the rule for classification 
in advance and then a large amount of data can be analysed without introducing 
additional subjectivity during the coding process (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). 
However, the Naïve Bayes algorithm also suffers from some major limitations.  
For example, Loughran and McDonald (2016) claim that it is difficult to replicate 
this classification algorithm as rules used in the coding process might be 
unpublished. However, this limitation can be overcome by making the coding 
scheme and the training dataset publicly available, and by clearly stating the 
process of data preparation and algorithm configuration (El-Haj, Rayson, 
Walker, Young, & Simaki, 2019). The following sections provide more details 
about data preparation and algorithm training that were followed to mitigate this 
concern.  
  
 Data Preparation 
In order to classify CSR-related tweets, the sample was firstly partitioned 
into different industry groups and then five per cent were randomly selected 
from each group as the training data for the Naïve Bayes classifier. This process 
helps to avoid under-representation of tweets posted by less active industries. 
The total training data amounted to 27,620 tweets (5% of total sample). Next, 
tweets were manually coded into CSR- or non-CSR-related messages. CSR 
topics that each tweet covers were also identified following the coding scheme 
specified in Appendix H. The classification of CSR topics is not mutually 
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exclusive. In other words, one CSR-related tweet can talk about more than one 
topic.  
To prepare the training data, all URLs, non-English characters, 
punctuation, numbers, separators, symbols, hyphens, stop words and Twitter 
features (e.g. @users and hashtags) were firstly removed. Next, the corpus 
was separated into one to three N-grams and then converted to a document by 
matrix (DFM) format. Both minimum term-count frequency and minimum 
document-count frequency were adjusted to reduce the DFM size and increase 
accuracy. The prior text distribution was set to default which assumes that the 
unconditional probability of observing one class is identical to the probability of 
observing any other class. Finally, the algorithm distribution model was set to 
Multinomial because it considers both term presence and term frequency in a 
document and has a better classification performance than the Bernoulli model, 
which only considers term presence (Singh, Kumar, Gaur, & Tyagi, 2019). Once 
the training was complete, the algorithm was used to predict the remaining 95 
per cent of firm-initiated tweets (N = 525,059) and stakeholder-initiated tweets 
(N = 288,641). 
 
 Ten-Fold Cross Validation 
To provide a more comprehensive picture of the classification 
performance, the performance of both CSR-related tweets and CSR topics 
were assessed using in-sample, ten-fold cross validation, as well as out-sample 
validation (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010). For in-sample validation, all manually 
coded tweets were used to train the Naïve Bayes classifier, and then to test the 
model with the same sample. This validation shows an upper boundary for the 
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classifier performance. For ten-fold cross validation, the sample was partitioned 
equally into ten equal subsets and then one subset was used as a testing data 
and the remaining as a training data. The validation process was repeated ten 
times until each part of the sub-sample had been tested. At the end of the 
process, the performance of ten experiments was averaged and reported. For 
out-sample validation, one hundred tweets were randomly selected from the 
remaining 95 per cent test sample, and these tweets were manually coded in 
order to compare them with the classifier’s predicted values. 
 Table 4.2 Panel A reports the validation outcomes of CSR-related tweets 
classification. Both the in-sample and ten-fold cross validation show the 
classification performance on the same training dataset and the out-sample 
validations show the performance of firm-initiated tweets and stakeholder-
initiated tweets classification outside the training dataset. The accuracy rate is 
measured as the percentage of predicted value equals the true value. The 
precision rate is measured by using the true positive values divided by the total 
number of predicted positive values. The recall rate is computed using the total 
number of correctly predicted positive values divided by the total number of true 
values. The specificity rate measures the percentage of true negative values 
out of total predicted negative values. The F1 score provides an overall 
performance of the algorithm. As indicated in the table, the classification 
algorithm achieves a satisfactory performance where the accuracy rates for 
both in-sample and out-sample validations are above 80 per cent, and the 
overall F1 scores are about 85 per cent.   
Table 4.2 Panel B presents the performance of CSR topic classification 
using in-sample validation, ten-folds cross validation, and out-sample validation 
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for each topic. Overall, the classifier achieves a satisfactory performance as 
over 80 per cent of the tweets are correctly classified as governance, employee 
or economic-related. Environment and customer-related tweets achieve an 
accuracy of over 90 per cent. Although community-related tweets achieve 83 
per cent accuracy in in-sample validation, both ten-fold cross validation and out-
sample validation have accuracy rates below 80 per cent. This may be due to 
the diversity of community activities communicated which make the algorithm 





Table 4.2 Performance of Naïve Bayes Machine Learni ng Classifications 
Panel A. Performance of CSR-Related Tweets Classification 
  Accuracy  Precision  Recall  Specificity  F1 
 N (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
In-Sample Validation 27,620 85.08 92.64 83.80 87.49 88.00 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 81.54 89.64 81.09 82.39 85.15 
Out-Sample Validation       
Firm-Initiated Tweets 100 84.00 86.44 86.44 80.49 86.44 
Stakeholder- Tweets 100 81.00 81.25 88.14 70.73 84.55 
Panel B. Performance of CSR Topics Classification 
  Accuracy  Precision  Recall  Specificity  F1 
 N (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Governance       
In-Sample Validation 27,620 89.45 99.92 89.10 98.20 94.20 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 87.66 99.23 87.86 82.68 93.20 
Out-Sample Validation 100 85.00 98.80 85.42 75.00 91.62 
Employee       
In-Sample Validation 27,620 88.95 99.98 88.76 98.80 94.04 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 86.83 99.62 86.92 82.07 92.83 
Out-Sample Validation 100 83.00 98.78 83.51 66.67 90.50 
Community       
In-Sample Validation 27,620 82.64 98.52 80.82 93.06 88.80 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 78.95 95.86 78.59 80.56 86.41 
Out-Sample Validation 100 74.00 88.57 77.50 60.00 82.67 
Economic        
In-Sample Validation 27,620 86.36 99.88 85.95 97.28 92.39 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 84.49 99.21 84.59 81.96 91.32 
Out-Sample Validation 100 82.00 98.70 81.72 85.71 89.41 
Environment       
In-Sample Validation 27,620 91.89 99.18 91.56 94.35 95.22 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 89.84 98.01 90.32 86.33 94.01 
Out-Sample Validation 100 91.00 98.77 90.91 91.67 94.67 
Customer/Products       
In-Sample Validation 27,620 92.17 99.52 92.25 90.49 95.75 
Ten-Fold Cross 
Validation 27,620 89.83 98.15 91.07 63.27 94.48 
Out-Sample Validation 100 93.00 100.00 92.86 100.00 96.30 
Notes Table 4.2 presents the performance of Naïve Bayes classification. Panel A presents the performance of CSR-
related tweet classification. In-sample and ten-fold cross validation are performed within the training sample. Out-
sample validation is performed on 100 randomly selected observations from the remaining sample in firm-initiated 
tweets, stakeholder comments, and firm replies respectively. Accuracy measures the percentage of posts that are 
correctly selected by the algorithm. It is computed by (Σ True Positive + Σ True Negative) / Total Population. 
Precision measures the number of correct posts divided by the total number of posts returned. It is computed by Σ 
True Positive / (Σ True Positive + Σ False Positive). Recall measures the number of correct posts divided by the 
number of posts that should have been returned. It is computed by Σ True Positive / (Σ True Positive + Σ False 
Negative). Specificity measures the number of false posts divided by the number of posts that should not have been 
returned. It is computed by Σ True Negative / (Σ True Negative + Σ False Positive). F1 score considers both precision 
and recall and is computed as 2× (precision × recall) / (precision + recall).  Panel B presents the performance of 
CSR topic classification. In-sample and ten-fold cross validation are performed within the training sample. Out-





 Empirical Models 
 The following OLS regression models are used to examine the 
relationship between the extent and quality of social media engagement and B 
Corp governance mechanisms: 
EXTENTit = β0 + β1LEGALit + β2ETHICSit + β3POLICYit + β4TRANSit + β5CSPit  
                 + β6SIZEit + β7FIRM_AGEit + β8CERT_AGEit + β9TW_AGEit  
                 + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit 
(4.1) 
 
QUALit = β0 + β1LEGALit + β2ETHICSit + β3POLICYit + β4TRANSit + β5CSPit  
                 + β6SIZEit + β7FIRM_AGEit + β8CERT_AGEit + β9TW_AGEit  
                 + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit 
(4.2) 
 
where EXTENTit measures the extent of social media engagement of firm i in 
assessment year t using two alternative measures: CSR_TWit and STK_TWit 
(defined below). QUALit is the overall quality of social media engagement of 
firm i in assessment year t (defined below). To mitigate the endogeneity issues 
regarding the relationship, this study also examines the effect of B Corp 
governance mechanisms on the extent (EXTENTit+1) and quality (QUALit+1) of 
social media engagement in the year following assessment.  
 
 Measures of the Extent of Social Media Engagement 
 Two measures are constructed to capture the extent of social media 
engagement (EXTENTit). First, firms may proactively communicate with 
stakeholders regarding their CSR-related issues (Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, 
the percentage of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets scaled by the total number 
of firm-initiated tweets in a sample year (CSR_TWit) is used to capture the 












where CSR_TWit is the extent of firm-initiated engagement with stakeholders of 
firm i in assessment year t. mit is the total number of tweets posted by firm i in 
assessment year t. CSR_Tweetijt equals one if a tweet j posted by firm i in 
assessment year t is CSR-related, and zero otherwise.  
Second, due to the dialogic nature of social media engagement, 
stakeholders can also initiate dialogue with firms about CSR issues (Lee et al., 
2013; Saxton et al., 2019; She & Michelon, 2019). Therefore, firms that are 
more considerate of stakeholder interests and are active on stakeholder 
engagement are expected to receive more stakeholder-initiated tweets 
regarding CSR issues. Following Lee et al. (2013), the extent of stakeholder-











where STK_TWit is the extent of stakeholder-initiated engagement to firm i in 
assessment year t. pit is the total number of tweets posted by stakeholders to 
firm i in assessment year t. CSR_Stake_Tweetijt equals one if a tweet j posted 
by a stakeholder to firm i in assessment year t is CSR-related, and zero 
otherwise. Examples of stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets are shown in 
Appendix I. 
 
 Measures of the Quality of Social Media Engagement  
The quality of social media engagement (QUALit) is measured using the 
effective communication model proposed in Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2018). 
Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2018) suggest that high-quality social media 
engagement covers textual, intertextual and relational connectivity. Therefore, 
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their model considers both the content and the interaction with other external 
parties during the engagement. In the Twitter context, this study only considers 
intertextual connectivity and relational connectivity as the restriction on tweet 
characters (i.e. 280 characters) makes it difficult to organise texts and achieve 
textual connectivity. 
 Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2018) define intertextual connectivity as the 
ability to connect texts from different time and topics. Typical examples of 
intertextual connectivity in social media are the use of hashtags (“#”), cashtags 
(“$”), and hyperlinks (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Saxton et al., 2019; Yang 









where INTERit is the intertextual connectivity for firm i in assessment year t, nit 
is the number of CSR-related tweets posted by firm i in assessment year t. 
Intertext_Tweetijt equals one if a CSR-related tweet j posted by firm i in 
assessment year t contains a hashtag, cashtag, or hyperlink, and zero 
otherwise. 
Relational connectivity consists of four aspects: intentionality, 
informativity, acceptability and situationality (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2018). 
Intentionality refers to a firm’s intention to communicate with stakeholders. In 
the social media context, the use of “@” allows firms to direct messages 
towards stakeholders to whom they intend to communicate. Therefore, 











where INTENit is the intentionality of firm i in assessment year t, nit is the number 
of CSR-related tweets posted by firm i in assessment year t. Intent_Tweetijt 
equals one if a firm-initiated CSR-related tweet j posted by firm i in assessment 
year t contains “@” symbol, and zero otherwise. An example of a high 
intertextual connectivity and high intentionality tweet is displayed in Appendix I. 
Informativity refers to the credibility and verifiability of information. As 
prior studies suggest that high quality CSR communication contains more 
verifiable information (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Michelon et al., 2015), and more 
credible information is reflected in the number of specific information 










where INFOit is the informativity of firm i in assessment year t, nit is the number 
of CSR-related tweets posted by firm i in assessment year t. Specific 
information is the arithmetic mean of the types of named entity identified using 
the spaCy Named Entity Recognition algorithm (Bennett, Maximilian, Arnoud, 
& Bruno, 2017). The named entities include organisations (ORG), geographical 
locations (GPE), date and time (TIME), numeric numbers (NUM), and monetary 
figures (MON). The presence of visuals in a tweet (PIC) is also included in the 
measure. The presence of each specific entity receives a score of one, and 
zero otherwise. An example of a high informativity tweet is shown in Appendix 
I.  
 Acceptability and situationality refer to the information being relevant for 
stakeholders. Since firms may engage with various stakeholder groups on a 
broad range of CSR topics, the breadth of CSR topics covered in social media 
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engagement may meet the information needs of various stakeholders. 
Therefore, the relevance of information (RELEVit) is measured as the number 





where RELEVit is the relevance of information communicated by firm i in 
assessment year t. Each of the six CSR topics: Governance (GOV), Employees 
(EMP), Community (COM), Economic impacts (ECO), Environment (ENV), and 
Customers/Products (CUS) earns a score of one if firm i posts at least one tweet 
referring to each one topic in assessment year t, and zero otherwise.  
Following the approach in Michelon et al. (2015), a synthesis of the social 






 Measures of B Corp Governance Mechanisms 
 Data on B Corp governance mechanisms were retrieved from B Corp 
Impact data on data.world (B Lab, 2018c). B Lab provides an overall score 
summarising a firm’s governance characteristic as well as individual scores that 
capture each governance mechanism and policy.  
Legal Responsibility   
The level of B Corp legal responsibility to stakeholders (LEGALit) is 
measured using the BIA Mission Locked score. The Mission Locked score 
reflects the extent a B Corp firm integrates the consideration of stakeholders 
into its legal structure (i.e. through private agreement, corporate charter 
amendment, or the adoption of Benefit Corporation). The score ranges from 
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zero to ten, and scores of 2.5, 7.5 and 10 indicate signing a private agreement, 
amendment of corporate charter, and adoption of Benefit Corporation 
respectively. Zero is assigned to firms that have not incorporated stakeholder 
consideration into their legal structure. B Lab may also assign other scores if 
they think firms have additional or alternative means of incorporating 
stakeholder considerations. 
Ethical Standards  
The level of B Corp ethical standards (ETHICSit) is measured using the 
BIA Ethics score. The Ethics score captures the presence of ethics compliance 
programmes such as policies on anti-corruption, code of ethics, training on 
code of ethics, and its breach policy. Since the development and 
implementation of various ethical programmes indicates a more comprehensive 
compliance system (Erwin, 2011), a high Ethics score indicates a high ethical 
standard in ensuring integrity, thus reflecting a high ethical responsibility 
towards stakeholders.  
Mission-Alignment Policies   
The comprehensiveness of a firm’s policies in protecting stakeholder 
interests and preventing mission drift risk (POLICYit) is measured using the BIA 
Mission & Engagement score. A high score indicates that more comprehensive 
policies are in place to protect stakeholder interests, thus reflecting the firm’s 
commitments to stakeholder accountability at the strategic level. 
 
 Control Variables 
 Several control variables are included in the empirical model. First, a 
firm’s social media engagement may be influenced by its transparency 
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performance as a firm may use other methods or channels to engage with 
stakeholders and communicate relevant corporate information. Therefore, the 
BIA Transparency score (TRANSit) is used to control for firm’s transparency 
performance during the assessment year. Next, the firm’s overall BIA score 
(excluding governance) is used to control for CSR performance (CSPit) as prior 
studies document that good CSR-performing firms have better stakeholder 
engagement activities (Cho et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Mallin et al., 2013). 
Firm size may influence social media engagement activities since large firms 
face more diverse demands from external stakeholders (Saxton et al., 2019). 
To measure B Corp size, B Lab categorises firms into six groups based on full-
time employee number: zero, 1 to 9, 10 to 49, 50 to 249, 250 to 999, and 1000+. 
Therefore, the firm size (SIZEit) is measured using an ordinal variable ranging 
from one to six to indicate each size group. In addition, firm age (FIRM_AGEit) 
is controlled as prior studies find that company age has an impact on active 
stakeholder engagement (Lee et al., 2013; Roberts, 1992). A firm’s founding 
year is identified through its website, LinkedIn profile, or filings at the State of 
Secretary Office. Certification age (CERT_AGEit) is also controlled as firms that 
join B Corp membership early may have more experienced practice in 
stakeholder engagement.46  TW_AGEit is also included to control for firms’ 
Twitter age as studies find that firms with higher CSR performance adopt social 
media earlier than those with lower performance (Lee et al., 2013). Finally, 
industry fixed effect is used to control for time-invariant industry characteristics 
and year fixed effect is used to control for potential events or unobservable 
                                            
46 Minimum firm age and certification age are capped at zero. 
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trends that apply to all firms in a given year. Standard errors are robust. Variable 
definitions are summarised in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Summary of Variable Definitions 
EXTENT The extent of social media engagement is measured by two proxies: CSR_TW 
– the number of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets scaled by the total number of 
firm-initiated tweets. STK_TW – the number of stakeholder-initiated CSR-
related tweets scaled by the total number of stakeholder-initiated tweets.  
QUAL The quality of social media engagement. It is the sum of INTER, INTEN, INFO, 
and RELEV. 
INTER Intertextual connectivity – the percentage of CSR-related tweets containing 
hashtags (#), cashtags ($), or hyperlinks. 
INTEN Intentionality – the percentage of CSR-related tweets containing @. 
INFO Informativity – the average number of named entities mentioned in a CSR-
related tweet. The named entities are organisations (ORG), geographical 
locations (GPE), date and time (TIME), numeric numbers (NUM), monetary 
figures (MON). I also identify whether a tweet contains visuals (PIC). 
RELEV Relevance – the breadth of CSR topics tweeted by a firm in a year.  
LEGAL The level of B Corp’s legal responsibility to stakeholders. Measured using the 
Mission Locked score in BIA assessment. 
ETHICS The effectiveness of B Corp’s ethical programmes to protect stakeholder 
interests. Measured using the Ethics score in BIA assessment. 
POLICY The extensiveness of B Corp’s mission-alignment policies to protect stakeholder 
interests. Measured using the Mission & Engagement score in BIA assessment. 
TRANS The Transparency score in BIA assessment which reflects how the firm 
performs in terms of disclosing relevant corporate information to external 
stakeholders.  
CSP BIA assessment CSR Scores excluding governance score 
SIZE Ordinal variable ranges from one to six each of the size groups based on full-
time employee number: 0, 1 to 9, 10 to 49, 50 to 249, 250 to 999, and 1000+. 
FIRM_AGE Firm age. 
CERT_AGE Number of years since first certification. 
TW_AGE Twitter age. 
 
 Empirical Findings 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
main analysis. With regard to the extent of social media engagement, on 
average, 42 per cent firm-initiated tweets (CSR_TW) and 43 per cent 
stakeholder-initiated tweets (STK_TW) are CSR-related. However, the reduced 
observations (N = 787) indicate that there is a lack of CSR-related engagement 
initiated by stakeholders. The quality of social media engagement (QUAL) has 
a mean of 2.32, suggesting that on average firms score just over half of the four 
quality dimensions. When breaking down the index into individual dimensions, 
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81 per cent of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets (INTER) contain intertextual 
connectivity features such as hashtags, cashtags and URLs; and 39 per cent 
firm-initiated CSR-related tweets (INTEN) show firms’ intentions to engage with 
stakeholders. In addition, informativity (INFO) has a mean of 0.22, suggesting 
that firm-initiated CSR-related tweets contain little specific information. Finally, 
the average number of CSR topics covered by firm-initiated tweets (RELEV) is 
0.89, suggesting a wide breadth of CSR topics covered and high relevance of 
information for various stakeholder groups.  
 Regarding B Corp governance mechanisms, the level of legal 
responsibility (LEGAL) has a mean of 6.29 and a median of 7.5, suggesting that 
half of the firms have either amended their corporate charter or converted to 
Benefit Corporation. The level of ethical standards (ETHICS) has a median of 
zero, suggesting that half of the sample have no ethical programme. The 
comprehensiveness of mission-alignment policy (POLICY) has a mean of 1.93, 
suggesting that many B Corp firms lack mission-alignment policies.  
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CSR_TW 1520 0.42 0.26 0.01 0.20 0.37 0.62 1.00 
STK_TW 776 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.39 0.61 1.00 
QUAL 1520 2.32 0.46 0.00 2.09 2.37 2.65 3.33 
INTER 1520 0.81 0.22 0.00 0.73 0.89 0.98 1.00 
INTEN 1520 0.39 0.27 0.00 0.17 0.39 0.59 1.00 
INFO 1520 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.67 
RELEV 1520 0.89 0.22 0.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LEGAL 1520 6.29 3.01 0.00 2.50 7.50 7.50 10.00 
ETHICS 1520 0.66 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 2.60 
POLICY 1520 1.93 1.06 0.00 1.10 1.80 2.60 6.00 
TRANS 1520 3.35 1.29 0.00 2.50 3.30 4.20 7.00 
CSP 1520 84.02 16.46 60.00 71.80 79.45 92.00 162.40 
SIZE 1520 2.66 1.08 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 
FIRM_AGE 1520 13.98 17.92 0.00 4.50 9.00 17.00 226.00 
CERT_AGE 1520 2.16 2.57 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 11.00 
TW_AGE 1520 5.07 2.37 0.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 




 With regard to the control variables, firms on average have a 
transparency score (TRANS) of 3.35 and a CSR performance score (CSP) of 
84.02. Firm size (SIZE) has a mean of 2.66 and a median of three, indicating 
that B Corp firms are relatively small as half of the sample have 10 – 49 full-
time employees. The average firm age (FIRM_AGE) is 13.98 and the median 
value is nine, suggesting that firms are relatively young since half of them were 
established within the last decade. The sample also has a relatively young 
certification age (CERT_AGE) as many firms received their first B Corp 
certification two years prior to the observation year. Finally, half of the firms 
adopted Twitter five years prior to the observation year. 
  
 Correlation Table 
 Table 4.5 presents the correlation coefficients for variables used in the 
main analysis. The results show that the number of CSR-related tweets 
(CSR_TW) is strongly and positively correlated with both stakeholder-initiated 
CSR-related tweets (STK_TW) and the quality of social media engagement 
(QUAL). All governance mechanisms are positively correlated with the extent 
and quality of social media engagement except for ETHICS which shows a 
negative correlation with CSR_TW and STK_TW. In addition, no independent 
and control variables exhibit a pair-wise correlation coefficient in excess of ±0.5, 
except for SIZE and ETHICS, which have a correlation coefficient of 0.64, 
suggesting that larger firms have higher ethical standards. The Further 
Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) test shows that the maximum VIF in empirical 
models is 2.11 (un-tabulated), well below the rule of thumb threshold of 10 
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(Michelon et al., 2015). Overall, the results indicate no multicollinearity issue 




Table 4.5 Correlation Table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. CSR_TW 1                
2. STK_TW 0.76*** 1               
3. QUAL 0.19*** 0.10** 1              
4. INTER 0.15*** 0.05 0.61*** 1             
5. INTEN 0.18*** 0.10** 0.64*** 0.05* 1            
6. INFO -0.02 -0.07 0.29*** 0.03 0.17*** 1           
7. SITU 0.05 0.07 0.59*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.01 1          
8. LEGAL 0.03 0.01 0.04 0 0.06* 0.01 -0.01 1         
9. ETHICS -0.04 -0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.03 0.17*** 0.08** -0.02 1        
10. POLICY 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.07** 0.03 0.05* 0.07* -0.02 1       
11. TRANS 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.07** 0.05 0.06* -0.03 0.04 0.07** 0.02 0.29*** 1      
12. CSP 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.04 0.04 0 -0.02 0.06* -0.04 0.02 0.14*** 0.06* 1     
13. SIZE -0.18*** -0.12** 0.07** 0.01 -0.02 0.21*** 0.08** -0.02 0.64*** -0.15*** -0.05 0.04 1    
14. FIRM_AGE -0.11*** -0.10** -0.02 -0.01 -0.08** 0.12*** 0.02 0.04 0.29*** -0.07** 0.01 0.02 0.41*** 1   
15. CERT_AGE 0.07** 0.08* 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.32*** 0.13*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 1  
16. TW_AGE -0.18*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.07* -0.01 0.16*** 0.04 0.11*** 0.27*** -0.07** -0.03 -0.02 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 1 





 Regression Analysis 
With respect to the effect in the assessment year, LEGAL and ETHICS 
have no effect on the extent of social media engagement (CSR_TWt and 
STAKE_TWt). However, both mechanisms are significantly and positively 
related to QUALt (p <.1 and < .05 respectively), suggesting that B Corp legal 
responsibility and ethical standards improve the quality of social media 
engagement. POLICY is strongly and positively related to CSR_TWt, 
STAKE_TWt, and QUALt (all at 0.01 level), suggesting that firms with more 
comprehensive mission-alignment policies are more active in engaging with 
stakeholders and the engagement are of higher quality.  
 With regard to control variables, TRANS is significantly and negatively 
related to CSR_TWt (p < .01) but no effect is found on STAKE_TWt and QUALt, 
indicating that firms with higher transparency have fewer firm-initiated CSR-
related tweets. One possible explanation for this is that firms may use other 
methods such as CSR reports or focus groups to engage with stakeholders on 
CSR issues. CSP is positively and significantly related to CSR_TWt and 
STAKE_TWt but no effect is found on QUALt, indicating that better CSR 
performing firms are more active in engaging with stakeholders on CSR issues. 
SIZE is negatively related to CSR_TWt (p < .05) but positively related to QUALt 
(p < .1), suggesting that while larger firms tend to have fewer CSR-related 
tweets, the quality of engagement is relatively higher than smaller firms. Older 
firms have fewer firm-initiated CSR-related tweets, fewer stakeholder-initiated 
CSR-related tweets, and lower quality engagement (p < .01, < .05, and < .05 
respectively). In addition, firms with longer certification age (CERT_AGE) have 
more firm-initiated and stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets than newly 
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certified firms (p < .01). Finally, younger Twitter adopters have more firm-
initiated and stakeholder-initiated tweets than older adopters. 
Since the evaluation of B Corp governance scores may be driven by 
firms’ stakeholder engagement activities during the assessment year, the study 
also examines the effect of B Corp governance mechanisms on the extent and 
quality of social media engagement in the year following the assessment. As 
indicated in Columns 4 to 6, LEGAL still shows a positive effect on QUALt+1, but 
the coefficient is not significant. However, ETHICS is still significantly and 
positively related to QUALt+1 in the year following assessment and POLICY 
exhibits positive effects on CSR_TWt+1, STAKE_TWt+1, and QUALt+1 in the year 
following assessment. Overall, the results provide support to H1b, H2b, H3a, 




Table 4.6 OLS Analysis of B Corp Governance Mechani sms on the Extent 
and Quality of Social Media Engagement 
 Dependent Variables: 
 CSR_TWt STK_TWt QUALt CSR_TWt+1 STK_TWt+1 QUALt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)        
LEGAL 0.000 -0.000 0.008* -0.001 0.001 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
ETHICS -0.002 -0.007 0.053** -0.007 -0.018 0.052** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) 
POLICY 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.019** 0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) 
TRANS -0.014*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.017*** -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
CSP 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.015** 0.006 0.025* -0.009 0.012 0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)    
CERT_AGE 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.003    
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)    
TW_AGE -0.008*** -0.008** 0.009    
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)    
FIRM_AGEt+1    -0.001*** -0.001* -0.003*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CERT_AGEt+1    0.010*** 0.007** -0.004 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
TW_AGEt+1    -0.013*** -0.014*** 0.007 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant 0.328*** 0.341*** 2.130*** 0.338*** 0.339*** 1.994*** 
 (0.037) (0.051) (0.077) (0.040) (0.055) (0.091) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,520 776 1,520 1,338 689 1,338 
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.412 0.066 0.456 0.442 0.074 
Notes Table 4.6 reports the results on the OLS analysis of B Corp governance mechanisms on the extent 
and quality of social media engagement in the assessment and the following year. Column 1 to 3 presents 
the results from regressing the assessment year percentage of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets 
(CSR_TWt), percentage of stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets (STAKE_TWt), and the quality of social 
media engagement (QUALt) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (LEGAL), ethical standards (ETHICS), and 
mission-alignment policies (POLICY). Column 4 to 6 presents the results from regressing the following year 
percentage of CSR-related tweets (CSR_TWt+1), firm responsiveness to stakeholder tweets (RESPt+1), and 
the quality of social media engagement (QUALt+1) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (LEGAL), ethical 
standards (ETHICS), and mission-alignment policies (POLICY). The table reports OLS coefficient estimates 
and (in brackets) robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Table 3. *, **, and *** represent 





 Table 4.7 presents an analysis of the effect of B Corp governance 
mechanisms on each individual quality dimension. As indicated in Columns 1 
to 4, LEGAL and ETHICS is significantly and positively (p < .05 and p < .1 
respectively) related to INTENt, suggesting that firms with a higher level of legal 
responsibility and higher level of ethical standards show strong intentions to 
engage with stakeholders on Twitter. POLICY is significantly and positively 
associated with all four dimensions, suggesting that firms with more 
comprehensive mission-alignment policies use more intertextual features, 
show strong intentions to engage with stakeholders, communicate more 
specific information, and cover more CSR topics in social media engagement. 
The effect of B Corp governance mechanisms is also analysed on each 
quality dimension for the following year. Consistent with the findings in the 
assessment year, LEGAL is significantly and positively related to INTENt+1 (p < 
.05). Although ETHICS shows a positive direction on INTENt+1, it is not 
significant. However, it is significantly and positively related to INTERt+1 (p< .05) 
and INFOt+1 (p < .01), suggesting that firms with high ethical standards use 
more intertextual connectivity features and communicate more specific 
information in the year following assessment. POLICY still shows positive 
directions on all four quality dimensions. However, it is only significantly related 
to INTENt+1 (p < .05) and RELEVt+1 (p <.01), suggesting that firms with more 
comprehensive mission-alignment policies show strong intentions to engage 
with stakeholders and cover more CSR topics during the engagement in the 





Table 4.7 OLS Analysis of B Corp Governance Mechani sms on Individual 
Component of Social Media Engagement Quality 
 Dependent Variables: 
  INTERt INTENt INFOt RELEVt INTERt+1 INTENt+1 INFOt+1 RELEVt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEGAL 0.003 0.005** -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
ETHICS 0.016 0.021* 0.004 0.012 0.029** 0.002 0.013*** 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) 
POLICY 0.011** 0.014* 0.005** 0.011* 0.009 0.016** 0.001 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
TRANS -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
CSP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.002 0.002 0.014*** 0.011 -0.003 0.016* 0.016*** 0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) 
FIRM_AGE -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
CERT_AGE 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001     
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)     
TW_AGE 0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.006*     
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)     
FIRM_AGEt+1     -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CERT_AGEt+1     0.001 -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
TW_AGEt+1     0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant 0.851*** 0.360*** 0.156*** 0.763*** 0.759*** 0.325*** 0.148*** 0.762*** 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.013) (0.040) (0.045) (0.051) (0.016) (0.039) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.042 0.122 0.020 0.114 0.039 0.133 0.028 
Notes Table 4.7 reports the results on the OLS analysis of B Corp governance mechanisms on individual 
component of social media engagement quality in the assessment and the following year. Column 1 to 4 
presents the results from regressing current year intertextual connectivity (INTERt), intentionality (INTENTt), 
informativity (INFOt), and relevance (RELEVt) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (LEGAL), ethical standards 
(ETHICS), and mission-alignment policies (POLICY) Column 5 to 8 presents the results from regressing the 
following year intertextual connectivity (INTERt+1), intentionality (INTENt+1), informativity (INFOt+1), and 
relevance (RELEVt+1) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (LEGAL), ethical standards (ETHICS), and mission-
alignment policies (POLICY). The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 






 Additional Analysis 
4.9.4.1 Effect of Different Legal Structures 
Since the Benefit Corporation legislation assigns directors a legal 
obligation to consider stakeholders, it is interesting to examine whether this 
legal form can enhance the extent and quality of social media engagement. 
Table 4.8 presents an analysis of the effect of different legal structures on social 
media engagement extent and quality. BC is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm is also a Benefit Corporation, and zero for others. CHARTER is a 
dummy variable set to one if the firm amended the corporate charter, and zero 
otherwise. The baseline of comparison is those without substantial integration 
of stakeholder interests into their legal structure (i.e. no integration or only 
signing a private agreement). As indicated in the table, BC and CHARTER have 
no effect on CSR_TWt and STAKE_TWt, suggesting that Benefit Corporation 
status and the amendment of corporate charter do not improve the extent of 
social media engagement. Although both BC and CHARTER have a positive 
effect on QUALt, only CHARTER shows a significant relationship, suggesting 






Table 4.8 Additional Analysis – Effect of Different  Legal Structure on 
Social Media Engagement 
 Dependent Variables: 
 CSR_TW STK_TW QUAL 
 (1) (2) (3)     
BC -0.002 -0.012 0.050 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.032) 
CHARTER -0.005 -0.008 0.051* 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.028) 
ETHICS -0.002 -0.007 0.052** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) 
POLICY 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) 
TRANS -0.014*** -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
CSP 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.015** 0.006 0.026* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CERT_AGE 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
TW_AGE -0.008*** -0.008** 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant 0.333*** 0.344*** 2.141*** 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.078) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1,520 776 1,520 
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.411 0.066 
Notes Table 4.8 reports additional analysis results on the effect of different legal structure on the extent 
and quality of social media engagement in the assessment and the following year. BC is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the firm is a benefit corporation and zero others. CHARTER is a dummy 
variable if the firm amended its corporate charter and zero otherwise. Column 1 to 3 presents the results 
from regressing current year percentage of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets (CSR_TW), percentage 
of stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets (STK_TW), and the quality of social media engagement 
(QUAL) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (BC and CHARTER), ethical standards (ETHICS), and mission-
alignment polices (POLICY). The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust 
standard errors. All variables are defined in Table 3. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 





4.9.4.2 Moderating Role of Legal Responsibility and Ethical Programmes 
 Since mission-alignment policies are set and overseen by directors, and 
their actions are guided by the firm’s legal responsibility and ethical standards, 
it is interesting to examine whether legal responsibility and ethical standards 
play a moderating role on the relationship between mission-alignment policies 
and the extent and quality of social media engagement. The following models 
are used to explore this question: 
EXTENTit = β0 + β1BCit + β2ETHICS_DUMit + β3POLICYit + β4BCit×ETHICS_DUMit  
                 + β5BCit×POLICYit +β6ETHICS_DUMit×POLICYit  
                 + β7BCit×ETHICS_DUMit×POLICYit + Σ Controls + Industry Fixed Effect  
                 + Year Fixed Effect + εit
(4.3) 
 
QUALit = β0 + β1BCit + β2ETHICS_DUMit + β3POLICYit + β4BCit×ETHICS_DUMit  
                    + β5BCit×POLICYit +β6ETHICS_DUMit×POLICYit  
                    + β7BCit×ETHICS_DUMit×POLICYit + Σ Controls + Industry Fixed Effect  
                    + Year Fixed Effect + εit 
(4.4) 
 
where BCit is equal to one if the firm is a Benefit Corporation, and zero 
otherwise. ETHICS_DUMit is equal to one if the firm has ethical standards (BIA 
Ethics score greater than zero), and zero otherwise. 
BCit×ETHICS_DUMit×POLICYit is the variable of interest as it shows the 
moderating effect of the firm’s legal responsibility and ethical standards on the 
relationship between the comprehensiveness of mission-alignment policies and 
the extent and quality of social media engagement. 
 As indicated in Table 4.9, only CSR_TWt is weakly and positively related 
to BC×ETHICS_DUM×POLICY, suggesting that when a firm is a Benefit 
Corporation and has ethical standards, more comprehensives mission-
alignment policies lead to more firm-initiated CSR-related tweets. In spite of the 
fact that BC×ETHICS_DUM×POLICY shows a positive direction on both 
STK_TWt and QUALt, the coefficients are not significant, suggesting that 
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Benefit Corporation status and the presence of ethical standards have no 
moderating effect on the extent of stakeholder-initiated engagement and the 
quality of social media engagement.   
 
Table 4.9 Additional Analysis – Moderating Role of Legal Responsibility 
and Ethical Standards 
 Dependent Variables: 
  CSR_TW STK_TW QUAL 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
BC 0.016 0.012 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.052) (0.087) 
ETHICS_DUM 0.010 -0.016 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.063) 
POLICY 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.031*  
(0.007) (0.011) (0.018) 
BC×ETHICS_DUM -0.073 -0.038 -0.135  
(0.049) (0.078) (0.138) 
BC×POLICY -0.010 -0.012 0.007  
(0.011) (0.019) (0.031) 
ETHICS_DUM×POLICY -0.004 -0.009 0.013  
(0.012) (0.016) (0.028) 
BC×ETHICS_DUM×POLICY 0.042* 0.024 0.068  
(0.022) (0.035) (0.057) 
TRANS -0.014*** -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
CSP 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.017** 0.014 0.031* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CERT_AGE 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
TW_AGE -0.008*** -0.008** 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant 0.354*** 0.261*** 2.177*** 
 (0.043) (0.061) (0.090) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1,520 776 1,520 
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.411 0.062 
Notes Table 4.9 reports the additional analysis results on the interaction effect of governance 
mechanisms on the extent and quality of social media engagement. Column 1 to 3 presents the results 
from regressing the assessment year percentage of firm-initiated CSR-related tweets (CSR_TW), 
percentage of stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets (STAKE_TW), and the quality of social media 
engagement (QUAL) on the three-way interactions among B Corp’s BC status (BC), a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of ethical standards (ETHICS_DUM), and mission-alignment policies 
(POLICY). The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors. All 






4.9.4.3 Heckman Model 
Since not all B Corps use Twitter to engage with stakeholders, the 
regression analyses on a subsample may cause potential selection bias 
(Lennox, Francis, & Wang, 2011). Following prior studies (Lee et al., 2013; 
Michelon et al., 2015; Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011), Heckman's (1979) 
two-step model as a robustness test. In the first stage, the Probit model in 
Equation 4.5 is used to calculate the Inverse Mill’s ratio (INVERSE_MILLSit) 
which is then controlled in the OLS model in Equation 4.6 and Equation 4.7: 
TWEETit = γ0 + γ1GOODGOVit + γ2GOODCSRit + γ3FACEBOOKit + γ4SIZEit  
                           + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit 
(4.5) 
 
EXTENTit = β0 + β1LEGALit + β2ETHICSit + β3POLICYit + β4TRANSit + β5CSPit  
                  + β6SIZEit + β7FIRM_AGEit + β8CERT_AGEit + β9TW_AGEit  
                  + β10INVERSE_MILLSit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect  
                  + εit 
(4.6) 
 
QUALit = β0 + β1LEGALit + β2ETHICSit + β3POLICYit + β4TRANSit + β5CSPit  
                  + β6SIZEit + β7FIRM_AGEit + β8CERT_AGEit + β9TW_AGEit  
                  + β10INVERSE_MILLSit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect  
                  + εit 
(4.7) 
 
where TWEETit equals one if a firm has at least one tweet during the year, and 
zero otherwise. GOODGOVit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
governance score is above median, and zero otherwise. GOODCSRit is a 
dummy variable that equals one if CSP is above median, and zero otherwise. 
Since firms may use alternative social media platforms such as Facebook to 
engage with stakeholders, a dummy variable (FACEBOOKit) is included if the 




 Table 4.10 presents the results for the Heckman model. Consistent with 
the main analysis, LEGAL and ETHICS are positively and significantly 
associated with the QUALt, but no significance is found on CST_TWt and 
STK_TWt. POLICY is positively and significantly associated with CSR_TWt, 
STK_TWt, and QUALt. The INVERSE_MILLS is not significant, indicating that 






Table 4.10 Additional Analysis – Heckman Two-Step M odel 
 Dependent Variables: 
  TWEET CSR_TW TWEET STK_TW  TWEET QUAL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
LEGAL  0.000  -0.000  0.008* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
ETHICS  -0.001  -0.007  0.054** 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.021) 
POLICY  0.037***  0.023***  0.040*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.012) 
TRANS  -0.013***  -0.007  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
CSP  0.002***  0.001**  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.012*  -0.001*  0.025 
  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.016) 
CERT_AGE  -0.001***  0.009***  -0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
TW_AGE  0.008***  -0.008**  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
INVERSE_MILLS  0.044  -0.029  0.012 
  (0.029)  (.032)  (0.067) 
SIZE 0.149*** -0.014** 0.158*** 0.003 0.149*** 0.021 
 (0.033) (0.007) (0.039) (0.009) (0.033) (0.016) 
GOODGOV 0.158**  0.167**  0.158**  
 (0.068)  (0.081)  (0.068)  
GOODCSR -0.048  -0.037  -0.048  
 (0.069)  (0.081)  (0.069)  
FACEBOOK 1.067***  1.148***  1.067***  
 (0.079)  (0.096)  (0.079)  
Constant 0.036 0.216*** -0.601 0.192** 0.036 1.989*** 
 (0.311) (0.052) (0.386) (0.077) (0.311) (0.120) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,999 1,520 1,255 776 1,999 1,520 
Notes Table 4.10 reports additional analysis results using Heckman two-step model. The first stage I 
ran a probit model by regressing the likelihood to post at least one tweet during the sample year 
(TWEET) on SIZE, GOODGOV, GOODCSR, and FACEBOOK. GOODGOV is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm governance score is above median and zero otherwise. GOODCSR is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CSP is above median and zero otherwise. FACEBOOK is a dummy 
variable if the firm also has a Facebook account. Then I use the inverse mill ratio obtained from the first 
stage as a control in the second stage regression. Column 1 and 2 presents the Heckman two-step 
model by regressing current year percentage of CSR-related tweets (CSR_TW) on B Corp’s legal 
responsibility (LEGAL), ethical programmes (ETHICS), and mission-alignment policies (POLICY). 
Column 3 and 4 presents the Heckman two-step model by regressing current year percentage of 
stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets (STK_TW) on B Corp’s legal responsibility (LEGAL), ethical 
standards (ETHICS), and mission-alignment policies (POLICY). Column 5 and 6 presents the Heckman 
two-step model by regressing current year social media engagement quality (QUAL) on B Corp’s legal 
responsibility (LEGAL), ethical standards (ETHICS), and mission-alignment policies (POLICY). The 
table reports Probit and OLS coefficient estimates and (in brackets) standard errors. Variables that are 
not defined in this note are summarised in Table 3. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 





  Conclusion, Discussions, Limitations, and Future 
Research 
This study examines the effect of B Corp legal responsibility, ethical 
standards and mission-alignment policies on the extent and quality of social 
media engagement. Since B Corp firms are held accountable to both 
shareholders and stakeholders and face a mission drift risk where the financial 
objective may crowd out CSR objectives, they are expected to undertake more 
extensive and high-quality engagement with stakeholders on social media to 
communicate and seek stakeholder opinions on CSR issues. Focusing on the 
social media engagement activities of a sample of U.S. B Corp firms certified 
between 2014 and 2018 on Twitter, the findings show that although B Corp 
legal responsibility and ethical standards have no effect on the extent of social 
media engagement, both mechanisms improve the quality of social media 
engagement. In particular, quality is mainly driven by the firm’s intention to 
engage with stakeholders on CSR-related issues. These findings indicate that 
firms with high legal responsibility and ethical standards emphasise quality 
rather than the extent of engagement on social media. Furthermore, although 
legal responsibility and ethical standards have no effect on the content of CSR-
related tweets (i.e. using intertextual connectivity features, disclosing specific 
information, and communicating a wide range of CSR topics), both mechanisms 
improve a firm’s intention to engage with stakeholders. These findings are 
consistent with prior studies in which scholars argue that legal and ethical 
mechanisms reflect the tone and principal set at the top (Schwartz et al., 2005) 
and these mechanisms determine the firm’s institutional environment in 
considering stakeholders (Arjoon, 2005; Rossouw, 2005b). As a result, these 
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instruments may have more influence on improving stakeholder engagement at 
an institutional level, rather than on a day-to-day basis (Schwartz et al., 2005). 
Instead of regulating the content of social media engagement, legal and ethical 
mechanisms determine whether the firm takes an active approach in 
stakeholder engagement and mitigating mission drift risk. 
In addition to legal responsibility and ethical standards, firms with more 
comprehensive mission-alignment policies have more firm-initiated CSR-
related tweets and receive more stakeholder-initiated CSR-related tweets. 
These firms also have higher quality social media engagement regarding the 
use of more intertextual connectivity features, showing a strong intention to 
engage with stakeholders, disclose more specific information, and 
communicate a range of CSR topics during the engagement. Since mission-
alignment policies are specifically established to achieve a CSR mission and 
mitigate mission drift risk, they have a more direct impact on social media 
engagement activities than the legal and ethical mechanisms. These findings 
are consistent with prior studies in which the establishment of CSR policies and 
strategies can improve CSR practices and generate positive organisational 
outcomes (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Mallin et al., 2013; Peters & Romi, 2014; 
Shaukat et al., 2016). Overall, the findings show that B Corp governance 
mechanisms can positively influence social media engagement activities and 
enhance stakeholder accountability. 
 Several additional analyses are also performed to reveal more details 
about B Corp governance mechanisms and increase robustness. Firstly, the 
study examines the effect of different legal structures on the extent and quality 
of social media engagement as prior studies suggest that Benefit Corporation 
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status gives the highest legal protection to stakeholder interests (B Lab, 2016; 
Hiller, 2013). However, Benefit Corporation status has no effect on either the 
extent or the quality of social media engagement. In contrast, corporate charter 
amendment has a positive effect on the quality of social media engagement, 
suggesting that firms which amend charter provisions place more emphasis on 
social media engagement quality than those with a term sheet or those that 
have yet to incorporate a legal responsibility. This finding raises an interesting 
question as to whether Benefit Corporation status is a necessary mechanism 
in promoting stakeholder accountability as claimed by B Lab. One view is that 
Benefit Corporation status may play a more important role during major 
corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions in which stakeholder 
welfare is likely to be compromised and directors need to exercise fiduciary duty 
based on stakeholder interests (Alexander, 2017). As a result, Benefit 
Corporate status may be more useful when defending legal claims filed by 
shareholders rather than having a direct impact on stakeholder engagement 
activities (Arjoon, 2005). However, the Benefit Corporation legislation states 
that a director’s fiduciary duty towards stakeholders should be exercised 
whenever they are making business decisions. In this case, directors and 
managers are expected to be active in engaging with stakeholders at all times 
in the day-to-day decision-making process, rather than simply engaging with 
them during major events. Therefore, the current findings suggest that there is 
still a lack of active stakeholder engagement by Benefit Corporations on social 
media both in terms of its extent and quality. Such findings reinforce the 
concerns raised by prior studies which question the sufficiency of legal formats 
in strengthening stakeholder power and meeting firm committed purpose 
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(André, 2012; Levillain & Segrestin, 2019). To prevent mission drift and 
enhance stakeholder accountability, Benefit Corporations need to pay more 
attention to social media engagement activities, ensure stakeholder opinions 
are promptly sought, and information about the firm’s CSR practice is widely 
communicated.   
Next, the study explores the moderating role of legal responsibility and 
ethical standards on the relationship between the comprehensiveness of 
mission-alignment policies and the extent and quality of social media 
engagement. The results show that when firms have a Benefit Corporation 
status and implement ethical standards, the comprehensiveness of mission-
alignment policies leads to more firm-initiated CSR-related tweets. However, no 
interaction effect is found between governance mechanisms and the level of 
stakeholder-initiated engagement and the quality of social media engagement. 
These findings suggest that when a firm’s CSR policies and strategies are 
consistent with its overall institutional environment, a high extent of social media 
engagement can be achieved. Therefore, Benefit Corporation status, ethical 
standards and mission-alignment policies may jointly mitigate mission drift risk 
and improve stakeholder accountability. 
Lastly, a Heckman two-step model is employed to address the issue of 
selection bias. The results are consistent with main findings, thus suggesting 
no presence of selection bias. 
 
Limitations and Further Research Opportunities 
 Like all studies, this paper is not without limitations. Firstly, this study 
only examines the effect of governance mechanisms on the extent and quality 
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of social media engagement within B Corp firms. Whether social media 
engagement activities differ between B Corp firms and non-B Corp peers 
remains unanswered, and future research may provide more insights on this 
question. Second, due to the inaccessibility of B Corp’s financial information, 
this study cannot fully control for the impact of financial performance on the 
extent and quality of social media engagement. Although the range of full-time 
employee numbers is used as a proxy for firm size, this measure is not very 
precise. Future research may consider analysing the relationship between B 
Corp financial performance and social media engagement activities. Lastly, 
although the performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier is considered to be 
reasonable, supervised machine learning still has its limitations in classifying 
tweets, and some classification errors may be still present. Future research may 
propose more advanced methods to improve the performance of machine 





5 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
Opportunities 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the use of social media in 
stakeholder engagement and its implications on stakeholder accountability 
across different types of organisations. To meet this research aim, this study 
focuses on corporations, A-NGOs and hybrid organisations and develop 
research objectives accordingly. First, this study considers how corporations 
use social media to engage with stakeholders and how stakeholders react to 
the disclosure of CSR practices. Second, the study investigates how an 
advocacy NGO uses social media to generate stakeholder support and the 
implications on downward accountability. Lastly, this paper explores the impact 
of B Corp governance mechanisms on social media engagement activities. 
Empirical studies are presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively to address 
these research objectives.   
   
 Research Findings and Implications 
Chapter 2 examines stakeholder perceptions regarding the legitimation 
strategies employed in corporate CSR disclosures on Facebook. By focusing 
on the dynamic interactions between corporate disclosure strategies and 
stakeholder subsequent reactions at a Facebook message level, it is found that 
stakeholders exhibit diverse reactions towards corporate CSR hypocrisy and 
façade disclosures, and the intensity and sentiment of their reactions also have 
an effect on corporate post-disclosure responses to stakeholder comments. 
Overall, the results suggest that corporations employ hypocrisy and façade 
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strategies in social media CSR disclosures to manage stakeholder perceptions, 
and there is a disengagement between companies and stakeholders who 
express concerns or criticism about corporate CSR practices, as companies 
only engage with stakeholders who exhibit positive reactions. The chapter 
concludes that corporations mainly use social media to maintain legitimacy 
instead of improving transparency and accountability. 
Chapter 3 examines how A-NGOs communicate advocacy information 
with stakeholders in social media to attract their engagement, and whether such 
engagement can obtain large-scale stakeholder support beyond social media 
platforms. By focusing on the Greenpeace “Save the Arctic” campaign and its 
social media engagement at the message-, account-, and network-level, the 
findings show that Greenpeace communicates advocacy information that 
appeals to logic and emotions to attract stakeholder engagement on social 
media, and the effectiveness and dissemination of advocacy information can 
help Greenpeace obtain large-scale stakeholder support beyond social media 
platforms. Overall, this chapter highlights the potential of social media in helping 
A-NGOs identify and engage with stakeholders and enhance downward 
accountability. 
Chapter 4 examines the effect of B Corp governance mechanisms on 
social media engagement activities. More specifically, this study investigates 
the effect of B Corp legal responsibility, ethical standards and mission-
alignment policies on the extent and quality of social media engagement. The 
results show that B Corp legal responsibility and ethical standards have no 
effect on the extent of social media engagement, but they improve the quality 
of social media engagement. In contrast, mission-alignment policies improve 
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both the extent and quality of social media engagement. Further analyses 
reveal that Benefit Corporation status does not lead to any improvement on 
social media engagement activities, but Benefit Corporation status and the 
presence of ethical standards can moderate the positive relationship between 
mission-alignment policies and the extent of social media engagement. Overall, 
the chapter concludes that B Corp governance mechanisms play a positive role 
in improving social media engagement activities and promoting greater 
stakeholder accountability, but some challenges remain for Benefit 
Corporations. 
 
 Implications for Relevant Organisations 
These findings provide important implications for relevant organisations. 
For corporations, the findings suggest that despite the dialogic feature of social 
media, they are still being used to maintain legitimacy rather than enhance 
transparency and accountability to stakeholders. Managers should not over-
use hypocrisy talk and decisions, or reputational façade strategies in CSR 
disclosures to manage stakeholder perceptions, as the results reveal that 
divergent stakeholder interests are also accommodated by the presence of 
actions as well as the demonstration of progression in CSR commitments. The 
mere use of talk, decisions and reputational façade may increase the risk of 
exposing hypocrisy and hindering stakeholder accountability.   
For A-NGOs, the findings show that social media may facilitate large-
scale stakeholder engagement, and social media engagement measures such 
as emoticons, shares and comments may be used as indicators for accounting 
the impact of advocacy campaigns and evaluating campaign outcomes. 
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However, NGOs should bear in mind that over-emphasis on the quantitative 
measurement of social media indicators may lead to myopia where the 
fundamental purpose for stakeholder engagement and its impact on long-term 
mission achievements are undermined. In addition, NGOs should always 
communicate authentic and fair information on social media to help 
stakeholders assess and make better decisions on advocated issues. 
For hybrid organisations, the results show that B Corp governance plays 
an important role in improving the extent and quality of social media 
engagement activities. Therefore, B Corp should establish good practice in 
corporate governance to ensure stakeholders are sufficiently informed and 
engaged so that mission drift risk can be mitigated. The results also reveal that 
there is still a lack of stakeholder engagement in Benefit Corporations. Since 
directors and managers have an obligation to consider stakeholder interests in 
this legal setting, the lack of stakeholder engagement may cause an under-
representation of stakeholder voices during the decision-making process. 
Benefit Corporation managers should further improve social media 
engagement activities so that their fiduciary duties to stakeholders can be 
fulfilled.  
 
 Research Limitations 
There are several limitations in the study. Firstly, Chapter 2 only focuses 
on the largest corporations in the U.S.; it is less clear how corporations in other 
countries use social media to engage with stakeholders on CSR issues. Future 
research may investigate social media engagement activities in a different 
country setting or even on an international basis to understand the effect of 
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country-level characteristics such as culture, governance systems and 
institutional views towards corporate social responsibility (Matten & Moon, 
2008) on social media engagement activities.  
Secondly, Chapter 3 only focuses on a single A-NGO and the results may 
not be generalizable to other A-NGOs in social media. Future research may use 
a bigger sample size and examine whether the effectiveness of advocacy 
information in attracting stakeholder engagement can lead to any real effect 
beyond social media platforms (e.g. improvement in the practices of targeted 
organisations). Further studies may also examine the inter-organisational effect 
on information dissemination among A-NGOs to better understand the concept 
of switching capacity.   
Thirdly, due to data availability, the models used in Chapter 4 have limited 
controls for B Corp financial performance. Future studies may provide more 
insight into the relationship between B Corp financial performance and social 
media engagement activities. In addition, Chapter 4 only focuses on social 
media engagement activities among B Corp firms, while it is unknown how 
these activities differ from non-B Corp peers. Future studies may compare the 
extent and quality of social media engagement activities between hybrid and 
traditional corporations to provide more insights about the benefits of B Corp 
certification.   
Lastly, this thesis uses dictionary-based textual analysis and machine-
learning-based textual analysis to identify and analyse relevant social media 
messages. While the validation process reveals reasonable performance for 
both techniques, some inherent limitations in algorithm specification and 
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classification errors are still present. Future research may employ more 
advanced algorithms to further improve the performance of textual analysis. 
    
 Future Research Opportunities 
While the focus of this thesis is on the organisational use of social media 
and stakeholder reactions to the information communicated during the 
engagement process, it does not examine how stakeholders use social media 
to make organisations more accountable. Since social media are famous for 
features such as high interactivity, high autonomy and wide dissemination, 
stakeholders can also produce, disseminate and debate on issues regarding a 
firm’s social and environmental practice. While several studies have examined 
the word-of-mouth effect of social media on predicting corporate quarterly 
earnings and financial performance (Bartov et al., 2017; Hales et al., 2018), the 
ability of stakeholder-initiated messages in influencing corporate CSR policies 
and practices remains unknown (Blankespoor, 2018). Therefore, it would be 
interesting to examine the impact of social media on corporate social and 
environmental responsibility from a stakeholder perspective. 
Because social media users enjoy high autonomy in producing and 
disseminating information, it is inevitable that some of the messages about 
organisations are subjective and biased (Etter et al., 2019). These messages 
may have a negative impact on stakeholders’ assessment of organisational 
performance and organisational reputation. Therefore, it is also important to 
understand the characteristics of credible information on social media, its 
impact on organisational practices and reputation, as well as its impact on 
stakeholder decision-making. Furthermore, it is also interesting to examine 
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managerial response to biased or even misleading information about corporate 
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Appendix A List of Sample Companies 
Firm Ticker Industry Sector Observations % 
AbbVie Inc. ABBV Biotechnology 66 0.31 
Abbott Laboratories ABT Healthcare Equipment 224 1.06 
Accenture plc ACN IT Consulting and Other Services 610 2.88 
American International Group, Inc. AIG Multi-line Insurance 370 1.75 
The Allstate Corporation ALL Property and Casualty Insurance 403 1.9 
Amazon.com, Inc. AMZN Internet and Direct Marketing Retail 771 3.64 
American Express Company AXP Consumer Finance 185 0.87 
The Boeing Company BA Aerospace and Defence 103 0.49 
Bank of America Corporation BAC Diversified Banks 568 2.68 
Biogen Inc. BIIB Biotechnology 160 0.76 
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation BK Asset Management and Custody Banks 172 0.81 
BlackRock, Inc. BLK Asset Management and Custody Banks 28 0.13 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY Pharmaceuticals 201 0.95 
Citigroup Inc. C Diversified Banks 85 0.4 
Caterpillar Inc. CAT Construction Machinery and Heavy Trucks 214 1.01 
Celgene Corporation CELG Biotechnology 208 0.98 
Comcast Corporation CMCSA Cable and Satellite 61 0.29 
Capital One Financial Corporation COF Consumer Finance 161 0.76 
ConocoPhillips COP Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 157 0.74 
Costco Wholesale Corporation COST Hypermarkets and Super Centers 586 2.77 
Cisco Systems, Inc. CSCO Communications Equipment 641 3.03 
CVS Health Corporation CVS Drug Retail 8 0.04 
Chevron Corporation CVX Integrated Oil and Gas 168 0.79 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD Diversified Chemicals 139 0.66 
The Walt Disney Company DIS Movies and Entertainment 304 1.44 
The Dow Chemical Company DOW Diversified Chemicals 197 0.93 
Duke Energy Corporation DUK Electric Utilities 479 2.26 
Emerson Electric Co. EMR Electrical Components and Equipment 235 1.11 
Ford Motor Company F Automobile Manufacturers 246 1.16 
Facebook, Inc. FB Internet Software and Services 5 0.02 
FedEx Corporation FDX Air Freight and Logistics 151 0.71 
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. FOXA Movies and Entertainment 212 1 
General Electric Company GE Industrial Conglomerates 427 2.02 
General Motors Company GM Automobile Manufacturers 265 1.25 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. GS Investment Banking and Brokerage 74 0.35 
Halliburton Company HAL Oil and Gas Equipment and Services 280 1.32 
The Home Depot, Inc. HD Home Improvement Retail 132 0.62 
International Business Machines Corporation IBM IT Consulting and Other Services 280 1.32 
Intel Corporation INTC Semiconductors 495 2.34 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ Pharmaceuticals 183 0.86 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM Diversified Banks 154 0.73 
The Kraft Heinz Company KHC Packaged Foods and Meats 708 3.34 
Kinder Morgan, Inc. KMI Oil and Gas Storage and Transportation 195 0.92 
The Coca-Cola Company KO Soft Drinks 228 1.08 
Eli Lilly and Company LLY Pharmaceuticals 383 1.81 
Lockheed Martin Corporation LMT Aerospace and Defence 588 2.78 
Lowe's Companies, Inc. LOW Home Improvement Retail 185 0.87 
Mastercard Incorporated MA Data Processing and Outsourced Services 268 1.27 
Mondelez International, Inc. MDLZ Packaged Foods and Meats 152 0.72 
Medtronic plc MDT Healthcare Equipment 116 0.55 
MetLife, Inc. MET Life and Health Insurance 131 0.62 
3M Company MMM Industrial Conglomerates 194 0.92 
Monsanto Company MON Fertilizers and Agricultural Chemicals 235 1.11 
Merck & Co., Inc. MRK Pharmaceuticals 466 2.2 
Microsoft Corporation MSFT Systems Software 692 3.27 
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE Electric Utilities 22 0.1 
NIKE, Inc. NKE Footwear 53 0.25 
Oracle Corporation ORCL Systems Software 465 2.2 
The Priceline Group Inc. PCLN Internet and Direct Marketing Retail 183 0.86 
Pepsico, Inc. PEP Soft Drinks 168 0.79 
Pfizer Inc. PFE Pharmaceuticals 688 3.25 
PayPal Holdings, Inc. PYPL Data Processing and Outsourced Services 49 0.23 
QUALCOMM Incorporated QCOM Semiconductors 185 0.87 
Raytheon Company RTN Aerospace and Defence 607 2.87 
Starbucks Corporation SBUX Restaurants 22 0.1 
The Southern Company SO Electric Utilities 233 1.1 
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Simon Property Group, Inc. SPG Retail REITs 185 0.87 
AT&T Inc. T Integrated Telecommunication Services 339 1.6 
Target Corporation TGT General Merchandise Stores 84 0.4 
Time Warner Inc. TWX Movies and Entertainment 237 1.12 
Texas Instruments Incorporated TXN Semiconductors 679 3.21 
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated UNH Managed Healthcare 206 0.97 
Union Pacific Corporation UNP Railroads 257 1.21 
United Parcel Service, Inc. UPS Air Freight and Logistics 145 0.69 
U.S. Bancorp USB Diversified Banks 217 1.03 
United Technologies Corporation UTX Aerospace and Defence 200 0.94 
Verizon Communications Inc. VZ Integrated Telecommunication Services 180 0.85 
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. WBA Drug Retail 536 2.53 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC Diversified Banks 101 0.48 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. WMT Hypermarkets and Super Centers 112 0.53 
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM Integrated Oil and Gas 64 0.3 





Appendix B Dictionary for Identifying CSR Facebook Posts 
Categories Lexicons 
Environmental air; animal; animals; bees; benthos; bionomics; bioclimatic; biodegradable; 
biodiversities; biodiversity; biogenic; biome; bioremediation; biosphere; bird; birds; 
carbon; carcinogenic; cfc; clean; cleaner; cleanest; cleaning; cleans; climate; co2; 
composting; conservancy; conservation; conservationist; conservations; 
contaminate; contamination; cooling; deforest; deforests; desertification; dioxides; 
discharge; discharges; earth; ecologies; ecology; ecosystem; ecosystems; effluents; 
electricities; electricity; emission; emissions; endangered; energy; environment; 
environmental; eutrophic; eutrophication; extinction; fish; footprint; footprints; forest; 
forests; gas; gases; ghg; green; ground; habitat; habitats; heating; heatings; hydric; 
incineration; insect; insects; lake; lakes; landfill; marine; material; materials; msc; 
natural; nature; nitrogen; nuclear; ocean; oceans; ods; oxides; ozone; ozonsphere; 
pathogens; pests; planet; pollutants; pollute; pollutes; pollution; protected; rainwater; 
recyclable; recycle; recycled; recycles; recycling; rehabilitate; rehabilitates; 
remediation; renew; renewable; renews; reserve; reserves; reused; river; rivers; 
solar; species; steam; sulfur; sustainability; sustainable; toxic; unforest; warming; 
waste; water; wetlands; wildlife 
  
Diversity african; black; chinese; discriminate; discrimination; diverse; diversity; equal; 
equality; ethnic; ethnicdiversity; ethnicity; female; females; feminine; gender; 
genderdiversity; girl; girls; indian; jew; lady; male; males; man; men; minorities; 
minority; negro; racial; sex; sexual; woman; women; woman; women 
  
Human Rights biased; child; dictator; disability; disable; discrimination; forced; freedom; gay; gays; 
genocide; homosexual; human; inclusion; inclusive; indigenous; labor; labour; 
lesbian; lesbians; lgbt; lgbtq; prejudice; pride; racism; rights; slave; slavery 
  
Employees bargaining; benefits; care; career; careers; collective; compensate; compensated; 
compensation; compensations; crew; crews; development; developments; disease; 
diseases; employ; employabilities; employability; employee; employees; 
employment; employments; engagement; engagements; fatalities; health; injuries; 
injury; intern; internship; internships; involvement; involvements; job; jobs; labor; 
labour; maternal; maternity; occupation; occupational; paid; parental; paternal; 
paternity; pay; pays; profession; professional; remunerated; remuneration; 
remunerations; retire; retirement; safe; safety; salaries; salary; satisfaction; skill; 
skills; staff; team; teams; training; trainings; unions; wage; wages; welfare; worker; 
workers; working conditions; workplace; workplaces 
  
Community aids; charitable; charities; charity; communities; community; contribute; contribution; 
contributions; donate; donated; donation; donations; educate; education; education; 
educational; educations; engagement; famine; fight; fund; funding; funds; hunger; 
local; medical; medicine; medicines; malnutrition; obesities; obesity; people; 
philanthropic; philanthropy; poverty; public; school; schools; social; societal; society; 
sponsor; sponsored; sponsoring; sponsorship; stem; student; students; veteran; 
veterans; voluntary; volunteer; volunteered; volunteering; volunteers; welfare 
  
Product product; products; service; services; recalls; components; component; production; 
process; raw; testing; tests; test; customer; customers; privacy; confidentiality; 
confidential; quality; qualities; client; clients 
  
Governance accountability; accountable; acquisition; annual; corrupt; corruption; csr; disclosure; 
disclosures; ethic; ethical; ethics; governance; gri; guideline; guidelines; market; 
missions; performance; policies; policy; board; directors; ceo; report; reporting; 
reports; strategies; strategy; transparency; transparent; visions; volatility; citizen; 
citizens; citizenship; citizenships; responsibilities; responsibility; political 
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Appendix C Guidelines on Coding CSR Organised Hypoc risy 
and Façade Disclosures 
Organised Hypocrisy 
Talk 
• The message shows a statement on company’s commitments, visions, missions, goals, 
and values regarding its economic, social, and environmental issues. 
• The message shows a quote from a stakeholder of organisation (e.g. managers, 
employees, or customers etc.) regarding company’s economic, social, and environmental 
issues. 
• The message shows past experience or a story of a stakeholder of organisation (e.g. 
managers, employees, or customers etc.) regarding company’s economic, social, and 
environmental issues. 
• The message shows an organisational activity without supplying details such as parties 
involved, time, location, contents of activities, quantitative measures 
• The message demonstrates a history of activities done by the organisation. 
• The message invites stakeholders to participate in the conversation. 
• The message is often written in present tense. 
• Keywords example: committed, commitments, vision, mission, goal, value, believe, 
recognise, acknowledge, emphasise, understand, know, aware, always, why, say, speak, 
talk, etc. 
Decision 
• The message shows an organisation’s decisions on economic, social, and environmental 
policies, strategies, and practices. 
• The message shows an organisation’s activity that is scheduled in the future. The 
message often contains a future date and time. 
• The message outlines an organisation objective or targets for the future 
• The message is often written in future tense, and the subject of the sentence is the 
organisation. 
• Keywords example: will, won’t, would, going to, schedule, plan, decide, determine, 
pledge (verb), arrange, introduce, reveal, intend, propose, choose, agree, disagree, etc. 
Action 
• The message shows an organisation’s actions and performance on economic, social, 
and environmental issues. 
• The message is often written in continuous tense, past tense, or perfect tense, and the 
subject of the sentence is the organisation. 
• The message shows an organisation’s activity with factual evidence, such as parties 
involved, time, location, contents of activities, quantitative measures 
• Keywords example: accomplish, achieve, implement, obtain, succeed, establish, reach, 
realise, acquire, collaborate, collaboration, partner, partnership, agreement, contract, 
donate, donation, volunteer, etc. 
Organisational Façade 
Rational  
• It presents a façade that the management is running the firm in a rational manner with 
objectives to sustain firm’s growth, create opportunities, increase efficiencies, reduce 
costs, maximise revenues, profits, and shareholder values.  It highlights that managers 
will consider any specific demand based on a cost and benefit assessment and ensure 
shareholders’ value is sustained. 
Keywords example: growth, opportunity, risk, threat, efficiency, cost, benefit, profit, revenue, 
shareholder value, merger, acquisition, economy, economic, etc. 
Progressive 
• It presents a façade that the organisation is tackling economic, social and environmental 
issues and close gaps through continuous investments, carrying out researching 
activities, presenting research results at conferences, innovating new approaches, 
implementing state-of-the-art technologies, collaborating and forming partnerships with 
other organisations in developing new initiatives and programs (excluding volunteering 
and donation programs).  
• It also presents a façade that the organisation is progressing, transforming, and evolving 
by showing future objectives and targets, changes undergoing over the past years, and 
targets achieved recently.  
• Keywords example: investment, research, innovation, technology, collaboration, 
partnership, initiative, programs, progress, change, transform, evolve, etc. 
Reputational 
• This façade displays companies’ ethical principles, codes of conduct, awards, quality of 
products and services. 
• It presents the organisation in a positive manner which is often accompanied by symbols, 
stories, and attributes that can convince stakeholders that organisations are acting 
ethically. Being included in sustainability index and rankings and receiving awards in 
social and environmental areas can be considered as reputational symbols.  
• It also shows organisation engagement in philanthropic activities such as volunteering 






Appendix D Examples of Hypocrisy and Façades Strate gies 
Strategies  Example  
Organised hypocrisy  
 
Talk disclosure Happy World Environment Day today and every day! We're committed to 
fostering sustainable growth for our company, clients and in our 
communities. Learn more:  http://bddy.me/1ta6zmL #WED2016 (Accenture, 
5th June 2016) 
Decision disclosure We're looking to a cleaner future after increasing our 2020 renewable energy 
goal by 33 percent. (Duke Energy, 21st June 2016) 
Action disclosure Building on the legacy of its groundbreaking work in HIV/AIDS, the BMS 
Foundation is leveraging the HIV experience and infrastructure to create 
Global HOPE, pediatric hematology-oncology initiative in partnership with 




Rational façade Learn how we all can enjoy both a clean and safe environment and 
abundant and affordable energy: http://bit.ly/29ljQ68 (Kinder Morgan, 26th 
September 2016) 
Progressive façade We're in the business of progress. See how we strive to create prosperity in 
the communities we call home. (Chevron, 6th June 2016) 
Reputational façade We're committed to diversity and inclusion for all and we're proud to 






Appendix E Sample Facebook Accounts 
International and Regional Offices 
Offices Account Name (1) Language No. STA Posts Fans Size (2) 
International greenpeace.international English 256 2903428 
Save the Arctic arctic.rising(3) English/Spanish 1006 1634799 
Arabic GreenpeaceAR Arabic 133 3469475 
East Asia gpchina English 30 16684 
Southeast Asia GreenpeaceSEA English 10 1104 
  
National and Territorial Offices  
Congo GreenpeaceAfrique French 9 64499 
Senegal GreenpeaceAfrique French 9 64499 
South Africa GreenpeaceAfrica English 46 213782 
Argentina GreenpeaceArg Spanish 233 2965856 
Australia greenpeaceaustraliapacific English 137 364825 
Austria GreenpeaceAT German 164 105086 
Belgium greenpeace.belgium Dutch/French 98 133186 
Brazil GreenpeaceBrasil Portuguese 99 3276714 
Bulgaria greenpeacebg Bulgarian 47 15333 
Canada greenpeace.canada English/French 448 212765 
Chile greenpeace.chile Spanish 240 731905 
Colombia greenpeaceencolombia Spanish 269 639954 
Croatia greenpeace.hr Croatian 20 15955 
Czech Republic greenpeace.cz Czech 197 56169 
Denmark greenpeacedanmark Danish 338 61410 
Fiji greenpeaceaustraliapacific English 137 364825 
Finland greenpeacesuomi Finnish 421 60488 
France greenpeacefrance French 43 560624 
Germany greenpeace.de German 219 293158 
Greece greenpeace.gr Greek 163 410959 
Greenland greenpeacedanmark Greenlandic/Danish 338 61410 
Hong Kong greenpeace.china Chinese 204 173777 
Hungary greenpeace.hu Hungarian 51 110844 
India greenpeaceindia English 17 344783 
Indonesia GreenpeaceIndonesia Indonesian 22 779165 
Israel greenpeace.il Hebrew 103 145176 
Italy GreenpeaceItalia Italian 80 699468 
Japan GreenpeaceJapan Japanese 66 147829 
Korea greenpeacekorea Korean 181 196939 
Luxembourg greenpeaceluxembourg French 23 12516 
Mexico greenpeacemexico Spanish 170 955596 
Netherlands greenpeacenederland Dutch 126 124212 
New Zealand greenpeace.nz English 426 196543 
Norway greenpeacenorge Norweign 329 30172 
Papua New Guinea greenpeaceaustraliapacific English 137 364825 
Peru greenpeacepe Spanish 99 6384 
Philippines greenpeaceph English 67 296375 
Poland greenpeacepl Polish 26 195070 
Romania greenpeace.ro Romanian 40 82091 
Russia GreenpeaceRussia Russian 183 104749 
Slovakia Greenpeace.sk Slovak 26 31385 
Slovenia greenpeacesi Slovene 62 8321 
Spain greenpeace.spain Spanish 146 571306 
Sweden greenpeace.sverige Swedish 259 124207 
Switzerland greenpeace.ch German 83 57683 
Taiwan greenpeace.org.tw Chinese 177 485640 
Thailand greenpeaceseath Thai 79 310096 
Turkey Greenpeace.Akdeniz.Turkiye Turkish 127 1587914 
UK greenpeaceuk English 207 684355 
USA greenpeaceusa English 331 648034 
Total   8336(4)  
(1) Some Facebook accounts are used for more than one nation/territory.  
(2) Fan size is the number of fans following each Greenpeace Facebook account as of 13th February 2018. 
(3) The account name has been changed to peoplevsoil  
(4) After removing duplicate posts that come from shared Facebook accounts, the final sample constitutes 8,336 unique of Facebook 




Appendix F English Arctic-Related Dictionary Used f or 
Selecting STA Facebook Messages 
Arctic Lexicons 
alaska, alaskan, amsterdam, arctic, baffin, bear#, beluga, beringia, blast#, bowhead, 
bowheadwhal#, canada, chevron, circumpolar, copenhagen, crude, denmark, diesel, drift#, drill#, 
driller#, drillship#, emma, explor#, extract#, exxon#, exxonmobil#, fasiata, finland, finnish, 
finnmark, firstarcticoil, fossil, fox#, freethearct, freez#, frozen, fuel, gas, gazprom, glacier, 
greenland, groenlandicus, harp, historiophoca, ice, iceberg, icebreak#, icecrust, iceland, ici, 
indigen#, inuit, lagopus, lego, maritimus, melt#, moscow, narwhal#, noarcticoil, nordic, 
northward, norway, norwegian, obama, odobenus, offshor#, oil, oslo, pagophilus, 
peoplevsarcticoil, peoplevsoil, petroleum, polar, pole, porpois, reindeer, ribbon, rig#, rosmarus, 
russia, russian, savethearct#, wwwsavethearcticorg, scandinavia, seal#, seismic, shell, siberia, 
siberian, snow#, spill, statoil, stockholm, svalbard, sweden, switzerland, thompson, trump, 
tundra, ursus, walrus#, whale# 




Appendix G Performance of Textual Analysis on Selec ting STA Facebook Posts  
Language Source N Accuracy Error Recall Precision S pecificity F1 
Inter -coder  
Agreement 
English Crowdsourcing 441 0.95 0.05 0.73 0.84 0.98 0.78 96.97 
Spanish Crowdsourcing 210 0.96 0.04 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.94 96.83 
German Crowdsourcing 120 0.97 0.03 0.82 0.93 0.99 0.88 96.97 
Others Manual 300 0.96 0.04 0.78 0.81 0.98 0.79 - 
This table presents the performance of textual analysis on selecting messages related to STA campaign. Accuracy measures the percentage of posts that are 
correctly selected by the program. It is computed by (Σ True Positive + Σ True Negative) / Total Population. Error measures the percentage of posts that are 
falsely selected by the program. It is computed by (Σ False Positive + Σ False Negative) / Total Population. Recall measures the number of correct posts 
divided by the number of posts that should have been returned. It is computed by Σ True Positive / (Σ True Positive + Σ False Negative). Precision measures 
the number of correct posts divided by the total number of posts returned. It is computed by Σ True Positive / (Σ True Positive + Σ False Positive). Specificity 
measures the number of false posts divided by the number of posts that should not have been returned. It is computed by Σ True Negative / (Σ True Negative 
+ Σ False Positive). F1 score considers both precision and recall and is computed as 2× (precision × recall) / (precision + recall). Inter-coder agreement 
measures the degree of agreement among coders. 
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Appendix H CSR-Related Tweets Coding Scheme 
CSR Topics  Coding Items  Source  
Governance (GOV) • Firm ethics, missions, and values 
• Stakeholder engagement 
• Materiality assessment  
• Corporate reporting 
• Information for shareholders (e.g. 
financial performance, corporate events) 
• Corporate governance (founder, co-
founder, CEO, board of directors, audit, 
etc.) 
• Anti-corruption 
• General information on CSR, SDG, or 
ESG 
• B Lab 
Assessment 
• GRI G4 
Employees (EMP) • Employee wages and benefits 
• Employee welfare, safety, health and 
wellness 
• Training and development 
• Internships 
• Parental leave 
• Employee engagement 
• B Lab 
• GRI G4 
Community (COM) • Diversity, inclusion, & equality 
• Charitable donations & partnerships 
• Community engagement / discussions 
(e.g. attending talks, events, 
conferences, and workshops) 
• Event sponsorships 
• Support local neighbourhood & local 
businesses 
• Child labour 
• Human rights 
• Education engagement 
• B Lab 
• GRI G4 
Economic impacts 
(ECO) 
• Job creation 
• Local purchasing and hiring policies 
• Supply chain management & supplier 
engagement 
• Socially Responsible Investments & 
Impact Investment 
• Sustainable Financing & financial 
inclusions 
• Foreign aids / investment 
• Economic development 
• Affordable housing 
• Poverty & low-income groups 
• B Lab 
• GRI G4 
• Gomez-
Carrasco et al 
2016 
• Gomez-
Carrasco et al 
2017 
Environment (ENV) • Environmental policy 
• Pollution control 
• Environmental regulations / certifications 
• Capital expenditures for pollution control 
• B Lab 
• GRI G4 




• Carbon Emission 
• Renewable energy use/installation 
• Environmental remediation 
• Waste & Recycling 
• Water, Air, Land Management 
• Agriculture & food system 
• Biodiversity 
• Green constructions / materials 
• Sustainable sourcing 




• Animal welfare 
• Locally-sourced / traceable products 
• Fair trade 
• Organic food 
• Food Quality and Safety 
• Healthy product options (vegan) 
• Product Labelling 
• Health supplements, nutrition, and 
ingredients 
• Food allergies and intolerances (gluten 
free) 
• Customer health and well-being 
• Use of Biotechnology (e.g. antibiotics, 
pesticides, GMO, etc.) 
• Low-alcohol content product options 
• Eco-products / services 
• Responsible marketing 
• Customer privacy 
• B Lab 
• GRI G4 




Aerts, W., & Cormier, D. (2009). Media legitimacy and corporate environmental 
communication. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(1), 1–
27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2008.02.005 
B Lab. (2019). The B Impact Assessment. Retrieved 19 January 2019, 
from https://bimpactassessment.net/ 
Cho, C. H., & Patten, D. M. (2007). The role of environmental disclosures as tools of legitimacy: 
A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(7–8), 639–
647. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.09.009 
Cuganesan, S., Guthrie, J., & Ward, L. (2010). Examining CSR disclosure strategies within the 
Australian food and beverage industry. Accounting Forum, 34(3), 169–
183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2010.07.001 
Gómez-Carrasco, P., Guillamon-Saorin, E., & Garcia Osma, B. (2016). The illusion of CSR: 
drawing the line between core and supplementary CSR. Sustainability Accounting, 
Management and Policy Journal, 7(1), 125–151. https://doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-12-2014-0083 
Gómez-Carrasco, P., Guillamon-Saorin, E., & Garcia Osma, B. (2017). Stakeholder 
(Dis)Engagement in Social Media: The Case of Twitter and the Banking Industry. Presented at 
the 40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, Valencia. 
GRI. (2018). Global Reporting Initiatives G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Retrieved 
from https://www2.globalreporting.org/standards/g4/Pages/default.aspx  
257 
 
Appendix I Illustrative Examples of B Corp Tweets 
1) Examples of Firm-Initiated CSR-Related Tweets with High Quality Social 
Media Engagement 





Example tweet with high intertextual 
connectivity and high intentionality 
 
Example tweet with high informativity 
 





2) Examples of Stakeholder-Initiated CSR-Related Tweets 
@AlphaVerde fund top 1% of funds in its category, according to 
@MorningstarInc Sustainability Rating. 5 Globes!!!!! (@shafroth, 6 
April 2016) 
@AlterEcoSF @FairTradeUSA yes we can! #BeFair (@is4drea12, 
9 October 2015) 
Today's final #mouselink workshop of the 2015 spring term 
sponsored by @EmmysOrganics. Thank you, everyone! 
(@mouselink, 15 May 2015) 
OTA kicks off #biofach2015! 14 suppliers promoting USDA organic 
@lukesorganic @earthcircle @gomacro @goodcleanlove 
(@OrganicTrade, 11 February 2015) 
@kleankanteen @GoalZeroSolar @KEEN @IbexBuzz Pleas share! 
New blog post: #Oceans & #PlasticPollution Connect Us All. 
http://seatrash.blogspot.com/2014/01/what-do-china-hawaii-
washington-and.html (@teamOSOM, 2 January 2014) 
 
